Creation and Control in Business Ecosystems by Fox, Paul Brian
Page 1 of 245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCTORAL THESIS  
 
 
Title   Creation and Control in Business Ecosystems 
 
Presented by  Paul Fox 
 
Centre  ESADE Business School  
 
Department Departamento de Política de Empresa, Recursos Humanos y 
Sistemas de Información. 
Supervised by  Dr. Jonathan Wareham   
Page 2 of 245 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First of all, I would like to express my eternal gratitude to my thesis supervisor 
Jonathan Wareham for his help during what was a long and often complicated and 
frustrating process. Thanks so much for your support throughout, including help with 
financing, including me on critical projects like 3gERP, and helping me find a 
coherent structure to a thesis consisting of two very different data sets and multiple 
theoretical perspectives. 
I am grateful to the ESADE Business School, especially to Núria Agell, Josep 
Lluis Cano, Joan Rodón, and Xavier Busquets for their help throughout, even though 
there were often long pauses between contacts due to my full-time work.  
Finally, and most importantly, I would also like to thank my family for their 
support. I know sometimes it seemed like it would never end, but sometimes it takes 
time for the right path to reveal itself. Still, thank you to my wonderful wife Marime 
and my parents for their help and patience. 
 
Page 3 of 245 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................2 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................10 
DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS .................................................................................12 
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................15 
1.1 Thesis Structure .......................................................................................18 
1.2 Transaction Cost Economics ....................................................................21 
1.2.1 Hybrid Organizational Forms and Networks ........................................... 22 
1.2.2 Motives for choosing hybrid/network organizational forms .................. 26 
1.3 Ecosystems ...............................................................................................28 
1.4 Platforms ..................................................................................................30 
1.5 Summary of Subsequent Chapters ..........................................................34 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: Governance mechanisms in affiliate marketing programs in 
Spain 35 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: Control in technology ecosystems ......................................... 37 
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Rationalization of empirical analysis and theory 
development............................................................................................ 38 
2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN INTERNET-BASED AFFILIATE MARKETING 
PROGRAMS IN SPAIN .........................................................................................40 
2.1 Introduction: ............................................................................................40 
2.2 Research background ...............................................................................43 
2.2.1 Affiliate Marketing ................................................................................... 43 
2.2.2 Types of Affiliate Programs ..................................................................... 44 
2.2.3 Affiliate Marketing Channel Structure ..................................................... 45 
Page 4 of 245 
 
2.2.4 Affiliate Business Models ......................................................................... 46 
2.2.5 Affiliate Promotion Tools ......................................................................... 47 
2.2.6 Commission Pricing.................................................................................. 48 
2.2.7 Governance Mechanisms: Agency Theory and Transaction Cost 
Analysis Theory ........................................................................................ 48 
2.3 Data Collection and analysis ....................................................................52 
2.4 Results ......................................................................................................56 
2.4.1 Formal Contracts ..................................................................................... 56 
2.4.2 Partner Selection ..................................................................................... 58 
2.4.3 Incentives ................................................................................................. 60 
2.4.4 Monitoring ............................................................................................... 62 
2.5 Discussion .................................................................................................65 
2.5.1 Summary of Findings ............................................................................... 65 
2.5.2 Implications for managers of affiliate marketing programs .................... 66 
2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................66 
3 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN AN ERP-VENDOR ECOSYSTEM .......................69 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................69 
3.2 Background Literature .............................................................................74 
3.2.1 Platforms ................................................................................................. 74 
3.2.2 Control and Governance .......................................................................... 77 
3.2.3 Legitimacy and Status .............................................................................. 79 
3.2.4 Ecosystem Heterogeneity and Cohesion ................................................. 80 
3.3 Data ..........................................................................................................81 
3.3.1 Sales and Implementation ....................................................................... 83 
3.3.2 Levels of Control ...................................................................................... 87 
3.3.3 Value to Periphery ................................................................................... 89 
3.3.4 Value to Core ........................................................................................... 90 
Page 5 of 245 
 
3.3.5 Community Mechanisms ......................................................................... 90 
3.4 Theory Development ...............................................................................91 
3.5 Limitations and Future Research .......................................................... 100 
3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 101 
4 RATIONALIZATION OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT . 106 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 106 
4.2 Analysis of Strong Core and Fragmented Ecosystems along TCE 
Dimensions ............................................................................................ 109 
4.2.1 Asset specificity and transaction frequency: Business Software .......... 110 
4.2.2 Asset specificity and transaction frequency: Affiliate Marketing.......... 112 
4.2.3 Uncertainty: Business Software ............................................................. 113 
4.2.4 Uncertainty: Affiliate Marketing ............................................................ 115 
4.3 Theory Development ............................................................................ 116 
4.4 Discussion .............................................................................................. 127 
4.4.1 External Value Creation and Innovation ................................................ 127 
4.4.2 Graduation and Self-Selection of Control Mechanisms ........................ 129 
4.4.3 Balancing Creation and Control ............................................................. 130 
4.4.4 Heterogeneity and Variability ................................................................ 131 
4.4.5 Legitimacy and Status ............................................................................ 134 
4.4.6 Firms, Markets, and Communities......................................................... 135 
4.5 Additional Conceptual Development .................................................... 136 
4.5.1 Example 1. Standardized implementation methodology across 
heterogeneous implementations .......................................................... 141 
4.5.2 Example 2. Competitive balance between partners ............................. 143 
4.5.3 Example 3. Complement generativity and scale economies ................. 146 
4.5.4 Example 4: Use of merchant brands by affiliates .................................. 149 
4.5.5 Reflection ............................................................................................... 151 
Page 6 of 245 
 
4.6 Conclusions ........................................................................................... 153 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................ 156 
5.1 Research Agenda ................................................................................... 166 
5.2 Implications for Managers .................................................................... 168 
5.3 Future Research .................................................................................... 171 
5.3.1 Multi-platform “galaxy” ecosystems ..................................................... 172 
5.3.2 Paradox, tensions, dualities and dualisms ............................................. 175 
5.3.3 Organizational boundaries .................................................................... 179 
5.4 Concluding remarks .............................................................................. 181 
6 REFERENCES.................................................................................................... 183 
7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF PLATFORM MECHANISMS .................................... 198 
7.1.1 Focus: Product and channel development ............................................ 198 
7.1.2 Focus: Sales (relationship between Software Vendor and partner) ..... 199 
7.1.3 Focus: Sales and implementation (relationship between partner and 
customer) ............................................................................................... 200 
8 APPENDIX – SUMMARY OF 3GERP PROJECT AREA E: ORGANIZATION 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PARTNERSHIP MODELS ........................................... 201 
8.1 Participants ........................................................................................... 201 
8.2 Introduction .......................................................................................... 201 
8.3 Add-ons and Vertical Solutions ............................................................. 202 
8.4 Fee Structure ......................................................................................... 203 
8.5 Recruiting .............................................................................................. 204 
8.6 Training of Consultants ......................................................................... 205 
8.7 Activation of Partners ........................................................................... 206 
8.8 Relationship Between Partners ............................................................ 206 
Page 7 of 245 
 
8.9 Certification of Partners ........................................................................ 207 
8.10 Localization ........................................................................................... 208 
8.11 Partner Monitoring ............................................................................... 208 
8.12 Methodology (Sure Step) ...................................................................... 209 
8.13 Product Updates (roadmap) ................................................................. 210 
8.14 Partner Levels ........................................................................................ 210 
8.15 Sales Support from Microsoft ............................................................... 210 
8.16 Marketing and Branding ....................................................................... 211 
8.17 Technical Support and Maintenance .................................................... 211 
8.18 Tools (e.g. PartnerSource) ..................................................................... 211 
8.19 Training of Customers ........................................................................... 212 
9 ANALYSIS AND SELECT QUOTES FROM 3GERP INTERVIEWS IN SPAIN .......... 212 
9.1 Abstract: ................................................................................................ 212 
9.2 Interviews Included: .............................................................................. 213 
9.3 Fee Structure ......................................................................................... 214 
9.3.1 Fee Structure - General ......................................................................... 214 
9.3.2 Fee Structure - Software License Pricing: .............................................. 215 
9.3.3 Fee Structure - Maintenance Fee Pricing: ............................................. 215 
9.4 Recruiting .............................................................................................. 216 
9.4.1 Recruiting - General ............................................................................... 216 
9.4.2 Recruiting - Microsoft Support .............................................................. 217 
9.4.3 Recruiting – Type of Resource ............................................................... 217 
9.5 Training of Consultants ......................................................................... 217 
9.5.1 External Training Centers ...................................................................... 217 
9.5.2 Training – Type of Resource .................................................................. 219 
9.5.3 Training – Microsoft Support ................................................................. 219 
Page 8 of 245 
 
9.6 Vertical Solutions and Add-ons ............................................................. 220 
9.6.1 Add-ons - General .................................................................................. 220 
9.6.2 Add-ons - Number of Verticals .............................................................. 221 
9.6.3 Add-ons - Certification ........................................................................... 221 
9.6.4 Add-Ons – Microsoft Support ................................................................ 223 
9.7 Relationship Between Partners ............................................................ 224 
9.7.1 Relationship Between Partners – General............................................. 224 
9.7.2 Relationship Between Partners – Microsoft Support ............................ 225 
9.7.3 Relationship Between Partners - Add-ons ............................................. 226 
9.7.4 Relationship Between Partners – International .................................... 226 
9.8 Certification of Partners ........................................................................ 227 
9.8.1 Certification of Partners - General......................................................... 227 
9.9 Localization ........................................................................................... 228 
9.9.1 Localization – General ........................................................................... 228 
9.9.2 Localization – Microsoft Support ........................................................... 229 
9.9.3 Localization – Add-ons ........................................................................... 229 
9.9.4 Localization – Collaboration Between Partners .................................... 229 
9.10 Activation of Partners ........................................................................... 229 
9.10.1 Activation of Partners - General ............................................................ 229 
9.11 Partner Monitoring ............................................................................... 230 
9.12 Method (Sure Step) ............................................................................... 232 
9.12.1 Method (Sure Step) – Adoption............................................................. 232 
9.12.2 Method (Sure Step) – Background ........................................................ 233 
9.13 Product Updates (roadmap) ................................................................. 237 
9.14 Partner Levels ........................................................................................ 239 
9.15 Sales Support from MS .......................................................................... 239 
9.16 Marketing and Branding ....................................................................... 241 
Page 9 of 245 
 
9.16.1 Marketing and Branding – Microsoft Support ....................................... 241 
9.17 Tech Support and Maintenance ............................................................ 242 
9.18 Tools (e.g. PartnerSource) ..................................................................... 242 
9.19 Training of Customers ........................................................................... 243 
9.20 Other issues ........................................................................................... 244 
9.20.1 Background: ........................................................................................... 244 
9.20.2 Product 244 
9.20.3 Externalization ....................................................................................... 245 
9.20.4 Microsoft Services ................................................................................. 245 
9.20.5 Market 245 
 
Page 10 of 245 
 
ABSTRACT 
Platforms and ecosystems represent increasingly ubiquitous models for organizing 
economic activity in business and technology. This thesis represents an effort to 
explain observed phenomena in two distinct ecosystems: affiliate marketing 
programs and business software.  The overall practical business objective for each is 
to understand how the core firm(s) in each domain manage the efforts of hundreds 
or even thousands of contributors whose work centers around the core company’s 
platform. In our efforts to address this question, we apply multiple theoretical 
lenses, each with its own value and limitations. These include agency theory and 
transaction cost economics, platforms and ecosystems, and paradox theory. Once 
the body of the empirical observations had been recorded, we returned to review 
recent research on generativity, or the ability of a self-contained system to create, 
generate or produce a new output, structure, or behavior without any input from 
the originator of the system. We therefore stated our overriding research question 
as: “How do platform owners design their ecosystems for generativity, while 
maintaining the right level of control over the evolution of the platform”.  
This thesis addresses several gaps in the literature. First, prior research on 
organizational boundaries has relied primarily on single theories such as transaction 
cost economics. While we apply TCE to our two research domains, we complement 
this analysis with the more recent theories of platforms and ecosystems, offering 
further theoretical grounding and extension based on our empirical observations. 
Our research in chapters 3 and 4 is based upon several premises. First, we suggest 
that there is a fundamental tradeoff between creativity and control salient in 
technology platforms or ecosystems.  Creativity without control can lead to excessive 
fragmentation and variable quality, which could create a negative overall perception 
of the ecosystem by contributors, users, and customers, could affect the ability of 
niche contributors to profitably develop their activities. In addition, there is the risk 
that unregulated third-party activity may take ecosystem development in directions 
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inconsistent with the vision of the core sponsor. On the contrary, excessive control 
or poorly designed control mechanisms can hurt creativity and innovation, also 
damaging the health and growth of the ecosystem. Second, we argue that research 
on governance and control mechanisms is less developed or mature than discourse 
on creativity phases, and therefore warrants attention in order to understand this 
critical interdependence between creativity and control. Finally, we contend that 
prior research has tended to view technology ecosystems as homogeneous, 
assuming that governance is uniform for all parties. We propose that there is a need 
for empirical research which adopts a more subtle view of technology ecosystem 
governance, acknowledging that participant roles vary, but more importantly, 
governance across the ecosystem must embrace heterogeneity, even for similar 
participant roles.  Further, much of the extant literature related to relationships 
between firms has tended to focus on either creation or on control, but there is a 
need for more detailed empirical studies which address the tension between these 
two forces.  
The methodology used for our two studies is primarily qualitative, with 11 
semi-structured interviews and data from 136 affiliate programs in Spain for the 
affiliate marketing domain, and 31 semi-structured interviews in the business 
software domain.  
This thesis makes several contributions to extant theory, including substantial 
empirical observations in two large and complex business ecosystems, and 
theoretical development pertaining to efforts of core firms in such ecosystems to 
encourage third-party generativity while maintaining a degree of control over the 
third-party contributions to the core platform. 
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DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS 
Ecosystem: A business ecosystem was first defined by Moore (1993) as “an 
economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and 
individuals—the organisms of the business world. The economic community 
produces goods and services of value to customers, who are themselves members of 
the ecosystem. The member organisms also include suppliers, lead producers, 
competitors, and other stakeholders. Over time, they coevolve their capabilities and 
roles, and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one or more central 
companies. Those companies holding leadership roles may change over time, but the 
function of ecosystem leader is valued by the community because it enables 
members to move toward shared visions to align their investments, and to find 
mutually supportive roles” (p. 23).  
Generativity: Generativity refers to the ability of a self-contained system to create, 
generate, or produce a new output, structure, or behavior without any input from 
the originator of the system (Avital and Te’eni 2009, Tilson et al. 2010). Zittrain 
(2006) offers another definition of generativity as “a technology’s overall capacity to 
produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences” 
(p. 1981). The added contribution of the Zittrain definition is that it emphasizes the 
heterogeneity of the third-party contributors, an issue which increases the 
complexity of ecosystem governance. 
Governance and Control: The objective of control in transaction cost analysis is to 
minimize the cost of exchange by minimizing the impact of opportunism on channel 
members, where opportunism can be defined as “some form of cheating or 
undersupply relative to an implicit or explicit contract” (p. 48, Wathne and Heide, 
2000). In much of the literature surveyed in this thesis, control and governance are 
used interchangeably. In fact, in chapter 2 of this thesis our primary framework is 
derived from the work of Wathne and Heide (2000) who identify 4 primary control 
mechanisms: formal contracts, partner selection, incentives, and monitoring. 
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However, in our research on ecosystems and platforms we consider the overriding 
construct as governance, where control is one key objective and encouraging 
creation the other. Governance has been defined differently depending on context. 
For example, Williamson (1975, 1991) is focused on governance form (defined 
below). In this research we have adopted the following definition from Heide (1994): 
“a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the initiation, termination, and 
ongoing relationship maintenance between a set of parties”. (p. 72). This definition is 
a broader concept than control since it includes aspects of creation and structuring 
of inter-firm relationships as well as aspects of monitoring and enforcement.  
Governance Form: Transaction cost theory (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975) was 
explains a firm’s choice between two options: an internal hierarchical structure for 
organizing its economic activities, or a market-like interaction between independent 
firms. These two options may be represented as a choice between two governance 
forms: markets and hierarchies. Williamson (1991) later added the possibility of 
hybrid forms, which include “various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal 
trading, regulation, franchising, and the like” (p. 280). Thorelli (1986) proposed the 
network paradigm as a supplement to the theory of the firm, suggesting that 
networks lie between markets and hierarchies and that, in fact, many forms of 
organization which Williamson identified as markets are actually networks. Thorelli 
defines networks as “two or more organizations involved in long-term relationships” 
(p.  37). Jarillo (1988) defines strategic networks as “long-term, purposeful 
arrangements among distinct but related for-profit organizations that allow those 
firms in them to gain or sustain competitive advantage vis-a-vis their competitors 
outside the network” (p. 32). While participating firms maintain some independence 
(otherwise they would qualify as Williamson’s conception of hierarchies), the 
relationships between participants are key to competitive positioning, and they 
require a hub firm which creates and maintains the network. 
Infrastructure: Infrastructure can be defined as the underlying physical and 
organizational structures needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, and the 
services and facilities necessary for an economy to function (Tilson et al. 2010). 
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Information infrastructure can be defined as “A shared, open (and unbounded), 
heterogeneous and evolving socio-technical system … consisting of a set of IT 
capabilities and their user, operations and design communities” (Hanseth and 
Lyytinen 2010, p. 4). This concept has been extended to the more encompassing 
digital infrastructures, defined as digital infrastructures can be defined as the 
constitutive information technologies and organizational structures, along with the 
relatedservices and facilities necessary for an enterprise or industry to function 
(Tilson et al. 2010). 
Platform: Iansiti and Levien (2004a) define a platform as “an asset in the form of 
services, tools, or technologies that offer solutions to others in the ecosystem” 
(Iansiti and Levien 2004a, p. 74). Platforms are systems defined by markets with core 
components made by one company and complements made by a variety of 
companies. They have two primary characteristics: 1) they should perform an 
important function within a ‘system of use’ or solve an important technical problem 
within an industry; and (2) it should be easy to connect to or build upon the core 
solution in order to expand the system of use and allow new and even unintended 
end-uses. The core firm’s product has important, but limited, value when used alone, 
but substantially increases in value when used with complements (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002, 2008).  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-operation and affiliation. Planned co-
ordination does not stop at the boundaries of the individual firm but can be effected through co-
operation between firms” (Richardson, 1972, p. 895) 
 “The new organizational forms literature essentially asserts that hierarchies are becoming 
increasingly infused with elements of the market…and markets are likewise claimed to be increasingly 
infused with characteristics of the hierarchy.” (Foss 2002) 
 
The above statements summarize the phenomenon of firms increasingly moving 
towards what Williamson (1991) called hybrid organizational forms. In transaction 
cost economics, hybrid forms are a means to economize on transaction costs in 
interorganizational relationships when "parties to the transaction maintain 
autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree" (Williamson, 1991, p. 
271). In the extensive literature on new organizational forms which has developed 
since, authors have noted the myriad possibilities for the design of “boundary-
spanning” organizational forms, primarily resulting from the torrid pace of 
development of communication and information technologies, including the growth 
and continuous evolution of the Internet, as well as declining computing and 
communication costs (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Foss, 2002; Zott and Amit, 2009).  
These changes in the research literature are a reaction to increasingly 
prevalent modes of organizing economic activity in business and technology, 
platforms and ecosystems. Technology platforms have emerged as a novel way of 
organizing product portfolios, harnessing the creative efforts of numerous 
independent actors to produce complements and services that increase the overall 
value of the core product. Platform strategies are well known from both the iPhone 
and Android platforms, but are also common in gaming consuls such as Xbox, Wii 
and PlayStation, as well as social platforms Facebook and Twitter. Twitter, for 
example, claims to have over 750,000 developers and over 1 million apps (an 
increase from 150,000 apps a year earlier), with a new app registered every 1.5 
seconds (Twitter 2011). While Twitter itself has experienced significant growth, 
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much of the firm’s success has been driven by independent companies in its 
ecosystem.  
Technology platforms often represent exclusive options; the use of 
complements and services of one platform is largely incompatible with another. This 
can result in platform wars, such as the context between Google’s Android mobile 
operating system vs. Apple’s iOS. There are some clear similarities between the 
platforms, such as a comparable user interface and gesture control, and significant 
indirect network effects derived from third-party development of applications. 
According to Xylogic, a company that indexes app store downloads, as of October 
2011, Apple iOS users were downloading 1.45 billion apps per month compared to 
640 million for Android users (Takahashi 2011). However, there are also some 
pronounced differences between the two models: Apple maintains tight control over 
its ecosystem, while Android maintains a more open model. Apple produces both 
hardware and software as a single package, while Google offers Android free to 
hardware manufacturers such as HTC, Samsung, and LG, who are at liberty to make 
hardware decisions and even modifications to the final operating system. Apple 
must approve each new application for iOS, while Google has no pre-approval 
process and leverages the Android user-community to flag apps in violation of 
Google policies (Claburn 2010). While Google’s model offers tremendous scalability, 
the fragmentation creates challenges for application developers since some 
applications may operate differently on various devices.  
The growth of apps or complements leverages the contributions of 
participants who are not directly employed by the technology core sponsor to create 
complementary products and services to address the needs of a large, 
heterogeneous group of end-users, in a manner that would be prohibitively difficult 
for the core to do alone. A platform strategy purposefully cultivates an ecosystem of 
complementors for ‘generativity’. Generativity refers to the ability of a self-
contained system to create, generate or produce a new output, structure, or 
behavior without any input from the originator of the system (Tilson et al. 2010). It 
includes both the technology artifacts, as well as the social meanings and behaviors 
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that embed the artifacts (Avital and Te’eni 2009). Zittrain (2006) offers another 
definition of generativity as “a technology’s overall capacity to produce unprompted 
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences” (p. 1981). However, 
where generativity is the main objective, un-controlled creative output is not always 
positive for the health of the ecosystem (Hagiu 2010). Letting 1,000 flowers grow 
can, in many cases, produce services and complements of lesser quality, resulting in 
a negative customer experience, thereby seriously harming the reputation and 
economic sustainability of the product platform (Boudreau 2011). The added 
contribution of the Zittrain definition is that it emphasizes the heterogeneity of the 
third-party contributors, an issue which increases the complexity of ecosystem 
governance. So the design of governance mechanisms for technology ecosystems is 
not a trivial task; the challenge is to establish control mechanisms that appropriately 
direct participant behavior without excessively constraining the desired level of 
generativity. This creates a natural tension in the ecosystem, one that defines many 
of the characteristics of the resulting governance mechanisms. This suggests that a 
creativity-control tradeoff is a substantial challenge in technology ecosystem 
governance.  
As an example of the give-and-take that platform owners must manage, 
consider the Apple App Store review process used in iPhone and iPad applications. 
The process has been criticized as being overly restrictive and lacking transparency. 
Taking note that as of December 2011, Google now commands 47.3% of the 
smartphone market compared to 29.6% for Apple (comScore 2012), Apple decided 
to allow their developers the use of third-party development tools after previously 
banning their use, and has succumbed to pressure to share the exact guidelines used 
to decide whether a particular application should be admitted to the App Store 
(Geere 2010). This ecosystem clash has only just begun, with both companies 
extending their platforms to the PC, tablets, and soon the television. 
Hence, as these types of boundary-spanning organization forms which rely on 
third-party contribution become more prevalent, platform owners must endeavor to 
find the right level of control without overly restricting generativity. Tiwana et al. 
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(2010) refer to this as the “Goldilocks Governance Problem”; that a platform can 
exhibit too much, too little, or the “just-right” level of governance (p. 679). This, 
then, is our core research question which guides this thesis:  
RQ 1: How do platform owners design their ecosystems for generativity, 
while maintaining the right level of control over the evolution of the 
platform?  
We address this research question through an empirical study of two distinct 
research domains, to which we apply various theoretical lenses. 
1.1 Thesis Structure 
This thesis represents an exploration and analysis of two distinct domains, both of 
which may be described as a hybrid organizational forms according to transaction 
cost economics, or platforms/ecosystems according to the nomenclature in that 
theory base. Our research in each domain began with observations of certain 
phenomena in their respective business contexts. Next, we experiment with 
different theoretical lenses in an iterative effort to gain insight into our observations. 
Finally, we analyze the results and summarize our findings which with the intention 
of advancing existing theory. Table 1.1 below summarizes the sample studies, 
research frameworks applied, and theoretical contribution for each chapter in this 
thesis. 
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Table 1.1: Overview of studies composing this dissertation 
Chapter Title Sample Research Framework Theory Contribution 
2 Governance 
mechanisms in 
Internet-based 
affiliate 
marketing 
programs in 
Spain 
Data from 136 
affiliate programs 
in Spain, 11 semi-
structure 
interviews 
Agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Ross, 1973), 
transaction cost 
economics (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 
1975, 1985, 1991), 
governance 
mechanisms (Wathne 
and Heide, 2000) 
Analysis in a novel 
research domain of 4 
primary governance 
mechanisms: formal 
contract, partner 
selection, incentives, and 
monitoring; 
recommendations for 
managers of affiliate 
marketing programs. 
3 Control in 
Technology 
Ecosystems  
 
31 semi-structured 
interviews with 
entities associated 
with the enterprise 
software of a 
major, 
multinational 
software 
manufacturer 
Ecosystems 
(Messerschmitt and 
Szyperski 2003, Iansiti 
and Levien 2004a, 
2004b, Moore 1993), 
platforms (Baldwin 
and Woodard 2010, 
Boudreau and Hagiu 
2009, Gawer and 
Cusumano 2002, 
2008) 
Extensive analysis of 
governance mechanisms 
put in place by the core 
firm to incentivize 
creation and control 
output; additional 
findings inherent to the 
domain studied not 
sufficiently addressed by 
ecosystem/platform 
literature to date. 
4 Rationalization of 
empirical analysis 
and theory 
development 
Data from affiliate 
marketing and 
business software 
domains. 
Transaction cost 
analysis (see above), 
platforms and 
ecosystems (see 
above), paradox 
theory (Farjoun 2010, 
Hanseth and Lyytinen 
2010, Tilson et al. 
2010, Tiwana et al. 
2010)  
Analysis of the ability of 
TCE dimensions to 
explain our observed 
phenomena; additional 
explanatory value 
provided by theory on 
platforms/ecosystems; 
preliminary observations 
of paradoxes manifest in 
our research domains, 
including the notions of 
conflicting dualisms and 
enabling dualities. 
 
Our research begins in chapter 2 with the affiliate marketing ecosystem in 
Spain. We apply agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 
1973) and transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991), 
as they represent the predominant theories applied in extant research to analyze the 
economic activity between firms.  
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Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) argue that work on organizational boundaries is 
commonly focused on single theories such as transaction cost economics, but that 
additional insights may be achieved by exploring the relationship among different 
conceptions. In accordance with this suggestion, in chapter 3 we apply platform and 
ecosystem theories to the second research domain analyzed in this thesis, business 
software. We contend that these theory bases complement transaction cost 
economics; as TCE tends to take a dyadic approach to transactions between two (or 
more) firms, we found it lacking in its ability to explain the entirety of the complex 
relationships between multiple, heterogeneous firms. TCE tends to focus primarily 
on the larger firms which organize the economic activity, and insufficient attention is 
given to the role of complementors or niche players deemed critical to the growth 
and overall health of the ecosystem. In addition, theory on platforms and 
ecosystems concentrate on managing in order to maximize value creation by third 
parties while attaining some degree of value appropriation, a concept which is not 
directly addressed in TCE. As chapters 2 and 3 have applied distinct theories to 
distinct research domains, in chapter 4 the objective of our analysis is to rationalize 
these different approaches into a more cohesive theory. 
In chapter 4 we compare and contrast the theories of transaction cost 
economics, with its well-documented theoretical and empirical grounding, with the 
more recent concepts of platforms and ecosystems, which have yet to receive such 
extensive treatment. It is our intention to position these newer theories against the 
backdrop of TCE as a way to further ground them in extant theory, to look for 
complementarities between them, and to open potential paths for future research.  
We end chapter 4 with preliminary observations of paradoxes manifest in our 
research domains as a return to the issue of tensions in ecosystems. We contend 
that these tensions merit further attention as theory development remains 
immature. That said, some recent studies have shed new light on the inherent 
conflicts which exist in technology ecosystems. Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010) describe 
4 design classes for IT systems. In order of increasing complexity, these are: IT 
capabilities, applications, platforms, and information infrastructures. An information 
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infrastructure is defined as a “shared, open (and unbounded), heterogeneous and 
evolving socio-technical system … consisting of a set of IT capabilities and their user, 
operations and design communities” (p. 4). These digital infrastructures, due to their 
open nature and heterogeneity, must increasingly be designed to embrace the new 
phenomenon of generativity (Tilson et al. 2010). Tilson et al. (2010) further suggest 
that we can obtain a deeper understanding of the dynamics and generativity of 
digital infrastructures by studying the paradoxes of change and control.  The paradox 
of change reflects the need for stability in digital infrastructures in order to develop 
new capabilities; as well as flexibility, to ensure unbounded growth. The paradox of 
control relates to the need to derive value from generativity, while at the same time 
ensuring that the results are beneficial to the overall ecosystem.  
While the primary data collection and analysis in chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis was conducted prior to the research cited above on generativity and the 
paradoxes of change and control, we nevertheless consider our work to be in step 
philosophically with these issues, and our hope is to make some contribution to 
extant theory both through our empirical observations of two novel data sets, as 
well as our discussion of the data and further theory development.  
We now continue the introduction with a review of the relevant theory on 
transaction cost economics, the primary theory base applied in the second chapter 
of this thesis (and to which we return in chapter 4). Research on platforms and 
ecosystems provides additional tools for extending the analysis and uncovering new 
dimensions, and we continue the introduction with a discussion of prior research in 
this area. Finally, we will conclude the introduction with a brief description of 
chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the thesis where the bulk of our research is described, 
including the research questions we have addressed and primary conclusions 
reached. 
1.2 Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction cost theory (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975) was principally envisioned to 
explain a firm’s choice between two options: an internal hierarchical structure for 
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organizing its economic activities, or a market-like interaction between independent 
firms. These two options may be represented as a choice between two governance 
forms: markets and hierarchies. As its name implies, transaction cost analysis focuses 
on the attributes of a transaction that determine variations in its costs. Three major 
characteristics are identified as germane to the determination of the appropriate 
organizational form: asset specificity, exchange uncertainty, and transaction 
frequency (Williamson 1985). As summarized by Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) “In a 
context of bounded rationality of economic agents and exchange uncertainty, the 
precise terms of transactions are costly to define, monitor, and enforce, leading to 
incomplete contracts” (p. 492). Bounded rationality refers to the fact that while 
decision-makers intend to act rationally, their ability to do so is restricted by their 
cognitive capability and limits on their rationality. These limits become particularly 
problematic in uncertain environments “in which the circumstances surrounding an 
exchange cannot be specified ex ante (environmental uncertainty), and performance 
cannot be easily verified ex post (behavioral uncertainty)” (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997, p. 31). This creates an adaptation problem, where it is difficult to modify 
arrangements as circumstances change, and therefore contracts will be incomplete 
as it is either impossible or too expensive to anticipate all possible circumstances and 
contingencies which may arise.  
1.2.1 Hybrid Organizational Forms and Networks 
After its initial conception, Williamson (1991) amended the binary choice of market 
or hierarchy to include the possibility of hybrid forms, which include “various forms 
of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising, and the like” (p. 
280). Hybrids become an attractive alternative when investments are specific 
enough to create contractual hazards but not enough to justify integration with its 
related difficulties, and where uncertainties are significant enough to require greater 
coordination than that provided by markets (Williamson 1991). Responding to a 
perceived need for a more precise definition, Menard (2006) defines hybrid forms as 
follows: “underlying this diversity of arrangements is the intuition that they 
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participate to the same ‘family’ of agreements among autonomous entities doing 
business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price system, and 
sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products, and services without a unified 
ownership” (p. 30).  
Surveying prior literature, Menard (2006) identifies several characteristics, or 
“regularities” in the research, which distinguish hybrid organization forms. First, 
there is the prevalence of pooled resources, suggesting that one reason hybrid forms 
develop is the inability of markets to bundle the required resources and capabilities 
and that integration would result in lost flexibility and weaker incentives. He 
concludes that a major problem for hybrids is to secure cooperation from external 
parties in order to coordinate activities without losing the advantages of 
decentralized decisions. 
The second regularity identified is that of relational contracting, which 
governs transactions among partners who simultaneously participate in activities not 
related to the contracted relationship. The relational aspect is based on the 
advantages and risks which accrue to sharing among independent partners where 
contracts tend to be incomplete and therefore require other governance measures 
to adapt to changing circumstances, monitor activities, and resolve conflicts when 
they occur. The problem identified by Menard related to this regularity is how to 
secure effective relational contracts while minimizing the need for renegotiation. 
The third characteristic is the complex role of competition in hybrid 
relationships, where partners are interdependent but simultaneously operate 
autonomously in pursuing their independent business activities. Therefore, partners 
may cooperate on some activities and compete on others, activities may overlap 
with partners competing for the same customers, and hybrid arrangements may 
compete with other organizational arrangements, including other hybrids. As a 
result, the problem becomes “what is the best stable mechanism for delineating 
joint decisions, disciplining partners, and solving conflicts while preventing free 
riding?” (Menard 2006, p. 31) 
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The information systems literature has also predicted the move away from 
traditional company hierarchies.  Malone et. al. (1987) posit that the ability of IT to 
reduce transaction costs will result in an increasing shift in governance form away 
from vertical integration and towards markets in the future, meaning a greater 
degree of outsourcing.  The authors claim that lower search costs would lead to a 
greater reliance on search, and the development of electronic markets. However, 
they also predicted the development of electronic hierarchies, with greater use of 
strong ties with a few long-term partners. Clemons et al. (1993) proposed the move 
to the middle hypothesis: “1. A greater degree of outsourcing will take place (a move 
away from ownership and vertical integration). 2. But the firm will rely on fewer 
suppliers than before, with whom the firm will have close and long-term 
relationships and with whom the firm will cooperate and coordinate closely (a move 
away from the market to intermediate governance structures when outsourcing)” (p. 
13).  
While many have followed Williamson’s lead and adopted the hybrid 
construct, there is a large base of literature which classifies these intermediate forms 
as networks. Thorelli (1986) proposed the network paradigm as a supplement to the 
theory of the firm, suggesting that networks lie between markets and hierarchies 
and that, in fact, many forms of organization which Williamson identified as markets 
are actually networks. Thorelli defines networks as “two or more organizations 
involved in long-term relationships” (p.  37), and suggested that this form of 
institutional arrangement adds three new elements to the existing “four p’s” of 
marketing strategy: power, influence, and trust.  
Jarillo (1988) defines strategic networks as “long-term, purposeful 
arrangements among distinct but related for-profit organizations that allow those 
firms in them to gain or sustain competitive advantage vis-a-vis their competitors 
outside the network” (p. 32). While participating firms maintain some independence 
(otherwise they would qualify as Williamson’s conception of hierarchies), the 
relationships between participants are key to competitive positioning, and they 
require a hub firm which creates and maintains the network. While Thorelli observed 
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that many forms considered markets under Williamson are actually networks, Jarillo 
goes further to explain this distinction, claiming that strategic networks, unlike 
typical markets, show a high degree of perceived opportunities for value creation 
between the parties (p. 38).  
Powell (1990) takes exception with Williamson’s view of organizational forms 
as lying on a continuum with hybrid forms in the middle: “the familiar market-
hierarchy continuum does not do justice to the notion of network forms of 
organization.... such an arrangement is neither a market transaction nor a 
hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode of exchange, one 
with its own logic, a network” (pp. 296, 301).  
Ebers (1999) defines inter-organizational co-operation between more than 
two firms as inter-organizational networks, which are classified by “recurring 
exchange relationships among a limited number of organizations that retain residual 
control of their individual resources yet periodically jointly decide over their use” (p. 
3). The author highlights the long tradition of co-operative arrangements and 
emphasizes the acceleration in the number of inter-organizational alliances during 
the 1980’s (see also Granovetter, 1994).  
 Klein and Poulymenakou (2006) note a blurring between the concepts of 
hierarchies, networks, and markets, and propose a characterization of networks 
based on actors, the linkages between the actors, and their environment. 
Considerations for actors include the number and type of firms involved, and their 
roles. Linkages include the type of relationship (formal contract or relational 
contract), governance structures based on power and social relationships, the types 
of resources exchanged (goods and services, knowledge, technology, etc.), shared 
values and trust, relationship history, etc. By environment, the authors refer to both 
the competitive environment of other networks or governance forms, the broader 
view of a business ecosystem, as well as social, political and legal environments. The 
authors conclude that inter-firm networks represent a distinct governance form 
governed by relational contracts which are underspecified, which makes them very 
Page 26 of 245 
 
flexible but at the same time precarious (Das and Teng 2000). Further, networks are 
highly heterogeneous arrangements, incorporating a variety of member firms and 
adding another layer of heterogeneity and complexity from the network itself. (Klein 
and Poulymenakou 2006, pp. 7-8). 
1.2.2 Motives for choosing hybrid/network organizational forms 
In the context of analyzing the application of transaction cost economics to 
predict the most appropriate organizational form, we should consider not merely the 
observed phenomenon of the proliferation of co-operative arrangements, but 
additionally the motives for firms’ engaging in same. Citing prior literature, Ebers 
(1999) groups the primary motives for participating in inter-organizational co-
operation into two broad categories: increasing revenue and reducing costs. Table 
1.2 below summarizes Ebers’ survey of prior literature on the topic. In one of the few 
empirical studies of the relative importance of motivational factors for inter-
organizational networking, Glaister and Buckley (1996) identified five main factors. In 
diminishing order of significance, these are: technology development, market power, 
market development, resource, and large project size. 
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Table 1.2: Motives for inter-organizational networking 
Motives  Reference 
Collude against common rivals or reduce competition Porter and Fuller 1986 
Access complementary resources and/or capabilities or closely co-ordinate use 
of resources to enhance competitiveness, for example, in terms of improved 
products, better market access, or faster market entry 
Contractor and Lorange 1988; 
Harrigan 1985; Zajac and Olsen 
1993 
Create economies of scale and scope through joint research, marketing or 
production 
Contractor and Lorange 1988, 
Håkansson and Snehota 1995 
Reduce governance costs of coordinating activities between firms Hennart 1991; Thorelli 1986 
Gain access to knowledge that can neither be made available internally nor be 
easily transferred by licensing. 
Badaracco 1991; Dyer 1996; 
Kreiner and Schultz 1993 
Acquire and appropriate skills in a fast, effective, and efficient manner Dodgson 1993 
Spread financial or other risks, for example involving (mostly 
large) innovations or other risky projects 
Contractor and Lorange 1988; 
Mariti and Smiley 1983 
Six predictive contingencies: 
1. Necessity, when organizations are mandated through law or regulation by 
higher authorities to establish relationships;  
2. Asymmetry that allows one party to exercise power or control over another 
one or its resources;  
3. Reciprocity, when through co-operation organizations can pursue common 
or mutually beneficial goals or interests;  
4. Efficiency, when through co-operating organizations can achieve higher 
input/output ratios;  
5. Stability, when through co-operation organizations can better forestall, 
forecast, or absorb uncertainty affecting their activities; and  
6. Legitimacy, when through co-operation organizations can establish or 
enhance their reputation, image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing 
norms. 
Oliver (1990) 
 
Langlois and Robertson (1992) discuss modular systems, which they 
distinguish from prepackaged products or appliances. Through case studies, the 
authors demonstrate that there are both supply-side benefits (autonomous 
innovation due to division of labor, and rapid trial-and-error learning) and demand-
side benefits (fine-tuning products to customer needs which allows for better 
coverage of the product space) to such systems.  Through such modularization, 
“First, new products can satisfy a desire for attributes that has not been satisfied, or, 
perhaps, even noticed. Second, through technological convergence, new ways of 
packaging or bundling consumption technology, and therefore providing attributes, 
become feasible.” (p. 299). 
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While pursuing transaction cost economics and agency theory as the basis for 
our empirical analysis in chapter 2, we arrived at a point of impasse in the ability of 
these theories to explain some key phenomena from our observations. We therefore 
turned to the newer theories of ecosystems and platforms for the analysis of the 
business software domain in chapter 3. These theory bases complement TCE theory 
in that they focus on a particular type of hybrid/network governance form, which we 
found not adequately explained by the market/hierarchy/hybrid conceptualization of 
TCE. Further, while TCE tends to take a dyadic approach to transactions between two 
(or more) firms, ecosystem and platform theories take a more holistic view of the 
activity between multiple firms. The perspective in both cases is primarily from the 
perspective of the core firm, also known as the keystone firm in ecosystem theory, 
though in ecosystems and platforms the role of complementors or niche players is 
also deemed critical to the growth and overall health of the ecosystem. In addition, 
these theories focus on how to manage a platform/ecosystem in order to maximize 
value creation and appropriation, a concept which is not prevalent in TCE. In section 
1.3 we review prior research on ecosystems, and in section 1.4 we discuss extant 
theory on platforms. 
1.3 Ecosystems 
Recent literature has used the concept of ecosystems to describe the complex 
interdependencies in various industry sectors. The use of this biological metaphor is 
an acknowledgement that no one firm can address every customer need, and that 
the health of each firm in a given sector is dependent on the overall health of the 
business ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien 2004, Iyer et al. 2006, Adner 2006).  
There have been a variety of streams in the literature that inform the concept 
of the technology ecosystem. The key idea of this biological analogy is that for an 
ecosystem to remain healthy, participants must share value with the ecosystem; that 
is, give as much as they take (Iansiti and Levien 2004). This emphasis on sharing 
within the ecosystem immediately suggests an open strategy should be adopted, at 
least partially, by firms. One way in which those at the core of an ecosystem enable 
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participants to give back to the ecosystem is to open up parts of an otherwise 
proprietary or closed platform. Central, core participants in an ecosystem known as 
keystone players create value by developing “platforms” consisting of services, tools 
or technologies to foster innovation, growth and diversity (Iansiti and Levien 2004).  
The idea of assuming a partially open or hybrid strategy is central to much of 
the literature on Open Innovation (Chesbrough 2003, Gassmann 2006). Successful 
executors of an open innovation strategy will offer incentives and tools for 
innovation outside the firm, combined with some mechanism for value 
appropriation from these creations. For example, West (2003) details hybrid 
strategies for the development of computing architectures. These include: a) 
opening parts, ceding control of commodity layers of the software in order to benefit 
from developments in open source communities, and b) partly open disclosing 
technology with restrictions.  
Moore (1993) is credited with originating the concept of business ecosystems. 
According to the author, “in a business ecosystem, companies co-evolve capabilities 
around a new innovation: they work cooperatively and competitively to support new 
products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually incorporate the next round of 
innovations” (p. 76). In this initial work, Moore claims that business ecosystems 
evolve through various stages, from birth to expansion, leadership, and self-renewal. 
Moore also identified the role of central ecological contributors with examples such 
as Intel, Microsoft and Wal-Mart, which he claimed “maintain the much-coveted 
chokehold within a business ecosystem” (p. 81). 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a) identify three main strategies for ecosystem 
participants. In a physical dominator strategy the company “ultimately becomes its 
own ecosystem, absorbing the complex network of interdependencies that existed 
between distinct organizations, and is able to extract maximum short-term value 
from the assets it controls” (p. 74). In other words, dominators are more concerned 
with extracting value for themselves than with the health of other ecosystem 
participants, and may end up ultimately destroying the ecosystem.  
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In a niche strategy, the predominant strategy in an ecosystem, firms focus on 
a narrow business segment in order to differentiate themselves from competitors. 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a) emphasize the importance of diversity in an ecosystem, 
measured by the number of new niches created. They state “One way to assess 
niche creation is to look at the extent to which emerging technologies are actually 
being applied in the form of a variety of new businesses and products.” (p. 73). The 
authors further state “Effective niche players…create custom solutions by combining 
their specialized assets with complementary products and platforms provided by 
other niche players and keystones” (Iansiti and Levien 2004b, p. 134). 
Keystone organizations, while representing a small percentage of the overall 
ecosystem, play a critical role, as “they aim to improve the overall health of their 
ecosystems by providing a stable and predictable set of common assets … that other 
organizations use to build their own offerings” (Iansiti and Levien 2004a, p. 73). In 
contrast with the dominator strategy, keystones implement measures to share value 
with other ecosystem participants in a sustainable way, recognizing that the health 
of niche players is important to the success of the keystone. A significant 
contribution of the work of Iansiti and Levien is their explication of the role of the 
keystone in both creating value as well as sharing value with other ecosystem 
participants.  
1.4 Platforms 
Keystones create value by creating and maintaining a platform, “an asset in the form 
of services, tools, or technologies that offer solutions to others in the ecosystem” 
(Iansiti and Levien 2004a, p. 74). The authors claim that keystones enable value 
creation in large networks by generating operating leverage, which they describe as 
“a series of assets that can be easily scaled and shared by a broad network of 
business partners” (2004b, p. 92)  
Platforms are systems defined by markets with core components made by 
one company and complements made by a variety of companies. They have two 
primary characteristics: 1) they should perform an important function within a 
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‘system of use’ or solve an important technical problem within an industry; and (2) it 
should be easy to connect to or build upon the core solution in order to expand the 
system of use and allow new and even unintended end-uses. The core firm’s product 
has important, but limited, value when used alone, but substantially increases in 
value when used with complements (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, 2008).  
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) distinguish between a product and an industry 
platform. They claim “a product is largely proprietary and under one company’s 
control, whereas an industry platform is a foundation technology or service that is 
essential for a broader, interdependent ecosystem of businesses” (p. 28). The 
researchers further acknowledge that not every market need have a platform leader, 
but that several platform companies may exist simultaneously.  
The tension between stability and evolvability is central to platforms. By 
making some components variable, platforms become adaptable to future 
technological developments, social or business trends, as well as uncertain or 
unanticipated environmental changes. Complementors, working on the periphery of 
the ecosystem, have the ability and mandate to respond to the needs of users with a 
level of speed or specialisation that would otherwise be prohibitively difficult for the 
core. Explicitly, they invoke the speed of market mechanisms, a Hayekian response 
to the here and now, yet simultaneously leverage the economic scale, benefits, and 
network externalities of a stable core infrastructure. This is particularly valuable 
when consumer patterns are heterogeneous, technologies are fragmented, and 
overall market trajectories are uncertain (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008; Boudreau & 
Hagiu, 2009). It is important to highlight that variability and creation are not limited 
to the periphery or complements of the platform. As Baldwin and Woodward (2008) 
highlight, core components of a system will also need to evolve over time, if for no 
other reason than to embrace basic technological advances in underlying 
technologies such as processing, storage, communication, and power consumption. 
Thus, in most cases, we will find evolvability at both the complement/application 
layer, and to a lesser degree, the core/infrastructure layer.  
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What remains stable through the evolution of the platform are the interfaces 
or thin crossing points (Baldwin, 2008) that govern interaction between the layers 
(Baldwin & Woodard, 2008). These architectural control points (Woodward, 2008) 
govern the relationships between the core and complements, creating bottlenecks 
where platform operators can, via property and other legal rights of exclusion, grant 
or deny outsiders access to the system (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Jacobides, 
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Thus, the design of the interfaces is 
considered one of the most important levers for governing the platform.  
Generativity refers to the ability of a self-contained system to create, 
generate, or produce a new output, structure, or behavior without any input from 
the originator of the system (Avital and Te’eni 2009, Tilson et al. 2010). While it is 
possible to cultivate generativity within the boundaries of a single firm, generative 
potential can be further realized in a looser system of heterogeneous actors who 
pursue self-interested, innovative activities in a distributed and scalable ecosystem 
(Busquets et al. 2009, Yoo et al. 2010).  
IT enabled control processes have been used to coordinate and synchronize 
processes in a single network of firms. However, as distributed innovation happens 
in a larger ecosystem (basically a quasi-market of heterogeneous actors), governance 
infrastructures must be developed that embrace disparate motivations and 
fragmented knowledge; while simultaneously fostering the continuity and 
predictability that enforces appropriate quality standards and enables the 
emergence of collective benefits (Boudreau, 2011). 
Incentive heterogeneity in platforms has been addressed by Boudreau and 
Lakhani (2009) who suggest two conceptual extremes: open innovation markets and 
open innovation communities. Innovation markets tend to be based upon profit 
seeking behavior, career advancement, or other extrinsic motivations; where 
innovation communities are based upon intrinsic rewards such as intellectual 
stimulation, sense of purpose and identity, and communal affiliation. As such, 
innovation markets will be governed by formal mechanisms such as explicit contracts 
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and licensing, where innovation communities will be governed by embedded social 
norms and intrinsic rewards. Most platforms or ecosystems contain instances of 
both market and communities in varying degrees, and governance mechanisms 
should successfully embrace a variety of motivations. 
We have encountered significant prior research on issues of generativity for 
inter-firm activity, but have been less successful in discovering extant theory and 
empirical analysis of mechanisms for value appropriation and control. For example, 
Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) delineate a variety of strategies that combine 
traditional strategy with open source business models and highlight the need to 
balance value creation with value capture. They state, “If companies cannot find 
ways to profit from their innovation activities in open initiatives – through 
deployment, hybridization, complements, or self service, they cannot sustain their 
participation in those initiatives over time (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007 p. 69)."  
Where their offered typology of open business models goes far to address co-
existence and creation, it is less explicit on how to achieve value appropriation, and 
omits any deeper discussion of governance and risk in open innovation processes. 
West and O’Mahoney (2008) discuss the tension between control and growth 
experienced by sponsors in sponsored source communities, concluding that the 
more control sponsors tried to exert over the direction of the community, the more 
they restricted the community’s ability to grow. Their study highlights a need for a 
balanced equilibrium between innovation and control; the need to govern, but not 
over-tax the ecosystem. 
 Therefore, our research in chapters 3 and 4 is based upon several premises. 
First, we suggest that there is a fundamental tradeoff between creativity and control 
salient in technology platforms or ecosystems.  Creativity without control can lead to 
excessive fragmentation and variable quality, which could create a negative overall 
perception of the ecosystem by contributors, users, and customers, could affect the 
ability of niche contributors to profitably develop their activities. In addition, there is 
the risk that unregulated third-party activity may take ecosystem development in 
directions inconsistent with the vision of the core sponsor. On the contrary, 
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excessive control or poorly designed control mechanisms can hurt creativity and 
innovation, also damaging the health and growth of the ecosystem. Second, we 
argue that research on governance and control mechanisms is less developed or 
mature than discourse on creativity phases, and therefore warrants attention in 
order to understand this critical interdependence between creativity and control. 
Finally, we contend that prior research has tended to view technology ecosystems as 
homogeneous, assuming that governance is uniform for all parties. We propose that 
there is a need for empirical research which adopts a more subtle view of technology 
ecosystem governance, acknowledging that participant roles vary, but more 
importantly, governance across the ecosystem must embrace heterogeneity, even 
for similar participant roles.   
1.5 Summary of Subsequent Chapters 
Empirical observations in this thesis are derived from the analysis of data in two 
distinct domains which fall into the broad categories of hybrid, or boundary-
spanning, organizational forms, also called network forms in another stream of 
research (Jarillo 1988, Powell 1990, Thorelli 1986). The first domain includes firms 
involved in affiliate marketing programs in Spain; and second is the ecosystem 
revolving around a major business software company. Theoretical development 
begins with well-established standards in economics and management: agency 
theory and transaction cost analysis. The rest of the thesis draws from more recent 
literature on platforms and ecosystems. The work contained herein represents a 
journey to ground these observations in extant theory, and where conflicts emerged 
between the phenomena observed and existing theory, to seek new explanations 
through additional theories from other domains (marketing, information systems, 
biology, etc.), and to supplement this secondary research with original data and 
analysis.  
While the thesis is designed with the intention that each chapter may stand 
on its own as a piece of academic work, they are all intended to pursue a common 
theme. Many companies realize that they may create more value by leveraging the 
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efforts of outside parties than by trying to conduct all of the business activities in the 
value chain internally. This is not inherently new; research on value chains, supply 
chains, and outsourcing, for example, have investigated this phenomenon. What we 
believe to be novel in recent studies is the emphasis on “opening” the channel to 
outside parties (open innovation is a diverse and growing field of study), and the 
idea of central, core participants known as keystones creating ecosystems revolving 
based on platforms consisting of services, tools or technologies to foster innovation, 
growth and diversity (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). While there is a burgeoning literature 
surrounding open innovation and ecosystems, we assert herein that there is a need 
for more studies which address the composition of these platforms, the mechanisms 
which enable value creation and sharing, and governance issues within the 
ecosystem. In our analysis, several issues have emerged which merit further 
investigation. These general questions have been converted to specific research 
questions, and analyzed using empirical data. The following is a summary of each 
chapter, including the research questions addressed, the analysis conducted, 
primary conclusions reached, and contributions to extant theory. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: Governance mechanisms in affiliate marketing programs in Spain 
Chapter 2 is an exploratory analysis of governance mechanisms (formal 
contracts, partner selection, incentives and monitoring) in one-to-many affiliate 
programs in Spain. Internet-based affiliate marketing programs have emerged as one 
of the fastest-growing methods for online retailers to acquire customers and 
increase sales by tapping into the power of independent web sites to reach a large, 
diverse audience of potential customers (Hoffman and Novak 2000). This researcher 
first became interested in affiliate marketing as a way to rapidly create and monetize 
new Internet businesses, since it offers both content and a way to extract value from 
that content through various potential business models. However, a strong 
incompatibility quickly emerged between the way programs were supposed to work 
in theory, and what we observed in reality. Affiliates are contracted to represent the 
sales and marketing efforts of merchants, and there appeared to be effective 
Page 36 of 245 
 
mechanisms in place to measure the results of affiliates’ efforts in terms of 
generating clicks (visits to the merchant web site), sales, or leads (visitors fill out a 
form). The distributed nature of the activity seemed to make it difficult, though, for 
merchants to observe the behavior of affiliates in generating these results. So the 
question arose as to how merchants ensure that affiliates, while representing the 
interests of the merchant, do not engage in fraudulent or otherwise negative 
behavior which could be associated with the brand of the merchant? Since this 
appeared to be a classic principal-agent conflict, we turned to transaction cost and 
agency theories as a lens through which we might view the phenomenon. We 
therefore address the following research question:  
RQ 2.1 How are governance mechanisms used by merchants in one-to-many, 
Internet-based affiliate marketing programs in Spain to control the activities 
of their affiliates?  
To analyze this research question we collected qualitative and quantitative 
data on four governance mechanisms identified as relevant from the literature 
(formal contracts, partner selection, incentives and monitoring). The conclusion is 
that there is a significant lack of transparency in the guidance and restrictions 
communicated to affiliates, and a lack of systematic monitoring of affiliate behavior, 
which increases the risk of opportunism or misconduct. And while a small number of 
affiliates are responsible for the main positive outcomes and therefore maintain a 
close relationship with merchants, there are thousands of affiliates who can produce 
negative outcomes for the merchant by committing fraud or otherwise damaging 
their brand reputation. General recommendations for managers of affiliate programs 
are considered. 
While we believe this analysis has generated interesting and valuable results, 
and we hope to have made an addition to the transaction cost and agency theory 
bases, it seemed to some degree unsatisfactory both from a theoretical perspective, 
as well as considering the needs of merchants and affiliates. On the theory side, we 
choose certain governance mechanisms through which to view the domain with a 
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qualitative analysis, but the choice felt somewhat incomplete, as these clearly 
represented a limited selection of governance mechanisms and not all potential 
strategies. We offer some prescriptive conclusions for merchants, but the issue 
remained as to how merchants could most effectively organize the channel to 
encourage participation and innovation on the part of the affiliates, while 
participating in value creation and retaining a degree of control. Therefore, for the 
analysis of the second domain in the thesis, we turned to theory on ecosystems and 
platforms for a more holistic view of the tensions between creation and control. 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: Control in technology ecosystems  
Chapter 3 uses an inductive process to formulate a model of value 
appropriation in hybrid technology ecosystems characterized by tension between 
creative activities fostered on the periphery and control processes orchestrated by 
the core. Our data come from a study of a business software ecosystem consisting of 
a major, multinational software manufacturer at the core and a system of 
independent implementation partners and solution developers on the periphery.  In 
this analysis, we address the following research questions: 
RQ 3.1 What are the primary platform mechanisms required for the 
coordination and control of technology ecosystems?  
RQ 3.2 How do platform mechanisms interact to foster creativity and 
innovation, and ensure value appropriation and control in technology 
ecosystems? 
RQ 3.3 How do incentive and control mechanisms accommodate ecosystem 
heterogeneity?  
In our analysis, we expand on several themes related to the tension between 
creation and control. Innovation on the periphery is fostered through: a) incentives 
to create, and b) infrastructure to create; where control is facilitated through: c) 
incentives to control, and d) infrastructure to control. As the levels of creation and 
control are both functions of self-selection by non-core participants, the underlying 
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architecture of the ecosystem must balance infrastructures of creation and control 
with the appropriate incentives for creation and control. Control processes must 
impart value to the creative process to be sustainable. The research is novel in that it 
describes the mechanisms of value appropriation in hybrid ecosystems previously 
underserved in the literature of open source, open innovation, toolkits and 
technology ecosystems.     
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Rationalization of empirical analysis and theory development 
In Chapter 4 we rationalize the two primary empirical sections of this thesis: a 
more “traditional” analysis employing elements of transaction cost analysis and 
agency theory to a novel, fragmented ecosystem with no clear platform leaders; and 
a more exploratory effort to build theory based primarily on the emergent 
ecosystem and platform theory bases, where the target ecosystem is based around a 
single platform with a large, profit-seeking company at its core. In order to 
accomplish this task, we proposed the following research questions: 
RQ 4.1: What aspects of ecosystems/platforms as a new organizational form 
are explained by transaction cost economics and agency theory? 
RQ 4.2: What additional explanatory value is provided by 
platform/ecosystem theory? 
RQ 4.3: What additional conceptual development is needed? 
We begin to address these research questions through a detailed qualitative analysis 
of each of our two domains along the primary dimensions of transaction cost 
economics: asset specificity, transaction frequency, environmental uncertainty, and 
behavioral uncertainty. Based on our analysis, we conclude that TCE is generally 
effective in its explanatory value for analyzing the most effective governance form 
for a dyadic relationship, including hold-up costs and partner lock-in, the 
completeness of contracts, and issues related to the monitoring of exchange 
behavior.  
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However, we find several areas where the ecosystems and platforms literature 
may complement TCE. These include the focus on a complex network of 
relationships as opposed to a dyadic relationship focus; the importance of 
innovation, and the tension between encouraging creation while retaining a degree 
of control; issues related to mechanisms for value appropriation by the core firm; 
the importance of tools for encouraging innovation by third parties; the graduation 
and self-selection of control mechanisms; the treatment of heterogeneity and 
variability; the transfer of legitimacy and status; and the co-existence and interaction 
of market and community mechanisms.
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2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN INTERNET-BASED AFFILIATE 
MARKETING PROGRAMS IN SPAIN 
* An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 20th Bled eConference 
(June, 2007), and the final manuscript of this chapter has been published in the 
International Journal of Ebusiness Research (Fox and Wareham, 2010). 
2.1 Introduction: 
Revenue-sharing affiliate marketing is potentially the most cost-effective 
method for acquiring new customers on the Internet. Also called pay for 
performance marketing, an affiliate marketing program consists of an on-line retailer 
(merchant) who places a link on a third-party website (affiliate). If a visitor to the 
affiliate site clicks on the link and performs a specified action (e.g. visits the 
merchant’s website, fills out a form, or purchases a product), the affiliate receives a 
commission. The arrangement has been described as similar to having a large, 
independent sales force working solely for commission and absorbing the total risk 
associated with marketing a retailer’s products (Duffy, 2005). 
While Amazon is generally credited with creating the first major affiliate 
program on the Internet (launched in 1996), Hoffman and Novak first focused the 
attention of the academic community on this strategy in 2000, concluding that of the 
various forms of advertising used by online retailer CDnow, their affiliate program 
was by far the most cost effective (after word-of-mouth, to which they attributed a 
cost of zero), since it allowed the retailer to “draw a direct line from advertisement 
to sale” (p. 188, Hoffman and Novak 2000).  
Hoffman and Novak are not the only researchers who have taken an interest 
in affiliate marketing. Papatla and Bhatnagar (2002) propose a guide to choosing 
affiliate partners, while Libai et al. (2003) perform a theoretical analysis of affiliate 
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referral fee structures in order to determine the optimal program for different types 
of affiliates. Other research includes case studies of merchants (e.g. Walthieu, 2000) 
as well as affiliates (e.g. Moon, 2000).  
Despite these initial efforts to bring the topic of affiliate marketing to the 
fore, recent empirical studies have been few and far between. This might lead one to 
the conclusion that affiliate marketing was merely a fad which was popular for a 
time, but has since faded into obscurity. This is not the case. Duffy (2005) recently 
observed that “affiliate marketing is likely to become the principal mainstream 
marketing strategy for e-commerce businesses in the future” (p. 161). It is difficult, 
however, to find exact estimates of market size, as affiliate marketing has yet to be 
clearly defined, and the entrance of dozens of intermediaries further complicates the 
situation (Molander, 2005). While ValueClick (2006) estimates the global affiliate 
marketing sector to be in the range of $400 - $500 million, MarketingSherpa places 
the figure at $6.5 billion (MarketingSherpa, 2006a). Today, 9-40% of a typical online 
retailer’s sales come from affiliates (MarketingSherpa, 2006b). 
In light of the growing practical importance of affiliate marketing, there are 
critical issues which have not received sufficient attention by researchers thus far. 
An area of particular interest, and the topic of this chapter, is the governance 
mechanisms used in affiliate programs to control the promotional activities of 
affiliates. One of the principal advantages of affiliate marketing is its ability to 
accurately track the behavior of visitors in terms of website visits, lead generation 
and sales. However, there is a significant risk that while promoting merchants’ 
products and services, affiliates may engage in activities that are fraudulent, 
unethical, or somehow destructive to the brand value of the merchant. As affiliates 
are often the first point of contact with a potential customer, negatively-perceived 
activities on their part could have a disastrous effect on the retailer’s business.  
The need for further investigation in the area of governance of affiliate 
marketing programs is corroborated by a recent survey from AffStat (2006), in which 
nearly 200 affiliate managers were asked their biggest challenge in affiliate 
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marketing. About half indicated some form of governance issue (detecting fraud, 
properly managing the affiliates, monitoring affiliates for brand risks and monitoring 
affiliates’ use of trademarks in search engines).  
Transaction cost analysis (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991) and 
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) provide 
the theoretical background for the constructs used in this study. Opportunism has 
appeared in the literature in many different forms (see Wathne and Heide, 2000 for 
a detailed treatment of the construct), but can be generally described as “some form 
of cheating or undersupply relative to an implicit or explicit contract” (p. 48, Wathne 
and Heide, 2000). In the TCA and Agency theory literature, the primary relationship 
considered is that between a principal and an agent, which in affiliate marketing 
would be the merchant and its affiliate. However, in the context of affiliate 
marketing (and in marketing relationships in general), the most important 
relationship is that between the merchant and the end customer. Therefore, 
opportunism in this case would include any action on the part of the affiliate which 
could damage the reputation of the merchant in the eyes of its customers (or 
potential customers).  
The means of limiting channel member opportunism in transaction cost 
analysis is through the use of governance, and several mechanisms are available for 
managing partner opportunism (Heide, 1994). The authors have identified the 
following as the most relevant in the affiliate marketing channel: the formal 
contract, partner selection, incentives, and monitoring. All four governance 
mechanisms are reviewed in greater detail in the Research Background section. 
This chapter explores the following research question:  
RQ 2.1: How are governance mechanisms used by merchants in one-to-many, 
Internet-based affiliate marketing programs in Spain to control the activities 
of their affiliates?  
This is accomplished by combining theoretical analysis with empirical evidence 
obtained in two phases: first, data was collected from a total of 136 affiliate 
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programs managed by three of the largest affiliate networks in Spain at the time the 
study was conducted; next, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 
professionals representing the various roles in the affiliate marketing channel: 
merchants, advertising agencies, and affiliate networks. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the following 
section, background theory is reviewed on types of affiliate programs, the affiliate 
marketing channel structure, commission pricing, and transaction cost analysis and 
agency theory applied to the affiliate marketing context. We continue with Data 
Collection and Analysis, where the research method is described and a summary of 
the data is provided. The Results section details the findings for each of the four 
governance mechanisms. Finally, the Discussion section summarizes the findings and 
describes implications for the management of affiliate programs and is followed by 
Conclusions.  
2.2 Research background 
2.2.1 Affiliate Marketing 
Amazon.com is widely credited with creating the first affiliate program on the 
Internet in 1996 (Dysart, 2002; Libai et al., 2003). Since then, Amazon has gone on to 
develop one of the largest and most successful affiliate programs in the world. 
According to their website, they currently have over 1,000,000 members worldwide. 
Many others have followed Amazon’s example, making affiliate marketing an 
important source of customer acquisition (Hoffman and Novak, 2000; Libai et al., 
2003).  
The benefits from these programs in terms of increased visitor traffic and 
sales can be significant. However, there are additional risks for retailers when they 
entrust their marketing efforts to affiliates. According to a recent survey of affiliate 
managers (merchants) by AffStat (2006), when asked their biggest challenge in 
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affiliate marketing, a high percentage of the responses were related to governance 
issues1: 
Table 2.1: Challenges in Affiliate Marketing 
Risk Relationship Structure 
 Pay per Sale Pay per Lead 
Detecting Fraud 14% 24% 
Properly managing the affiliates 18% 22% 
Monitoring affiliates for brand risks 6% 4% 
Monitoring affiliate use of trademarks in search engines 8% 2% 
Total 46% 52% 
 
The following sections provide further background on the types of affiliate 
programs in use, the affiliate marketing channel structure and affiliate commission 
pricing, as well as a discussion of agency theory and transaction cost analysis as 
applied to governance mechanisms in the affiliate marketing context. 
2.2.2 Types of Affiliate Programs 
Libai et al. (2003) describe two types of affiliate programs, one-to-one and 
one-to-many. In a one-to-one program, the merchant and affiliate negotiate a 
unique contract which specifies the terms and conditions of the arrangement. In this 
case, the affiliate site has significant negotiating power with the merchant. The fee 
arrangement is often long-term and often involves up-front payment of all or a 
portion of the commissions.  
In contrast, Amazon.com has an “open” program, where affiliates link to the 
Amazon.com site and earn up to an 8.5% referral fee when visitors who click on the 
links make a purchase. This is an example of a one-to-many program, in which the 
merchant (Amazon in this case) makes the program available to numerous affiliates 
and establishes the terms of the agreement including pricing, advertising formats 
                                                     
1 The results of the survey are divided by the type of pricing scheme offering. In Pay per Sale programs, the 
affiliate receives a commission when the customer referred to the merchant site makes a purchase. In Pay per 
Lead programs, the affiliate receives a commission for each unique visitor sent. 
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available, and acceptable practices. Affiliates simply decide whether or not to apply 
to the program. Once the affiliates sign up for the program, the merchant has 
considerable power in the relationship, and may change the terms of the agreement 
or cancel the agreement at any time.  
One-to-one programs by their very nature are easier for merchants to 
control: there are fewer affiliates, and the relationship is more direct. However, one-
to-many programs are much more difficult, as merchants must keep track of the 
performance of potentially thousands of affiliates, and often use one or more 
intermediaries to do so. Due to the acute nature of the governance issues in one-to 
many programs as compared to one-to-one, the remainder of this research will focus 
on one-to-many affiliate programs. 
2.2.3 Affiliate Marketing Channel Structure 
The affiliate marketing channel structure is summarized in Exhibit 1 
below:
 
Marketer 
Advertiser 
Merchant 
Ad 
Agency 
Affiliate 
Network(s) 
Affiliates Customers 
Create ads 
Place ads with 
affiliate networks 
Monitor affiliate 
network 
Monitor affiliate 
activities 
Create ads 
Place ads with 
affiliate networks 
Issue program 
guidelines 
Monitor affiliate 
network 
Monitor affiliate 
activities 
Pay ad agency 
and/or affiliate 
network 
Provide tracking 
technology 
Manage calculation of 
commissions 
Issue payments to 
affiliates 
State affiliate program 
conditions  
Facilitate affiliate 
application processing 
Provide affiliates with 
access to ads 
(banners, text links, 
product data file) 
Monitor affiliate 
activities 
 
Promotional activities  
using various  
business models: 
Niche/Content site 
Shopping site 
PPC advertising 
Etc. 
...and various tools: 
Text Links 
Banners 
Content 
Search Engine Optimization 
Email 
PPC 
Coupons 
Data feeds 
CPA 
Networks 
Perform similar 
activities to affiliate 
networks 
Exhibit 2.1: Affiliate Marketing Channel 
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A company can either manage their affiliate program themselves, or use one 
of the many affiliate marketing networks who perform this function. Proponents of 
in-house programs claim that they are only cost-effective once they reach a certain 
size (Ray, 2001, p.30). Therefore, the vast majority of merchants use one or more 
affiliate networks to manage their affiliate programs.  
The focus of this research is on affiliate programs which use one or more 
affiliate networks as intermediaries. The proposition is that this indirect relationship 
between the merchant and the affiliates increases the importance of governance 
mechanisms. As the affiliate marketing channel gets longer (with additional 
intermediaries between the advertiser and the consumer) and wider (with additional 
affiliates added to the channel), governance of the activities of affiliates logically 
becomes more difficult.  
2.2.4 Affiliate Business Models 
Affiliates engage in various types of business activities, where affiliate 
marketing can represent anything from a small source of extra income to the core 
activity of the business. In a recent survey by PartnerCentric (2006) of 1,041 
affiliates, the majority of respondents identified themselves as niche/content sites 
(44.5%), coupon/discount shopping sites (26.9%) and PPC advertisers (17.5%). The 
remaining 11.1% included sweepstakes/contest sites, shopping malls, 
incentive/loyalty sites, personal websites and blog/ezine.  
The business models used by affiliates have governance implications, 
particularly in the areas of partner selection and monitoring. For example, it may be 
more difficult to monitor an affiliate who promotes merchants using search engine 
marketing, but does not have a web page. 
Affiliates also vary significantly in the size of their operations and contribution to an 
advertiser’s program, but the general rule is that the vast majority of visitors and 
sales come from a small number of affiliates. Some have claimed that 20% of 
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affiliates account for 80% of transactions (Fox, 2000), while others believe that as 
much as 95% of sales come from 5% of the affiliates (Ray, 2001). 
2.2.5 Affiliate Promotion Tools 
In terms of the tools used to promote affiliate programs, the leading 
responses in the Partnercentric (2006) survey include:  
Table 2.2: Promotional Tools for Affiliate Programs 
Promotion Tool Percentage  
Text links  19.88% 
Banners  18.80% 
Content  18.40% 
Search engine optimization  11.51% 
Email  9.42% 
PPC 7.51% 
Coupons  6.83% 
Data feeds  4.09% 
 
Much of the governance challenge in affiliate marketing is due to the degree 
to which affiliates can customize the merchant’s message. Therefore, those tools 
where the affiliate has a significant degree of autonomy in deciding how to represent 
a merchant tend to add to the monitoring challenge. 
Email is one tool which is popular for affiliates since it allows them to send 
targeted advertising to customers at a low cost.  However, from a customer 
perspective, the problem of spam looms large. Consumer concerns regarding spam 
include “privacy, false email identities, questionable email content, enticement and 
fraud”, and in 2002 the European Parliament dictated that users must opt-in (give 
prior consent) to receive UCE (unsolicited commercial email) (Sipior et al., 2004).  
One common strategy used by merchants is to forbid the use of their 
trademarks in the search engine marketing activities of affiliates. Another approach 
is to prevent affiliates from using the merchant trademark in the text of 
advertisements written and placed in search engines. The efficacy of these measures 
is far from clear, however. While there is a risk of cannibalizing sales from the 
merchants’ other marketing efforts, many have suggested allowing affiliates to bid 
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on trademarks improves reach, effectively “filling the channel” by showing multiple 
ads to search engine users, which ultimately should result in more sales for the 
advertiser (Internet Retailer, 2004; Stein, 2004).  
2.2.6 Commission Pricing  
The Internet as a marketing channel has the unique ability to not only track 
the amount of advertising delivered, but the amount consumed as well (Hoffman 
and Novak, 2000). Through the use of a cookie placed on a visitor’s computer when 
they click on an ad, it is possible to track which site the visitor came from (including 
any affiliate programs associated with the ad) as well as their behavior on the 
merchant site, up to and including events such as a registration or a purchase, even if 
that event happens 30-45 days (or in some cases a year, depending on the 
configuration of the cookie) later. This ability to track visitor behavior has given rise 
to additional pricing models which emphasize pay-per-performance (PPP), 
commonly known as cost-per-action or cost-per-acquisition (CPA). 
  The choice of pricing model has important implications for governance. See 
Table 2.3 below for a brief description. 
Table 2.3: Affiliate commission pricing models 
Pricing Model Description 
CPC  
(Cost-per-Click) 
A commission is paid for each 
unique visitor referred to the 
merchant site. 
CPS  
(Cost-per-Sale) 
A commission is only paid when a 
visitor makes a purchase. 
CPL  
(Cost-per-Lead) 
A commission is only paid when a 
visitor fills out a form. 
Hybrid  A commission is paid for each 
unique visitor, and an additional 
commission is paid per sale or 
lead 
2.2.7 Governance Mechanisms: Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Analysis Theory 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) 
addresses the agency relationship in which a principal delegates work to an agent 
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who then performs the work. The two parties are engaged in cooperative behavior, 
but have different goals and different attitudes towards risk. Agency theory 
describes this relationship using the metaphor of a contract, and attempts to resolve 
two problems: a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict; and b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify the agent’s activities (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The problems in developing effective contracts are a result of certain human 
assumptions (self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion) and information 
asymmetry between the two parties, which give rise to the risks of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.   
Information asymmetry in the case of affiliate marketing occurs due to the 
fact that one-to-many affiliate marketing programs have potentially thousands of 
affiliates who are given a significant degree of autonomy as to how they represent 
the merchants’ products and services. Many of these activities are not easily 
observed due to the highly distributed nature of the Internet. This information 
asymmetry is exacerbated by the presence of affiliate networks acting as 
intermediaries, which distances the merchant even further from the activities of its 
affiliates.  
The primary limitation of agency theory is that it focuses exclusively on the 
formal contract as the unit of analysis. Transaction cost analysis may be a useful tool 
to extend the analysis to a broader understanding of governance in the merchant-
affiliate relationship. Transaction cost analysis (TCA), (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975, 1985), has been used extensively in marketing to analyze interfirm 
relationships (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Brown et al., 2000; Dahlstrom et al., 
1996; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Brown et al. (2000) claim that the normative goal 
of the theory is to minimize the costs of exchange, and that one way to accomplish 
that objective is to minimize the impact of opportunism on channel members.  
The means of limiting channel member opportunism in transaction cost 
analysis is through the use of governance, which may be broadly defined as “a 
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multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing the initiation, termination and 
ongoing relationship maintenance between a set of parties” (Heide, 1994, p. 72).  
Several mechanisms are available for managing partner opportunism. The 
model provided by Wathne and Heide (2000, p. 44) is used as the basis for the 
governance mechanisms employed in this research, along with the formal contract 
as used in agency theory. The governance mechanisms identified as relevant to 
affiliate marketing include: the formal contract, partner selection, incentives and 
monitoring.  
2.2.7.1 Governance Mechanisms: Formal Contract 
Agency theory describes two basic forms of contracts, outcome-based and 
behavior-based. The assertion is that outcome-based contracts “coalign the 
preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both 
depend on the same actions and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest between 
principal and agent are reduced” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). Behavior-based contracts, 
on the other hand, work best in situations where information systems are capable of 
measuring the agent’s behavior, where outcomes are not easily measurable, where 
agents are risk averse, where the tasks to be performed by the agent are easily 
programmed in advance, and where the relationship is long-term (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
It follows, therefore, that in one-to-many affiliate marketing programs the 
contracts would tend to be outcome-based. In fact, this is practically the definition of 
pay-per-action commission pricing. However, it may also be possible to have a hybrid 
policy towards control, where a mix of outcome-based and behavior-based 
strategies are used (Oliver and Anderson, 1995). This hybrid model appears to be 
what is required in affiliate marketing. While the incentives may be outcome-based, 
many of the conditions stipulated in the contracts between the affiliate network and 
affiliate address the behavior that the affiliate may or may not engage in while 
promoting the merchant’s products and services. In other words, the contract 
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stipulates not just the outcomes expected from the affiliate, but the expected 
behavior as well. This will have important implications for monitoring. 
2.2.7.2 Governance Mechanisms: Partner Selection 
One method for addressing the problem of opportunism, specifically 
regarding adverse selection, or “the risk of being locked-in with a supplier who lacks 
the needed skills” is to “select exchange partners a priori that are not 
opportunistically inclined or are inherently cooperative with respect to a particular 
task” (Stump and Heide, 1996, p. 432).  
Papatla and Bhatnagar (2002) addressed partner selection in affiliate 
marketing by proposing guidelines for how to choose affiliate partners, concluding 
that affiliate partnerships should be established between businesses with related 
products including: substitutes, strict complements, episodic substitutes and 
episodic compliments.  
In this study, we analyze this governance mechanism through a combination 
of the criteria for selection set forth in the formal contracts, as well as interviews 
with professionals involved in affiliate marketing.  
2.2.7.3 Governance Mechanisms: Incentives 
The primary benefit of well-structured incentives is a situation where the 
long-term gains from cooperative behavior exceed the short-term payoffs from 
opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  An effective incentive structure has also 
been called a self-enforcing agreement, which “remains in force as long as each 
party believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he would 
be by ending it” (Telser, 1980, p. 27).  
The main incentives in affiliate marketing programs are outcome-based 
commissions based on the number of visitors sent to a merchant site, and the 
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conversion of these visits into sales or registrations (see Table 3 for a list of the 
pricing models in use). The type of incentive used has important implications for 
partner selection, for monitoring, and for evaluating the success of the program. 
In this study, incentives are explored through a categorization of the base 
commissions included in the affiliate contracts, combined with qualitative data from 
interviews with professionals involved in affiliate marketing. 
2.2.7.4 Governance Mechanisms: Monitoring 
Monitoring may be defined as “an effort made by one party to measure or 
“meter” the performance of another” (Heide et al., 2007, p. 426). Monitoring serves 
to reduce information asymmetry between the two parties, and thereby to reduce 
opportunism. Agency theory uses the term information systems for the same 
activity. In the case of affiliate marketing, affiliate networks gather real-time 
statistics on visitors, registrations and sales in the various affiliate marketing 
programs. In other words, the outcomes of affiliate activities are tracked regularly. 
However, it is not readily apparent which strategies are used to monitor the affiliate 
activities in order to ensure they comply with the behavioral restrictions included in 
the contract.  
In this study, monitoring is analyzed through data gathered from the affiliate 
program guidelines (formal contracts), combined with interviews with professionals 
associated with affiliate marketing. 
2.3 Data Collection and analysis 
Spain was chosen as the location of the study for two main reasons: 1) it is 
small enough for the sample to encompass a substantial portion of the affiliate 
programs in the country; and 2) It contains a much higher proportion of programs 
with cost per click pricing (as opposed to cost per action) than countries such as the 
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U.S. or the U.K., and therefore has a higher potential for opportunistic behavior on 
the part of affiliates.  
This study explores the first governance mechanism, the formal contract, by 
reviewing the restrictions placed on affiliate behavior in three areas: a) the program 
guidelines communicated to affiliates when they are accepted into a program; b) 
restrictions stipulated in the contract between the affiliate and the affiliate network; 
and c) restrictions from other intermediaries such as search engines.  
Data was collected from a total of 136 programs managed by three of the 
largest affiliate networks in Spain at the time the study was conducted: 
Tradedoubler (56 advertisers), Zanox (75 advertisers) and OMG (5 advertisers). 
These include all of the programs in the three affiliate networks and, as such, 
represent a significant portion of the overall population in Spain. Not included are 
programs run on other affiliate networks, or programs run directly by a merchant 
without using an intermediary. While it is difficult to gauge the total population of 
affiliate programs in Spain due to a lack of an authoritative list of all programs, the 
authors estimate that this sample represents upwards of 75% of the population at 
the time the sample was taken, and perhaps as much as 90%.  
Background information was collected from the guidelines for each program 
including: name of affiliate network, program name and category of business 
activity. Next, affiliate restrictions were gathered from the program guidelines. The 
results are summarized below: 
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Table 2.4: Research Results  
Question 
Number of Affirmative 
Responses 
Percentage of 
Total 
Are there restrictions on the use of the company trademark in the 
affiliate’s URL? 5.00   3.68% 
Is search engine marketing prohibited? 20.00 14.71% 
Is the affiliate restricted from using the merchant’s trademark(s) in 
advertising copy? 22.00 18.97%* 
Is the affiliate restricted from bidding on the merchant’s trademark(s)? 34.00 29.31%* 
Is the affiliate restricted from bidding on the misspellings of the 
merchant’s trademark? 8.00   6.90%* 
Is the affiliate restricted from bidding on the trademarks of the merchant’s 
competitors? 13.00 11.21%* 
Is there a restriction on the amount that the affiliate can bid on the 
merchant’s trademark(s)? 1.00   0.86%* 
Are visitors from the affiliate site sent to a special URL separate from the 
merchant’s home page? 6.00   5.17%* 
Are there restrictions on email marketing? 3.00   2.21% 
Are there restrictions related to privacy policies? 2.00   1.47% 
Partner Selection: Are there restrictions on the types of affiliates accepted 
in the program (restrictions on affiliate website content)? 18.00 13.24% 
N=136,  or * N=116 percentage of total programs which allow search engine marketing 
 
The remaining constructs (partner selection, incentives and monitoring) are 
analyzed based on a combination of the program data described above, as well as 
data gathered in semi-formal interviews conducted with professionals in the various 
roles in the affiliate marketing channel. 11 interviews were conducted in 2007. 
Please see Table 2.5 for an overview of the interviewees. 
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Table 2.5: Interviewee profiles 
 Title Organization 
1 Online Marketing Manager Large Online Travel Agency 
2 Online Advertising and Internet 
Manager 
Online Financial Services Company 
3 Online Manager Internet Dating Site 
4 Online Marketing Manager Hotel Reservation Site 
5 Marketing Manager Event Ticket Sales Online  
6 Managing Director Interactive Marketing Agency  
7 Account Director / Consultant Affiliate Network 
8 Account Manager Affiliate Network 
9 Affiliate Manager Affiliate Network 
10 Chief Marketing Director Large Online Travel Agency 
11 Head of Affiliates Large International Online Travel Agency 
 
The process for data collection and analysis began with an initial review of the 
general contracts from each of the three large affiliate networks in Spain 
(Tradedoubler, Zanox, and OMG). In this analysis we found general language 
prohibiting things such as illegal activities, negative messages and promotion of 
violence, spam through e-mail, forced clicks, and violation of copyrights and 
trademarks. Next, we analyzed the contract provisions for each of the 136 programs 
in our sample. Here we surfaced additional, more specific restrictions related to the 
use of the merchants’ brands in search engine advertising and on the affiliate web 
sites, and restrictions related to the use of email marketing. Since our findings from 
this initial analysis were limited, we returned to the literature on transaction cost 
economics and governance mechanisms, and identified 3 additional governance 
mechanisms to add to formal contracts (partner selection, incentives, and 
monitoring). At this point we scheduled our initial semi-structured interviews. We 
took detailed notes for each interview, recording the interactions when possible, and 
highlighted positive practices as well as sources of conflict. We used a snowball 
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sampling approach, asking each interviewee for additional potential respondents at 
the end of the interview. The results of these efforts are analyzed below.    
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Formal Contracts 
The first question is whether there are restrictions against an affiliate’s using 
the merchant’s trademark in the affiliate website URL (Uniform Resource Locator, or 
the Internet address of the affiliate site). While only 3.68% of the merchants 
expressly forbid this activity, the affiliate network Zanox forbids “the use of domain 
names registered with copyrights”. Tradedoubler states in their affiliate contract that 
“the affiliate also guarantees that the information and the productions on his 
website do not infringe the rights of any third party, including intellectual property 
rights, and that the information and the productions are not offensive, forbidden or 
objectionable for any reason. In case of doubt, Tradedoubler reserves the right to 
finalize its business relationship with the Affiliate (author’s italics)” (Tradedoubler, 
2007). OMG makes similar broad statements regarding intellectual property 
infringements. 
The area for which there are the most restrictions placed on affiliate behavior 
in the formal contracts is in the use of search engine marketing. This is an area 
where affiliates typically have a great deal of independence, since they write their 
own ad copy and choose which keywords to bid on. Over 85% of the programs in the 
study allow search engine marketing in some form. Of these programs, 29.3% 
prohibit bidding on their trademark(s) in sponsored search and 6.9% forbid bidding 
on competitors’ trademarks. One of the programs reviewed in the current study 
allows bidding on their trademarks, but limits the maximum amount of the bid. 
Presumably this is to prevent affiliates from outbidding the ads placed by the 
merchant directly. 
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19% of merchants prohibit affiliates from using merchant trademark(s) in the 
advertising copy used in search engine marketing. This low percentage is somewhat 
difficult to interpret, however. Search engine policies typically limit third parties’ use 
of trademarks in advertising copy. Merchants may rely on these search engine 
restrictions rather than making them explicit in the affiliate program guidelines.  
An additional control measure is preventing affiliates from sending visitors 
directly to the merchant’s homepage, using instead a special website set up for 
affiliates. This was the case in 5.17% of the programs.  
Email and privacy policies are two related areas. There are three main issues 
here: whether affiliates clearly communicate their privacy policies to visitors; 
whether affiliates only send email to individuals who have previously opted-in; and 
whether merchants restrict and/or monitor the messages communicated via email 
regarding their products and services. In the affiliate programs we reviewed, a mere 
2.2% of merchants (3 programs total) address email marketing in some way. Of these 
3 programs, one prohibits its use, and two require visitors to opt-in, or agree to 
receive promotional email. A mere 1.5% require affiliates to communicate their 
privacy policies to visitors. These areas, however, are also covered under European 
Union and Spanish law, which require prior opt-in for unsolicited commercial email 
(Sipior et al., 2004). In addition, the program guidelines for Zanox expressly forbid 
spam, which they define as unsolicited email without prior opt-in. However, by not 
explicitly stating these restrictions in their own program guidelines, merchants may 
be leaving themselves open for problems later. 
More importantly, there are no specific guidelines as to the content of the 
email advertisements. This is surprising, as it leaves the affiliates free to represent 
the merchants’ products and services however they see fit. Furthermore, while 
merchants can visit affiliate websites in order to monitor the content, it is more 
difficult to monitor the content of emails sent which contain merchant-related 
content. One way that many merchants try to address this is by providing pre-
approved content for email marketing which the affiliate can paste directly in emails 
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sent to their customers. While this does not address the spam issue, it does help 
ensure a consistent advertising message on the part of the merchant. 
2.4.2 Partner Selection 
Only 13.24% of the programs explicitly state restrictions on the types of 
affiliates who may or may not apply to their program. These restrictions generally 
include some combination of nudity, sexual material, child pornography, firearms, 
drug consumption, gambling, illegal activity or violence. The remaining 86.76% make 
no mention whatsoever of the types of affiliate businesses which are acceptable. A 
well-known credit card provider had the most stringent policy regarding affiliate 
website content, adding restrictions against sites with religious material and sites 
whose content is poorly designed or of poor quality. However, this was the only 
program which referred to either the design of the site or its quality.  
Nevertheless, this data must be evaluated in the context of the general 
affiliate contracts in the various affiliate networks. Tradedoubler restricts affiliates 
from placing merchant advertising alongside material which is “pornographic, 
discriminatory by race, religion or sex, or which infringes the rights of third parties in 
any way” (Tradedoubler, 2006). OMG’s contract states “the Affiliate website does 
not and shall not display or contain any information or materials or hyper text links 
to information or materials which are or may be objectively considered to be 
defamatory, obscene, pornographic, offensive, threatening, blasphemous or liable to 
incite racial hatred or which promote any illegal activity including (but not limited to) 
cracking or hacking” (OMG Affiliate Contract, 2007). 
While the above restrictions address affiliates who publish illegal or offensive 
content, they do not consider the types of business models used by affiliates. 
Furthermore, other criteria used to evaluate affiliate applications based on, for 
example, their offering related products (Papatla and Bhatnagar, 2002) are not 
addressed by affiliate program guidelines. Therefore, while merchants may have 
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established internal guidelines in this regard, these are not communicated to the 
affiliates. 
In the interviews, while most merchants mentioned that they pay attention 
to the business model of the affiliate site, the industry segment, the quality of the 
design and the ways that ads are shown (even if these criteria are not usually 
mentioned in the formal program guidelines), most maintain a fairly liberal policy 
when it comes to accepting affiliates. There is general recognition that one of the 
primary benefits of affiliate marketing is broad coverage, having their ads shown 
next to a wide variety of content and to a varied audience, and not necessarily just 
those visitors who fit the merchant’s usual customer segments. One merchant 
emphasized that “many times it’s the ugly sites which bring the most traffic”. 
Another sums up their policy as follows: “the criteria are not strict for accepting 
sites, but rather it’s the tracking (monitoring) that happens later which determines 
whether the site is a good partner or not.” 
Another important consideration in partner selection is the commission 
pricing model used by the merchant. Merchants who use a pure cost per sale model 
stated that while they try to attract affiliates who will generate a large volume of 
sales, they are not concerned if the traffic sent by many affiliates does not 
accomplish this goal. However, if the commission pricing includes cost per click, the 
merchants may be more restrictive in selection since the merchant is paying a 
commission for each visitor sent by the affiliate.  
Furthermore, if the incentive program uses cost per lead commission pricing, 
the merchant may not want to accept affiliates who run points and rewards 
programs which offer visitors incentives for making purchases and filling out forms. 
One merchant with a CPL program states that “what this model brings us are 
registrations, but what we really live on as a company is sales. So, it doesn’t really 
help us in the end to have thousands of registrations if, in the end, they’re not active 
(i.e. generate revenue for the merchant).”  
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The affiliate networks also have an important role when an affiliate applies to 
a new merchant program, as the network can provide references for affiliates based 
on their past experience representing other merchants on that affiliate platform. 
One affiliate network account manager states “we know our affiliates, and we know 
whether or not a particular affiliate is a good fit for a new program. Also, when a 
new merchant signs up, we can recommend which of our affiliates can help them to 
accomplish their goals”. 
2.4.3 Incentives 
The incentives used in affiliate marketing programs are outcome-based 
commissions based on visitors referred, leads, and sales, or some combination of the 
three.  In Spain, these incentives can be classified into five basic commission pricing 
models, which are chosen depending on the program objectives of each merchant. 
Each of the models has its own governance challenges. Table 6 below shows the 
distribution of the programs in Spain: 
Table 2.6: Commission pricing models used in Spain 
Pricing Model Number of 
programs 
Percentage of Total 
CPS  60 44.12 
CPC + Sale 30 22.06 
CPL  22 16.18 
CPC  12 8.82 
CPC + Lead 12 8.82 
 
The most common model is CPS (cost per sale), where the affiliate is only 
compensated when a referred visitor makes a purchase. This is the model with the 
fewest governance challenges, according to the interviewees, since the risk 
associated with advertising and conversion (getting visitors to make purchases) is 
transferred to the affiliates. In a pure CPS model, affiliates have an incentive to send 
“quality” traffic, or visitors who are likely to make a purchase. Otherwise the 
affiliates receive no compensation for their efforts. 
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The second-most popular model is CPC + Sale, where the affiliate is paid a 
high initial cost-per-click commission for each visitor referred, and then an additional 
commission if a visitor makes a purchase. The objective under this incentive model is 
similar to a pure CPS model: generating visitor traffic and sales. However, according 
to one affiliate network representative, this model is more attractive to affiliates 
“because the merchant absorbs some of the advertising and conversion risk”.  
One important governance mechanism available to merchants is their ability 
to change the commission pricing for a given affiliate or for the entire program 
whenever they want and for any reason. For example, in the case of CPC + Sale, if 
the visitors sent from a particular affiliate do not produce a high conversion rate, the 
merchant may change that affiliate’s commission to a pricing structure focused more 
on sales.  
CPL programs only pay incentives to affiliates when a referred visitor fills out 
a form on the merchant site. This form can be as simple as a contact form with 
phone number and email, or as detailed as a credit card or loan application, 
including banking and employment details. As discussed in the background section, 
the objective of this compensation structure is to generate leads, but it may be 
difficult to ensure the quality of the leads. Monitoring is a key governance 
mechanism for programs using this incentive structure. 
CPC programs present the most significant governance issues, as the sole 
objective is to generate traffic. However, since there is no conversion objective (sales 
or leads), it can be difficult to gauge the quality of the traffic. According to the 
affiliate network representatives interviewed, this type of structure is usually used 
for a short-term program with a traffic quota. Once this quota is reached, either the 
incentive structure is changed to include a CPS or CPL component, or the program is 
discontinued. 
The risks and governance issues in a CPC + Lead program are similar to those 
in a CPC + Sale program. 
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Many merchants operate multiple program levels depending on affiliate 
performance, and the merchant has the ability to reward an affiliate with promotion 
to a higher commission level, or to penalize them by demoting them to a lower 
commission level.  
These outcome-based incentives are designed to accomplish program 
objectives regarding generating traffic, sales and leads. However, they cannot 
address many aspects of affiliate behavior included in the formal contract. In other 
words, the incentive structures discussed above address the results of the affiliate 
activities, but not how they achieve those results. Therefore, monitoring is critical for 
ensuring that both outcomes and behavior comply with a merchant’s requirements. 
2.4.4 Monitoring 
The first area to consider under monitoring is how merchants measure the 
results of their programs.  Some important metrics include EPC, CTR, CR, and AOV. 
EPC is the average earnings per hundred clicks, calculated as the total commissions 
divided by the total number of clicks times 100. It represents the ability to turn clicks 
into commissions, and can be calculated both for an individual affiliate as well as for 
an entire affiliate program. CTR is the click-through rate, measuring the percentage 
of impressions (times an ad is shown) which result in a unique visitor clicking on an 
ad. CR is the conversion rate, or percentage of visitors who take a desired action, 
such as making a purchase or filling out a form, after clicking on an affiliate link. AOV, 
or average order value, is calculated by dividing the total sales value by the number 
of sales.  
While the above metrics are useful in evaluating programs and affiliates, the 
most important metric is return on investment (ROI). There are various ways to 
calculate this metric: the denominator is usually total marketing cost, but the 
numerator could be sales, gross profit or net profit, depending on the merchant’s 
specific objectives. While a high ROI is clearly preferable to a low one, one merchant 
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emphasized that they prefer affiliates who bring high volume at a lower ROI to 
affiliates who have a high ROI but few sales.  
While ROI numbers were not disclosed by the interviewees, one media 
agency representative with experience in the UK claimed that a transactional ROI of 
less than 120% in the mid- to long- term would be unacceptable, and that this figure 
would be very difficult to achieve for any program using CPC (which is the case for 
many affiliate programs in Spain). He claimed that CPC programs tend to benefit the 
affiliates and the affiliate networks at the expense of the merchants, whose 
profitability depends on sales, not visitor traffic. 
The frequency of monitoring these metrics depends both on the merchant as 
well as the type of commission pricing used. A program using a CPA model (either 
CPS or CPL) will usually review the program metrics and individual affiliate metrics 
bi-weekly or monthly, and changes are made to an individual affiliate’s commission 
structure depending on their performance. However, if a program’s commission 
pricing includes CPC (CPC only, CPC + sale, or CPC + lead), the CR is reviewed daily 
according to the affiliate networks (after an initial introduction period of a few 
weeks to a month). If the CR is low for an affiliate, it means that they are sending low 
quality traffic, where few of the visitors complete a desired action. In this case the 
commission structure can be changed to reduce the CPC commission, or to change 
the commission structure to CPC or CPL. 
The above relates to the monitoring of outcomes, which is one of affiliate 
marketing’s greatest strengths. However, monitoring affiliate behavior is just as 
important; the formal contracts include several restrictions on affiliate behavior, 
especially concerning how an affiliate is allowed to represent merchants in search 
engine marketing, and to a lesser extent in email marketing.  
One of the main ways that merchants tend to recognize fraud or undesirable 
activity is by monitoring significant changes in the visitors/sales/leads generated by 
affiliates. For example, an affiliate who usually generates very low volume may all of 
a sudden generate a large number of clicks, or a very high conversion rate. These 
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could be symptoms of using popups or forced clicks, or even adware, which “steals” 
commissions from other affiliates. Another example is in CPL programs where 
affiliates send a large number of registrations which remain inactive, or do not 
convert into sales.  
The affiliate program representatives stated that they try to monitor the way 
their ads are displayed on affiliate web sites on a monthly or quarterly basis, but that 
this is done in an unsystematic way, randomly selecting web sites and visiting them 
one by one.   
One of the biggest concerns of merchants is how affiliates use their 
trademarks (to use the legal term) or brands (to use the marketing term), especially 
in search engine marketing. One merchant described their approach as follows: “I’m 
fine with them (affiliates) bringing in traffic with whatever keyword they want, but 
leave our brand alone.” 
The monitoring strategies used by merchants in this area include the 
following: first, they register their trademarks with the search engines, so that only 
the merchant can bid on its own brand. Then, the merchant monitors the search 
engines for advertising which violates their program restrictions. If the merchant 
notices an affiliate misusing their brand, they notify them and perhaps exclude them 
from the program if the violation is intentional and persistent. Most emphasize that 
this is not a systematic process, however.  
Merchants also use the individuals or departments responsible for their own 
search engine marketing and search engine optimization to help monitor affiliate 
behavior. Since it is these individuals’ responsibility to keep detailed track of the 
positioning of the merchant’s web site compared to those of competitors for their 
important keywords, they are often the first to notice inappropriate behavior on the 
part of affiliates. One affiliate manager also stated that he uses a third-party auditing 
service to track the merchant’s brand, and that he often identified affiliate 
irregularities in these reports. One merchant summarized it as follows: “while there 
aren’t currently any tools which control this behavior completely, it is still very 
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controllable through coordination with our internal SEO and search marketing 
efforts.”  
In terms of email marketing, the affiliate managers interviewed expressed 
little concern because there are few affiliates engaging in this activity currently. 
However, this is a concern for the future, as many programs are beginning to 
recognize its potential, while there are currently few restrictions on affiliate behavior 
using email marketing included in the formal contracts. 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the following research 
question: How are governance mechanisms used by merchants in one-to-many, 
Internet-based affiliate marketing programs in Spain to control the activities of their 
affiliates? Four, inter-related governance mechanisms were identified: formal 
contracts, partner selection, incentives, and monitoring. The overall conclusion is 
that there is a considerable lack of transparency as to how affiliates are permitted to 
represent the merchants’ products and services. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that affiliates must consider not only the specific affiliate program 
guidelines, but also the network affiliate contract as well as other conditions 
specified by third party intermediaries such as search engines. This makes the 
affiliate’s task more difficult when it comes to conforming to the expectations of 
merchants, and it increases the importance of the other three governance 
mechanisms discussed in this chapter. In addition, the merchants have significant 
power in their management of their affiliate programs: they generally reserve the 
right to alter or cancel the arrangement with a particular affiliate at any time and for 
any reason (which need not be communicated to the affiliate). While this may be an 
effective governance mechanism, greater transparency may help to create more 
positive merchant-affiliate relationships. 
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Table 7 summarizes the conclusions for each governance mechanism.  
2.5.2 Implications for managers of affiliate marketing programs 
The following are general recommendations for managers of affiliate marketing 
programs: 
• Merchants should provide more explicit guidelines concerning sponsored search 
restrictions, the types of businesses which are acceptable as affiliates, and the 
necessity of including privacy policies on affiliate sites that use email marketing. 
• Merchants should conduct regular reviews of affiliate web sites, especially the 
placement and content of merchant-related information. 
• Merchants should do regular, systematic keyword searches for their brand and 
related keywords in order to identify the keywords and advertising messages 
used to represent the merchant’s brand. 
• Affiliate managers should coordinate with the merchant’s search engine 
marketing and search engine optimization efforts as a cross-check on affiliate 
behavior. 
• Email should be carefully controlled: either the affiliate should be restricted to 
using content prepared by the merchant, or they should be required to send the 
affiliate manager a copy of any promotional emails which include merchant-
related content. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This has been an exploratory study of the governance mechanisms used by 
merchants in one-to-many Internet-based affiliate marketing programs in a specific 
market, Spain, to control the behavior of their affiliate partners. While we cannot 
ensure that the sample was thoroughly random, we do believe that the relatively 
small size of the market/population enabled us to capture a large proportion of the 
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overall phenomenon. Of course, the Spanish market may not be representative of 
the global phenomenon.  
Since this was an initial exploratory study, a more predictive approach might 
be useful in analyzing the relationships between these governance mechanisms and 
program outcomes, both positive and negative.  
In addition, since Spain is a relatively new market in terms of affiliate 
marketing, future research may expand the study to include more established 
markets such as the U.K. and the U.S. For example, the U.K. and U.S. may be more 
restrictive in terms of program guidelines and partner selection, and incentives may 
be fine-tuned on a more frequent basis. Furthermore, their monitoring efforts may 
be more extensive than those in Spain, and may shed further light in terms of how 
best to ensure positive outcomes and behavior, and to identify/avoid opportunism. 
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Table 2.7 Conclusions for each governance mechanism 
Governance Mechanism Conclusions
Formal Contract There are some limitations placed on the use of search engine marketing by affiliates, primarily 
related to the use of the merchant’s trademarks. The content of the advertisements is not 
addressed, however, either in search engine or email promotions; this is left to the discretion of 
the affiliates. Here, the lack of explicit guidelines increases the risk of an affiliate 
misrepresenting the merchant’s business, and thus increases the importance of the other 
governance mechanisms discussed here.
Partner Selection The formal contracts clearly prohibit affiliates who use illegal or offensive content or who use 
the trademark of the merchant in their website address. It is unclear, however, the types of 
affiliate business models and industry segments which are acceptable. The interviews indicated 
that while merchants are most interested in affiliates who can generate a high volume of traffic 
and sales, offer complementary products and have well-designed, professional sites, they still 
accept the majority of affiliate applications in order to reach the broadest audience of potential 
customers.
Incentives Incentives fall into five basic categories of outcome-based commission pricing schemes. The 
model chosen by a given merchant depends on the objectives for their program and the type of 
model used has governance implications, particularly regarding the types of affiliates who should 
be accepted in the program and the level of monitoring required. For example, a CPC program 
requires much more frequent monitoring to ensure that affiliates are sending high-quality 
visitors.
Outcomes:
Outcome-based monitoring activities are focused on tracking the number of visitors, sales and 
registrations generated by the affiliate, with criteria according to the particular commission 
pricing scheme in place. Return on investment is the primary metric used to evaluate affiliates 
and programs. Affiliates who perform well are rewarded by promotion to a better commission 
level, and those who perform poorly may be penalized by demotion to a lower commission level, 
or eliminated from the program altogether.
Behavior:
Merchants look for sudden changes in affiliate performance as possible indicators of fraud or 
irregular activity. Most conduct periodic random checks of affiliate websites, albeit in an 
unsystematic way, to evaluate the placement of their advertisements. Finally, merchants 
generally identify affiliates who do not comply with their search engine marketing restrictions on 
an exception basis through periodic searches and through coordination with their search engine 
optimization and search engine marketing departments.
      
Monitoring
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3 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN AN ERP-VENDOR ECOSYSTEM  
Note: An earlier version of this chapter was presented as Research in Progress at the 
International Conference on Information Systems (December, 2008), and the full 
manuscript was submitted to Organization Science and has received a second “revise 
and resubmit” response from the editors (06/2012). We are currently in the process of 
preparing a revised manuscript (estimated submission date 12/2012). 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent literature has used the concept of ecosystems to describe the complex 
interdependencies between various roles within industry sectors including platform 
architects, core producers, complementors and communities of users (Gawer and 
Cusumano 2002, Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003, Iansiti and Levien 2004). The use 
of this biological metaphor is an acknowledgement that no one firm can address every 
customer need. A vibrant product ecosystem requires generalists and specialists; 
stability and inertia; and the ability to flexibly evolve with developments in consumer 
tastes and technological frontiers. Kapoor and Lee (2013) found that firms who pursue 
alliances through complementors exhibit a greater probability of investing in new 
technologies than firms who follow transaction-based or vertical integration strategies. 
The biology analogy further emphasizes that strategy is not merely a zero-sum game, 
and that the health of an individual firm is dependent on the overall health of the 
business ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien 2004, Iyer et al. 2006, Adner 2006). 
Consequently, for an ecosystem to remain healthy, participants must share value with 
the ecosystem; that is, give as much as they take (Iansiti and Levien 2004). This 
emphasis on sharing within the ecosystem immediately suggests an open strategy 
should be adopted, at least partially, by firms. One way in which those at the core of 
an ecosystem enable participants to give back to the ecosystem is to open up parts of 
an otherwise proprietary or closed platform. Central, core participants in an ecosystem 
known as keystone players create value by developing “platforms” consisting of 
services, tools or technologies to foster innovation, growth and diversity from 
independent actors on the periphery (Jeppesen and Molin 2003, Iansiti and Levien 
2004, Prugl and Schreier 2006).  
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 The idea of assuming a partially open or hybrid strategy is central to much of 
the literature on Open Innovation (Chesbrough 2003, Gassmann 2006), which argues 
that successful executors of an open innovation strategy will offer incentives and tools 
for innovation outside the firm, combined with some mechanism for value 
appropriation from these creations. As an example, West (2003) suggests that 
computing architectures can benefit from opening commodity layers of the software in 
order to harness developments in open source communities, but with carefully 
considered restrictions to ensure the retention of some value by the designer or 
protagonist of the architecture. This suggests a very clear challenge in designing 
processes that govern collaborative development and implementation projects in a 
central core and heterogeneous periphery.   
 While research on ecosystems and open innovation primarily address 
innovation between a company and its development partners, other streams of 
research focus on innovation between a company and the end-users of the company’s 
products. Von Hippel (2001) has studied user innovation communities, where 
consumers adapt an existing product to their specific needs without the need for 
further intervention from the manufacturer. Follow-on research on user innovation 
has focused on “toolkits”, which encourage external firms and individuals to create 
complementary products or add-ons (Jeppesen and Molin 2003, Prugl and Schreier 
2006, von Hippel 2001). Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2003) discuss co-creation 
experiences, where individuals interact with an “experience environment” composed 
of a nodal company, suppliers, partners and customer communities in creating value. 
The authors view innovation from the perspective of the end-user or customer, 
suggesting that value creation is not company-, product- or even customer-specific, 
but is rather “the purposeful interaction of the individual consumer with a network of 
companies and consumer communities that enable personalized experience” (p. 14). 
Arguably, however, where the literature does stress innovation or creative 
processes outside the firm, it is less explicit about the process of value appropriation 
and control. For example, Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) delineate a variety of 
strategies that combine traditional strategy with open source business models and 
highlight the need to balance value creation with value capture. They state, “If 
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companies cannot find ways to profit from their innovation activities in open initiatives 
– through deployment, hybridization, complements, or self service, they cannot sustain 
their participation in those initiatives over time (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007 p. 
69)."  Where their offered typology of open business models goes far to address co-
existence and creation, it is less explicit on how to achieve value appropriation, and 
omits any deeper discussion of governance and risk in open innovation processes. 
Adner (2006) does explicitly address the idea of risk in open innovation, suggesting 
that timing and delay are key tools to employ to harmonize highly complementary 
product launches in the ecosystem. West and O’Mahoney (2008) discuss the tension 
between control and growth experienced by sponsors in sponsored source 
communities, concluding that the more control sponsors tried to exert over the 
direction of the community, the more they restricted the community’s ability to grow. 
Their study highlights a need for a balanced equilibrium between innovation and 
control; the need to govern, but not over-tax the ecosystem. 
 Our research is based upon several premises. First, we suggest that there is a 
fundamental tradeoff between creativity and control salient in technology platforms or 
ecosystems. Creativity without control can lead to excessive fragmentation and 
variable quality, reducing cohesion and value for potential adopters, and inflicting the 
ecosystem sponsor with the reputation costs of the poor quality. This will limit value 
for all ecosystem participants. By contrast, excessively strict or poorly designed control 
mechanisms can starve creativity and hamper innovation, similarly damaging the 
health and growth of the ecosystem. Second, we argue that research on governance 
and control mechanisms is less developed or mature than discourse on creativity 
phases, and therefore warrants attention in order to understand this critical 
interdependence between creativity and control. Finally, we contend that prior 
research has tended to view technology ecosystems as homogeneous, assuming that 
governance is uniform for all parties. We propose that there is a need for empirical 
research which adopts a more subtle view of technology ecosystem governance, 
acknowledging that participant roles vary, but more importantly, governance across 
the ecosystem must embrace heterogeneity, even for similar participant roles.   
Accordingly, we formulate the following main research questions: 
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RQ 3.1 What are the primary platform mechanisms required for the 
coordination and control of technology ecosystems?  
RQ 3.2 How do platform mechanisms interact to foster creativity and 
innovation, and ensure value appropriation and control in technology 
ecosystems? 
RQ 3.3 How do incentive and control mechanisms accommodate ecosystem 
heterogeneity?  
One industrial sector that has successfully developed a vibrant ecosystem of 3rd party 
complementors for generativity is enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. 
Providers of commercial accounting and manufacturing software suites, such as SAP 
and Oracle, have long benefited from the expertise of local or regional implementers 
to make country specific modifications, sector specific add-ons, and company specific 
customizations that meet the local, distinct needs of their clients.  
The use of third party partners to do this is largely driven by the extreme 
heterogeneity that characterizes the enterprise resource planning software market. 
ERP software is designed to be a common suite of financial accounting, manufacturing, 
and logistics software that is modified to function in a global market of over 100 legal 
& accounting regimes. Orthogonal to national differences, myriad sector differences 
require modifications and add-ons to meet the needs of a wide range of entities from 
manufacturing to service organizations in the private and public sectors. Using one 
standard software suite to meet the different requirements of, for example, paper 
processing, health care, financial services, manufacturing, or education, is a formidable 
challenge. Consequently, the ERP software manufacturer wisely consigns these 
localization tasks to regional partners with far greater expertise in their native 
markets, functioning as accounting, legal, or sector specialists (Sarker et al. 2012, 
Ceccagnoli et al. 2012).  
Accordingly, our analysis studies one such major vendor of ERP software. We 
perform an extensive analysis of the governance mechanisms developed in a broad 
ecosystem that includes the software vendor at the core, and a large community of 
independent implementers that develop and implement complements targeted 
towards myriad national regions and industrial sectors. Our ERP ecosystem is of 
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interest for several reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few empirical examples of how 
technology platforms function in a for-profit, business-to-business context (Sarker et 
al. 2012, Ceccagnoli et al. 2012). Secondly, given the severe heterogeneity across 
customers, complementors, and complements, ERP ecosystems represent an extreme 
form of technology ecosystem, where the underlying creativity-control tension 
arguably assumes its utmost manifestation, and its appropriate management is of 
greatest potential consequence.  
Through an inductive exercise, we develop a preliminary framework that 
suggests the need for four main components in technology ecosystem governance: a) 
incentives, and b) infrastructure for creation; as well as c) incentives, and d) 
infrastructure for control. Our findings suggest a large role for agency and self-
selection on the part of ecosystem participants as they determine their level of 
involvement with the company at the core. The governance mechanisms are explicitly 
designed to embrace the agency of heterogeneous ecosystem participants, meaning 
that the decision and action to create, and thereafter forfeit some discretion of the 
innovation by entering a phase of control, is completely voluntary on the part of a 
periphery member. As such, our analysis suggests that in our focal ecosystem, the 
control infrastructure embraces heterogeneity via graduated certification levels and an 
ecosystem specific currency that permits lateral mobility. This infrastructure further 
serves a specific purpose of filtering, variance reduction and cohesion building in the 
ecosystem.  Consequently, our data and model highlight that the incentives for 
creation and control must be well-balanced, complementary, and often 
interdependent. Specifically, incentives and infrastructures for control must 
complement -or add value to - the creation process, not contradict it, in order to 
facilitate a balanced cycle of innovation and value appropriation in the ecosystem. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 presents a review of the 
extant literature which informs our study and theorizing; Section 3.3 provides a 
description of our data collection and elaboration of our findings; Section 3.4 couples 
the relevant theory with the findings of our study to formulate Findings generalizable 
to further validation across other technology ecosystems. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 discuss 
limitations and future research, as well as the conclusion of this analysis, respectively. 
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3.2 Background Literature 
There are two major streams of literature that inform our analysis of ecosystem 
governance: literature on platforms, originating primarily from software platforms; 
and organizational ecology, emerging from evolutionary theory and population 
ecology. 
3.2.1 Platforms 
Platforms are systems defined by markets with core components made by one 
company and complements made by a variety of companies. They have 2 
characteristics that are important: 1) they should perform an important function 
within a "system of use" or solve an important technical problem within an industry; 
and (2) it should be easy to connect to or build upon the core solution in order to 
expand the system of use and allow new and even unintended end-uses. The core 
firm's product has important, but limited value when used alone, but substantially 
increases in value when used with complements (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, 2008). 
These authors define 4 levers of platform leadership: a) the scope of the firm, that is 
what activities are performed by the core, and what is completed by complementors; 
b) product technology, meaning the nature of the technology, its modularity, the 
degree of openness of the interfaces and how much information of the core 
technologies should be disclosed to complementors; c) relationships with 
complementors, including the explicit economic incentives and inherent levels of 
cooperation or competition and how to treat potential conflicts of interest 
(complementors can create substitutes and thereby become a competitor); d) internal 
organization of the platform leader that enables the successful governance and 
responsive management of the platform (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, 2008).. 
 The theoretical perspectives on creation in platforms and ecosystems find their 
genesis in several well known streams of literature. Open innovation is one field of 
study which proposes opening up the innovation/creation process through open 
business models, whereby external ideas are internalized and unused internal ideas 
are allowed to flow outward (Chesbrough 2003, Gassmann 2006, West 2003). 
However, the concept of incorporating third parties in a company’s innovation strategy 
is prevalent in a variety of research streams. Sawhney and Prandelli (2000) proposed a 
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novel governance form for managing distributed innovation called “communities of 
creation” as a way to create a shared space for collaboration, while providing the 
coordination mechanisms typically lacking in markets. Research on open source 
software has likewise embraced community contributions to innovation, though the 
research on open models with a strong, profit seeking sponsor at the core has been 
less extensive (Shah 2006, West and Gallagher 2006, West an O’Mahoney 2008).  
 Platforms have been defined as consisting of three major components, the 
core, the complements, and the interfaces between the two. Certain components 
remain fixed over time, where others are permitted or even encouraged to vary 
(Baldwin and Woodard 2010). The complements are generally highly variable, where 
the core is less variable, although some variability is present.   
 The issue of evolvability is central to platforms. In making peripheral 
components variable, platforms become adaptable to future technological 
developments, social or business trends, and uncertain or unanticipated 
environmental changes. Complementors have the ability and mandate to respond to 
the needs of users with a level of speed or specialization that would otherwise be 
prohibitively difficult for the core. Explicitly, they invoke the speed of market 
mechanisms, a Hayekian response to the here and now, yet simultaneously leverage 
the scale, benefits and network externalities of a stable core infrastructure.  This is 
particularly valuable when consumer patterns are heterogeneous, technologies are 
fragmented and overall market trajectories are uncertain (Baldwin and Woodard 2010, 
Boudreau and Hagiu 2009).  It is important to highlight that variability and creation are 
not limited to the periphery or complements of the platform. As Baldwin and Woodard 
(2010) highlight, core components of a system will also need to evolve over time, if for 
no other reason than to embrace basic technological advances in processing, storage, 
communication, power consumption, etc. The core can govern the evolution of the 
infrastructure internally, but may also integrate innovations from complementors or 
other market participants simultaneously. Thus, in most cases, we will find evolvability 
at both the complement/application layer and to a lesser degree the 
core/infrastructure layer.  
Page 76 de 245 
 
 What remains stable through the evolution of the platform are the interfaces 
or thin crossing points (Baldwin 2008) that govern interaction between the layers 
(Baldwin and Woodard 2010). These architectural control points (Woodard 2008) 
govern the relationships between the core and complements, creating bottlenecks 
where platform operators can, via property and other legal rights of exclusion, grant or 
deny outsiders access to the system (Rochet and Tirole 2003; Jacobides et al 2006; 
Boudreau and Hagiu 2009). Thus, control and design of the interfaces is considered 
one of the most important lever for governing the platform. At one extreme, platform 
architects can design very thin interfaces making the platform highly modular with 
high levels of growth and innovation. This makes components more appropriable, 
subject to reverse engineering and duplication, and complementors quickly become 
competitors. Moreover, it has been argued that increased layering or modularization is 
synonymous with greater fragmentation, inefficiency and inferior user experience 
(Messerschmitt and Szyperski  2003). At the other extreme, higher levels of complexity 
and integration with core components can increase the intrinsic protection from 
appropriation, yet at the same time stifle innovation in the ecosystem and bound the 
level of evolvabilty of the platform (Baldwin 2008). Messerschmitt and Szyperski 
(2003) support this argument by suggesting that the greatest number of 
entrepreneurial start-ups are found at the outer layers of the technology stack: i) 
infrastructure, and ii) application; where diversity is less constrained by interface 
compatibility. The fewer layers you have to be compatible with, the greater the 
diversity in the solution set (Messerschmitt and Szyperski  2003). 
 Accordingly, the platform architect should aim to maintain strong 
interdependencies between the core and the components as well as high switching 
costs to competing platforms. Typically, platforms permit and desire levels of openness 
or portability within their ecosystem as governed by interfaces. However, although 
complete portability across competing platforms is often desired by developers and 
customers, some authors argue that it is not desirable, as it would eliminate functional 
differentiation and lock-in, and thereby erode any economic incentive to invest in what 
is a commoditized platform with limited potential rents (Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 
2003) 
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3.2.2 Control and Governance 
The issue of control in technology ecosystems has received less attention in the 
literature to date, and the studies which do exist have generally not been explicit 
about the mechanisms required for control. In order to address a perceived 
fragmentation in prior research, Markus (2007) conducted a qualitative review and 
synthesis of the research on control and governance in open source software projects 
(OSS), proposing six main categories of formal and informal structures and rules: 
ownership of assets (including intellectual property); chartering the project, which 
refers to statements about the visions and goals of the project; community 
management, including rules about membership and roles within the community; 
software development processes; conflict resolution and rule changing; and the use of 
information and tools.  
 It is important to emphasize, however, that much of this research involves self-
organizing communities, while platforms with an authoritative sponsor at the core 
have received less attention. One exception comes from West and O’Mahoney (2008) 
who, through an analysis of 12 sponsored open source communities, identified three 
design dimensions that sponsors consider: intellectual property rights, development 
approach, and model of community governance. In the same study, the authors 
discussed the tension between control and growth experienced by sponsors, and 
found that the more control sponsors tried to exert over the direction of the 
community, the more they restricted the community’s ability to grow; thereby 
highlighting a need for a balanced equilibrium between innovation and control. 
Finding an appropriate balance between creation and control has also been 
echoed in the platforms literature (Iansiti and Levin 2004). The economic logic of 
platforms suggests that a high level of fixed components in the core allows the 
realization of economies of scale and the amortization of fixed costs. On the periphery, 
economies of scope can be realized through the creation of specialized complements 
and constant experimentation (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Complementors often have a 
level of industry knowledge or specialization that would be outside of the logical 
boundaries of the core to maintain in order to develop the infrastructure. As 
complementors act as independent agents, they are attracted to a market when they 
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perceive economic value. Hence, the platform leader should create economic 
incentives for ecosystem members to invest in complementary innovations. Likewise, 
the platform leader must ensure that they themselves can benefit from these 
innovations, and will typically use non-price instruments (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009); 
that is, some kind of infrastructure in addition to monetary incentives to enforce a 
degree of value appropriation.  
Hence, protecting ones profit while enabling complementors to realize a 
reasonable return is one of the most difficult design challenges in a platform. Platform 
architects should not excessively tax their ecosystem, but rather, support a regime of 
property rights and legal protection that is sustainable for both the periphery and core 
(Ianseti and Levin 2004). Finally, the issue of core-complementor boundaries does not 
need to be static. Rather, the platform can practice a form of open innovation within 
its own system, choosing to roll internally developed innovations out to 
complementors, or leveraging degrees of control over complementor innovations and, 
in some instances, appropriating them entirely (Iansiti and Lakhani 2009). 
Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) synthesize much of this literature on external 
innovators by suggesting two conceptual extremes, open innovation markets and open 
innovation communities. Innovation markets tend to be based upon profit seeking 
behavior, career advancement, or other extrinsic motivations, where innovation 
communities are based upon intrinsic rewards such as intellectual stimulation, sense of 
purpose and identity and communal affiliation. For example, several studies have 
examined motivations behind why users contribute to open communities, especially in 
the context of open source software (for example, Lakhani and Wolf 2003, Hertel et al. 
2003, Hars and Ou 2002, von Hippel and von Krogh 2003), including such varied 
responses as enjoyment, social status, skills development, and economic benefit. As 
such, innovation markets will be governed by formal mechanisms such as explicit 
contracts and licensing, where innovation communities will be governed by embedded 
social norms and intrinsic rewards. Most platforms or ecosystems contain instances of 
both market and communities in varying degrees. As an example, highly profit oriented 
ecosystems can also employ extensive community mechanisms to foster peer 
cooperation and sharing in complementor communities (Iansiti and Lakhani 2009). 
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3.2.3 Legitimacy and Status 
Our work on technology ecosystems is also informed by an older stream of 
discourse on social ecology. Sociocultural evolutionary theory is largely attributed to 
the seminal work of Campbell (1965) and has since matured into what is called 
organizational or community ecology. Organizational ecology investigates the selection 
processes that dominate sectors, communities and ecosystems (Singh and Lumsden 
1990). Specifically, explaining the birth, growth, transformation and demise of human 
social systems, community ecology defines communities as collections of entities that 
share important similarities and depend upon the same mix of resources to survive 
(Monge et al. 2008).   
 By incorporating sociological mechanisms into what is population dynamics, 
Hannan (1988) was strongly focused on processes of legitimization which provides 
greater access to resources.  His main tenet was that organizational forms in the 
broader sense can be legitimized, not individual ones. However, the question of how 
legitimacy is conferred or how status can be increased by individual actors remains 
largely unspecified. If we assume that actors on the periphery of the ecology suffer 
from illegitimacy and lack of status due to a liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965), 
then there is a question as to how reputational stock can be transferred from the core 
to the periphery.  Research argues that uncertainty exists concerning the quality of a 
firm’s products in market exchanges (Akerloff 1970). As such, high status serves as a 
signal or proxy of quality to help mitigate the problems of uncertainty, as status is 
assumed to be correlated with quality (Podolny 1994). Status also serves as a currency 
or entity that can be awarded to lower status firms through mechanisms of affiliation; 
that is, endorsements or affiliations can transfer de-facto status from a high status firm 
to a lower status partner (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010).  
Hannan and Freeman (1984) suggested that the dynamics, particularly rates of 
change, can differ on the core versus periphery of individual organizations, as well as 
larger communities. Caroll (1985) following this logic, proposed a model that embraces 
the concept of niche width, asking if it is better for an organization to be a specialist or 
generalist. One major argument of this discourse is that when the generalists dominate 
the core of the resources space, specialists can survive on the periphery via a process 
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called resource partitioning, where generalists and specialists require distinct 
resources. This minimizes competition and enables symbiosis, where ecosystem cores 
can embrace and nourish the periphery as a source of non-competing specialization. 
Moreover, the platform core can scan the periphery and cherry pick the best 
innovations, acquiring them either by mandate or permitting them to self select 
themselves closer the core in an effort to obtain some operational or reputational 
advantage.   
3.2.4 Ecosystem Heterogeneity and Cohesion 
For these mechanisms to function effectively, an information infrastructure is 
needed to monitor the entire ecosystem, transferring information about peripheral 
activities to the core, as well as manifestation space in which core offerings to the 
periphery are made accessible. Such a shared technological infrastructure facilitates 
cooperation and transactions by defining procedures, interfaces, incentives, and codes 
of conduct and conflict resolution (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009, Mockus et al. 2002, 
Sawhney and Prandelli 2000, Scacchi 2002). Higher quality infrastructures increase the 
quality of the reciprocal exchanges (Astley 1985) which facilitate the development of 
common competencies which are necessary for the constant adaptation of the 
environment vis a vis competitors (McKelvey 1982). These mechanisms transfer 
competencies from one generation to the other, building a common culture within the 
ecosystem. This is what the professional literature has called building a “shared 
meaning” (Hagel and Seely Brown 2005 pg.89) in business networks, where business 
processes and technologies are aligned with incentives to facilitate the development of 
common norms and capabilities. Value creation in an ecosystem must take into 
account dynamic, context-dependent processes; heterogeneous goals of ecosystem 
participants; and the fact that the growth and viability of the ecosystem must be 
managed as a separate business activity above and beyond that of individual 
participating firms (van der Borgh et al. 2012). 
 A clear tradeoff exists in ecosystem design. Ecosystems seek to benefit from 
the depth, flexibility, and expertise of dedicated niche specialists in a manner that 
would be prohibitive for larger, more homogeneous and integrated organizations. By 
attracting specialists with different backgrounds and perspectives to address difficult 
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problems presented by clients, the ecosystem can foster “productive friction” (Hagel 
and Seely Brown 2005 pg. 100) which increase the possibility for innovation, learning 
and competency building. The location of the complementor in the ecosystem, 
whether upstream or downstream, may also have an impact on the core firm’s ability 
to capture value. Adner and Kapoor (2010) find that challenges in the upstream 
development of components tend to increase the performance advantage of the core 
while challenges downstream in complements tend to decrease this advantage. 
However, excessive specialization, diversity and random competition can lead to 
destructively high fragmentation and coordination costs (Boudreau, forthcoming) 
which can delay rates of development and adoption of both the core and the 
complements (Adner 2006). Moreover, unchecked variance in quality can lead to 
agency costs, where the platform core bears the negative costs of poor quality of the 
complementor or their applications (Wolter and Veloso 2008). As such, ecosystem 
governance can employ explicit rules and procedures along side of intrinsic embedded 
norms within the community to facilitate reciprocity. This fosters inimitable 
competencies and increased quality, thereby improving the sustainability of the 
community and protecting it from predation. Formal and informal governance can be 
used to institutionalize common behavioral patterns, expectations and norms that 
improve both the quality and cohesion of the ecosystem (McKelvey 1982).  
3.3 Data 
31 semi-structured interviews were conducted during the period of November 2007 to 
June 2010 with a variety of entities active in the sales channel for the enterprise 
software suite of a major, multinational software manufacturer (due to non-disclosure 
agreements in place, the software manufacturer which sits at the core of our study is 
hereafter referred to as “the Software Vendor”), including representatives from the 
Software Vendor’s training and productivity centers, as well as product and 
channel/partner managers. We employed a theoretical sampling approach, selecting 
subjects for their similarities as well as their differences.  Software Vendor 
respondents (N=16) were selected from a wide enough selection of functional areas 
within the Software Vendor in order to understand the full breadth of mechanisms and 
programs in place. These include channel management partners as well as 
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development managers and R&D directors. In addition, we interviewed a selection of 
independent implementation partners (N=10). Partners were chosen based on initial 
recommendations from Software Vendor management and subsequent 
recommendations from the interviewees, with the objective of interviewing a 
representative cross section (size and industry, as well as geographical span). After this 
initial group, a snowball sampling approach was pursued, with future respondents 
chosen based on recommendations from the partners themselves. We also 
interviewed a selection of customers (N=5), all in distinct industry sectors, in order to 
incorporate the end-user perspective in the study.  
 We used an inductive, qualitative approach in our research design in 
accordance with the exploratory nature of the study. The data were analyzed using a 
grounded theory approach by identifying general concepts, organizing the concepts 
into categories, and identifying properties for these categories and the relationships 
among them (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Categories were chosen by triangulating four 
primary sources: the Software Vendor’s partner program guidelines (archival data), 
interviews with representatives from the Software Vendor, interviews with partners 
and customers, and prior theory. This was an iterative process, with several rounds of 
addition and consolidation of the categories. Archival data from the Software Vendor 
was used to complement data gathered from the respondents. The initial interviews 
were semi-structured with the primary objective of identifying the various mechanisms 
which form the business model of the ecosystem. As the various platform mechanisms 
revealed themselves, multiple follow-up interviews were staged with the interview 
subjects, in order to ensure as complete a response as possible from each interviewee.  
By the end of the interview process, the interviews became more formal, with 
the mechanisms identified in Figure 1 providing the basis for discussion. Furthermore, 
multiple validation incidents were staged in order to cross-check information provided 
by partners and customers with representatives from the Software Vendor, and vice 
versa. The interview process was concluded when no significant additional insights 
were obtained from additional data points and theoretical saturation was achieved. 
Additional validation of the theoretical model was obtained from industry experts and 
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researchers external to the sample ecosystem, and the resulting feedback has been 
incorporated into the proposed Findings in the theory section. 
Here we provide more detail as to the specific data collection approach 
followed. We began with a first round of data collection with representatives from the 
Software Vendor. We transcribed the interviews that we were able to record 
throughout the process, and highlighted recurring themes. We highlighted positive 
observations in green, and negative ones in red. In these first interviews, the 
predominant themes included: revenue allocation, localization, upgrades and product 
roadmaps, implementation methodology, partner training, partner certification, and 
vertical solutions. Next, we conducted our initial semi-structured interviews with 
partners using these themes as a guide. In these interviews additional themes 
emerged such as: collaboration between partners, marketing and financial support, 
and recruiting support. We then returned in some cases to prior interviewees to 
discuss these additional themes, gaining additional support for our observations in 
some instances, and obtaining a counterpoint in others.   
 The following section details the “raw” mechanisms put in place by the core, 
representing the physical design of the ecosystem platform, as well as a narrative 
explanation of a typical implementation process. The succeeding section describes the 
conceptual apparatus, elaborating upon the interplay between the incentives and 
infrastructure which encourage creation, as well as the incentives and infrastructure 
which enable control. 
3.3.1 Sales and Implementation 
 Our analysis identified three main roles in the software ecosystem: the 
Software Vendor, partners, and customers. While we have used the generic term 
“partner”, it must be acknowledged that there are a wide variety of companies 
included in this group who differ on many dimensions such as size; nationality; regional 
vs. national vs. international focus; type (independent software vendors, value-added 
resellers, etc.); as well as application development partners, implementation partners, 
and those which focus on both development and implementation. In our subsequent 
analysis, we equate all partners as “complementors” from the platforms literature. 
These can be entities that write applications or add-ons, but also implementers or 
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training partners that offer service based complements. For Sarker et al. (2012) key 
resources which the Software Vendor brings to the relationship include technically 
high-quality core ERP package, technical know-how, brand, knowledge community 
with knowledge-sharing platform, a global network, and financial strength.  According 
to the authors, the partners bring industry competence, client-specific knowledge, 
close relationships with client organizations, reach to clients in specific geographic 
locations and/or specific industry verticals, human resources for sales, consulting, and 
development.  
 We divided the platform processes into three main areas: a) focus on product 
and channel development, b) focus on early stage sales, and c) focus on 
implementation and late stage sales. In addition, we describe the use of the various 
platform mechanisms as they relate to the actual development of partner solutions 
and implementations of the software for end customers. These are illustrated in figure 
1 below. We should emphasize that there are two primary types of partners who 
contributed to our understanding of these mechanisms: value added resellers (VAR’s), 
and independent software houses (ISV’s). While ISV’s would focus primarily on product 
and channel development, VAR’s would focus either on Sales plus Sales and 
Implementation, or they might undertake all three functions if they were engaged in 
developing their own software solutions as well. 
Software
Vendor Partner Customer
 Core Product Development
Software Development Kit
Partner Certification
Complementary Product Certification
Translation and Localization
Technical Training
Recruiting
Product Evangelist
Roadmap
Tools
Marketing
Branding
New Partner Support
Sales Training
Partner Level
Partner Monitoring
Tools
Technical Support
Implementation Support
Implementation Methodology
Sales Support
Complementary Product Development
Industrial Sector Solutions
Customer Training 
Focus:
 Product and Channel 
Developement
Focus: Sales
Focus:
Sales and Implementation
 
Figure 3.1. Platform mechanisms in the software ecosystem 
 The process begins with the marketing efforts of partners, which are normally 
managed by the individual partner, but may be performed with the support of the 
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Software Vendor in the case of certified partners. In discussions with the customers, 
the consensus is that the decision of software product selection is made through a 
combination of referrals from friends and colleagues, as well as third-party ratings, 
reviews and forum discussions on web sites. Once a software package is chosen, the 
decision of which implementation partner to choose is made primarily through 
referrals from colleagues, and potentially through the Software Vendor itself; the 
Software Vendor has established a group of select international partners whom it 
contacts for significant projects. These partners align themselves closely with the 
Software Vendor and represent an inner circle of preferred collaboration partners. An 
additional source for finding implementation partners may be through the custom 
partner solutions themselves, which are included in the partner solution finder catalog. 
Partners who elect the highest level of certification are given priority listings in the 
vendor catalogue. In addition, there are many third-partner user community sites (the 
Software Vendor lists over 100 on their web site) which provide ratings, peer-reviews, 
and discussion forums. Finally, a partner may be engaged in a project through another 
partner looking for complementary expertise in a particular vertical with which they 
are not familiar, or for local expertise on an international project. 
 Once the customer chooses the implementation partner, the partner and 
customer decide which software products to implement. The initial software may be 
the generic product developed by the core, or it may be a custom modification or 
vertical complement created by the partner. Two important mechanisms which 
encourage the creation of partner solutions are the flexible design of the software’s 
open source-code and the licensing agreements. The flexible, open source-code of the 
software allows partners to easily configure and/or customize the core software to 
match customers’ requirements. The licenses for core products are owned by the 
Software Vendor and license revenues are shared between the Software Vendor and 
the partners, while the license for any partner solutions or add-ons are owned by the 
developing partner. Partner solutions come in many forms, including slightly modified 
versions targeted towards specific local requirements, “horizontal” solutions for 
specific applications such as taxation or human resources, and vertical industrial sector 
solutions, which represent more comprehensive solutions designed for a particular 
industry, or even a specific region.  
Page 86 de 245 
 
 Partners create their vertical solutions based on their experience with one or, 
at best, a few customers operating in that industry segment. The partners claim that 
their vertical is based on industry standards, but in reality, it is often based on a simple, 
small sample. While partners already have direct contact with customers and do 
engage in co-creation through activities such as product customization and business 
process redesign, these are generally project based and one-to-one, i.e. one partner to 
one customer. Community infrastructures such as websites and conferences are 
cultivated to allow individual partners to collaborate on many-to-many engagements 
between partners and customers. These include cooperative implementations as well 
as mixed-module implementations composed of complements from multiple partners. 
In instances of multiple partner implementations or applications, revenue sharing is 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis with guidelines provided by the Software Vendor. 
 The configuration and customization of the software is a collaborative process 
between the partner and customer. The partners may use no implementation 
methodology at all, their own methodology, or the methodology developed by the 
Software Vendor. There are significant potential benefits to standardizing the 
methodology used, including improved quality and lower total cost of ownership. The 
Software Vendor has a clear interest in increasing the use of their implementation 
tools in that they are believed to result in higher quality implementations and fewer 
errors. 
 Customer training and support are the responsibility of the partner, while the 
Software Vendor provides support to partners depending on their level of certification; 
higher levels of certification receive higher levels of support. Likewise, maintenance 
and upgrade of both core software and partner solutions are the responsibility of 
partners. The cost of maintaining compatibility between partner solutions and new 
versions of the core software is born by the partner, which increases the importance of 
adhering to development standards.  
 Each software implementation is unique, and may be considered part of a co-
creation experience in which the implementation partner and customer play an active 
role in order to develop a custom solution which meets the customer’s particular 
needs. The Software Vendor plays a more passive role by providing a core software 
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product which is modular, highly configurable and easily customizable. The Software 
Vendor offers some support to the implementation partners via sales support for 
larger clients, technical expertise, online tools and templates for presales proposal 
preparation, project management, and implementation tools. The final solution is the 
result of choosing certain modules, configuring the core software and customizing it 
when appropriate, integrating the core software with partner vertical solutions and 
third-party software, and changing the customer’s business processes when necessary. 
In other words, the implementation process is enabled through the basic platform as 
provided by the Software Vendor, combined with custom software solutions from the 
partner, the partner’s experience and expertise, and the customer’s knowledge of 
their business. In addition, the experience the partner gains from executing several 
implementations in a given vertical sector is fed back into the software development 
community for industry vertical solutions.  
3.3.2 Levels of Control 
Our analysis identified a number of specific governance mechanisms that the Software 
Vendor developed to cultivate creation and enforce control in the ecosystem. Initial 
entry into the ecosystem as a registered partner is not particularly difficult; it requires 
approval and some validation by the Software Vendor. Partners seeking to develop 
skills and experience in the implementation of the software application can contact 
new partner support and training centers run by the Software Vendor or third party 
training entities, although this is not obligatory. The source code of the software is 
open, and it is both highly configurable and highly customizable for partners and 
clients. This is consistent with the positioning of the software toward SMEs, who 
typically do not welcome large changes to their own business processes, but would 
rather change the software to fit their existing business structure. Consequently, the 
acquisition or development of skills required for advanced implementations require 
substantial effort. The Software Vendor has therefore created a number of utilities to 
support partners in this process.  
 Table 1 below identifies five levels of elective control in the Software Vendor 
ecosystem across the dimension of partner certification level, describing the 
infrastructure mechanisms and incentives available to participants at each level, as 
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well as the resulting value derived by the Software Vendor. These levels are, with 
limited exceptions, inclusive (level 3 is a small business specialist), meaning that the 
requirements and benefits of the higher level build upon those of the previous level. 
Advancement to levels four and five are permitted by the acquisition of internal points, 
which are awarded for a variety of achievements and are valid for a limited time. 
Points are awarded for many activities, including technical certifications of personnel, 
specialist competency designations, demonstrated competencies in specific 
application areas, validated customer references, technical testing of applications, 
successful participation in customer satisfaction surveys, and the amount of licenses 
and/or revenue generated by the sales of the core’s platform product in specific 
markets. The internal point system permits advancement through higher levels 
through criteria that are both feasible and useful for a very heterogeneous population 
of solution and implementation partners.    
Note that the key concept is that each level of control imparts some additional value to 
both the periphery and core; that is, a value proposition is subsumed in the control 
infrastructure. For example, new partner support centers and productivity centers 
offer support and training to newer partners who benefit from stimulus to achieve 
critical mass. This additional training also improves quality control in the final products 
and services. Likewise, higher levels of certification for both solutions and partners 
require more stringent control (testing by third party, documented industry level 
implementations of solution), yet simultaneously offer value to the periphery (higher 
quality solutions/services, co-branding with the Software Vendor), and the core 
(expanded catalog of high quality partner solutions, greater scale and scope of 
ecosystem, additional revenue).     
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Table 3.1. Partner Levels, Requirements and Value Proposition 
Partner 
Level 
Requirements Value to Periphery members Value to Core 
Fifth Maximum point threshold 
Partner personnel certified 
Core vertical solutions certified 
Demonstrated competency in 
focused strategic area 
Participation in customer 
satisfaction surveys 
Dedicated Software Vendor 
account manager for large clients  
Validated customer references 
Highest level of co-branding 
Maximum suite of software 
licenses 
Access to development libraries 
Priority listing in solution finder 
catalogues  
Priority real time technical support 
Financing facility 
Dedicated Software Vendor 
account manager for large clients  
Core product license 
revenue 
Expanded core software 
offering and vertical 
solutions 
Specialist competencies 
Increased license 
revenue 
Fourth Medium point threshold 
Partner personnel certified 
Partner solutions certified 
Customer references 
Partner subscription fee 
Expanded suite of licenses for 
development and infrastructure 
software 
Practice management support 
More qualified personnel 
Use of Software Vendor logo/brand 
Inclusion of partner solutions in 
solution finder catalog 
Additional free online training 
Additional sales and marketing 
support 
Core product license 
revenue 
More qualified 
implementation 
personnel 
Fewer software errors 
Improved software 
interoperability 
Expanded portfolio of 
partner solutions 
Third Organizational assessment 
Partner personnel 
tested/certified 
 
Expanded suite of development 
tools 
Licenses for infrastructure software 
Use of Software Vendor Logo and 
branding 
Priority technical support 
Specialist community access 
Financing facility 
Core product license 
revenue 
Subscription revenue 
Second Subscription fees 
New partner support centers 
Development tools  
Productivity software licenses 
Online training platform 
Marketing tools and support 
Community technical support 
Core product license 
revenue 
Subscription revenue 
First Community platform 
Online tools and templates 
Access to peer network 
Access to technical support 
communities 
Marketing and sales tools 
Core product license 
revenue 
3.3.3 Value to Periphery 
There are a number of benefits that are consistent across all five levels of partners. 
These include: access to technical development tools and software libraries, sales and 
marketing support, status and legitimacy via co-branding, customer service and 
technical support, improved quality of add-ons and implementation skills, and 
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customer satisfaction. The benefits accrue to solution partners in increasingly higher 
levels commensurate with the stricter requirements placed upon the solution 
providers. While there are certain benefits that are not commensurate for all 
categories (a financing facility is available for levels 3 and 5), the majority of the 
benefits are graduated and inclusive; at each level, the quality or degree of the benefit 
increases (marketing, technical support, software licenses). 
3.3.4 Value to Core 
The primary benefit to the core in having a greater number of partners in higher levels 
is the direct incentive for the partners to sell additional licenses of the core's products. 
Points are explicitly awarded for increased license revenue for a variety of products. 
The secondary, but perhaps more important benefits are the indirect network effects 
of a larger, more vibrant ecosystem of qualified implementation partners and as well 
as the availability of applications and other subsidiary complements (e.g. training, 
support, user communities) that render potential value to clients.  
3.3.5 Community Mechanisms 
The Software Vendor has also developed a variety of community governance 
mechanisms to stimulate collaboration among partners in the periphery of the 
ecosystem with various degrees of intervention of the core. One of the most visible 
mechanisms created by the core are the international partner meetings that occur in 
major markets several times a year. These conferences support a variety of activities 
from technical evangelism to practice management training. In addition to these large 
social events, extensive p2p technology platforms have been developed to support 
partner to partner collaboration. The partner web portal currently hosts 22 different 
community sites based on specific interest in technical topics, political and 
environmental advocacy relevant to the software ecosystem, and geographic or 
industry specialization. The sites offer a variety of functionality including web-tv and 
social networking, as well as the ability to participate in early release projects run by 
the Software Vendor.  
 A partner finding platform is also available to complementors, where they can 
search a directory of several hundred thousand partners who publish profiles on 
Page 91 de 245 
 
practice and technical specialties, over 50,000 registered add-on applications, and 
several thousand broadcast opportunities for collaboration on an existing job or future 
tender. The typical motivations for partner-partner collaboration include access to 
specialized skills, building a suite of complementary applications, or expanding 
geographic reach. For example, a partner with expertise in a particular industry 
segment may turn to another partner for their expertise in a “horizontal” application 
such as tax reporting; or they may wish to expand internationally and find a partner in 
another country who could help localize their vertical application. While the 
technicalities of partner to partner business relationships will vary from legal region 
and job profile, the Software Vendor certainly encourages these collaborations (while 
not directly regulating them), and provides a number of generic best practice 
templates and tutorials on the commercial structure of such partnerships.  
 On its home page, the Software Vendor identifies several hundred web sites 
which are independently maintained and intended for use by partners and customers. 
The sites include both personal and community pages; are national and international; 
discuss Software Vendor products in general or are targeted toward specific products; 
and exist in multiple languages. They provide such services as discussion forums, blogs, 
white papers, listings of partner solutions (with comments and ratings), job listings, 
events listings, downloads, code samples, bug reports, tutorials, and advice. In this 
forum end users are able to share best practices in areas such as partner selection, 
implementation processes, and ways to minimize total cost of ownership. They may 
also help each other discover new ways to configure the product which avoid costly 
customization, as well as ways to alter their business processes to maximize product 
benefits. Many of these web sites are completely outside of any control of the 
Software Vendor.   
3.4 Theory Development 
Extant literature on technology platforms and ecosystems assumes a fairly 
homogeneous ecosystem constituted by: a) a tightly controlled core with some 
variability; b) a strictly controlled interface to the core; and c) a periphery with high 
variability and innovation; and d) homogenous rules of conduct and control processes 
applicable to all partners (Baldwin 2008, Baldwin and Woodard 2010). Our analysis 
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suggests a more nuanced perspective; technology ecosystems can be highly 
heterogeneous, where control processes vary considerably based upon the profiles 
and preferences of the periphery partners. As described, our analysis identified 5 
discrete levels available to periphery partners, where each level confers additional 
benefits to the partners. Access to each level is granted pending specific requirements, 
but in general terms, higher levels provide additional perceived value to both partner 
and core, and are associated with a reduction in quality variance via testing of 
applications or validation of individual skills or organizational competencies. 
Consequently, a useful metaphor of ecosystem governance may be a solar system, 
with some periphery partners located close to the core, and some further away. 
Individual partners may choose to enter closer proximity to the core to obtain 
perceived benefits and status. However, entrance to a level closer to the core requires 
the partner to forfeit some degree of freedom, coming under a stronger influence (i.e. 
control of applications and processes) of the core.   
Finding 3.1a Control infrastructures in technology ecosystems can be 
graduated, with greater value offered to complementors in exchange for 
submitting to higher levels of control by the core.  
Our analysis identified that in several levels of the graduated control, advancement to 
the next step is enabled through the acquisition of internal points. Points are awarded 
for a variety of accomplishments including overall license revenues, validation of 
individual skills or organizational competencies. However, partners operate in a 
diverse range of countries and industry sectors, and their activities may include 
software development, software implementation, training, technical support, or other 
types of services such as hosting or business process outsourcing. These activities are 
not mutually exclusive; partners may add competencies over time, with a software 
development partner electing to implement software, for example. Therefore, since 
the activities of the partners vary, so must the means of assessing advancement to 
subsequent certification levels. As a result, control infrastructures must be designed to 
permit a large variety of feasible avenues towards higher levels of certification.  
Finding 3.1b To embrace heterogeneity, technology ecosystems can develop 
internal currencies to permit: i) common measurement standards to assess 
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heterogeneous accomplishments, ii) multiple paths through higher graduations 
of recognition, and iii) horizontal mobility through the ecosystem. 
Our analysis also indicated that there are no clear rules dictating if, or when, partners 
should attempt progression to a subsequent level. Moreover, access to the lowest 
level ecosystem is essentially open to all with minimal requirements. As such, 
advancement through levels of control is entirely voluntary. Partners self-select 
themselves through higher graduations based upon the greater perceived benefits at 
the subsequent level. It should be noted, however, that it is the responsibility of the 
core to provide transparency in this process, communicating the benefits of higher 
levels of status as well as monitoring progress and addressing any problems partners 
encounter as they advance. New partners, for example, have access to new partner 
support centers where they are coached on the basics of sales, marketing, and project 
management, given additional training, and even shadowed on their first 
implementations by experienced implementation partners. At higher levels, partners 
have different needs and therefore the Software Vendor encourages partner 
advancement by providing financial support and assistance in hiring qualified 
professionals. 
Finding 3.2a Technology ecosystem participants self-select themselves through 
higher  levels of control. 
This renders the decision much like a market transaction, where ecosystem partners 
elect to pursue a more extensive package of benefits for some collateral exchange. For 
the Software Vendor, the direct goal is additional revenue gained on the sale of 
product licenses. This is achieved via direct incentives for the partners to sell additional 
licenses. More importantly, the Software Vendor benefits from the indirect network 
effects arising from the availability of qualified implementation partners and 
complements that renders the core's product more attractive to potential clients. In 
most instances, complementors forfeit some discretion over their own work or 
complements as they subject themselves to the pre-defined processes, templates or 
quality requirements mandated by the core.  In our sample, complementors make a 
monetary payment in the form of subscription fees, although this revenue is of 
minimal significance for the core and likely designed as a filtering and signaling 
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mechanism. At lower levels, partners are encouraged to pursue development in 
industry verticals which are of strategic importance to the Software Vendor; in other 
words, the partners forfeit some discretion over choosing which products to develop 
and which markets to target. At higher levels, the integration between the Software 
Vendor and the partner is even closer, with partners required to engage in large 
projects where the Software Vendor participates directly by providing staff, making 
key decisions, and monitoring progress. 
Finding 3.2b  The decision to self-select through higher control levels is similar 
to a market transaction. Ecosystems participants offer or forfeit something in 
exchange for some additional value. 
In many cases, the mechanisms that enforce additional control on the ecosystem 
periphery are indirectly related to the value proposition. For example, access to on-line 
marketing campaigns or financing facilities helps periphery partners with the business 
operations, which indirectly supports the sales of additional licenses of the core 
product. In these instances, the creation and control mechanisms are complementary. 
However, often the creation and control mechanisms are interdependent. For 
example, the testing and certification of individual skills, organizational competencies, 
or the technical compatibility of an application are of direct, simultaneous benefit to 
both the core and the periphery.  
 Finding 3.2c  Although distinct, creation and control mechanisms should be 
 complementary, and are often interdependent. 
We summarize the positions of Findings 1 and 2 by suggesting that technology 
ecosystems are composed of four main components: incentives to create, 
infrastructures to create, incentives to control and infrastructures to control. 
Descriptions of these mechanisms with supporting findings are presented in table 2 
below. 
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Table 3.2. Incentives and Infrastructures for Creation and Control 
Concept Definition Case Data 
Incentives to Create Explicit or implicit incentives for 
users or organizations to 
contribute to the ecosystem 
through innovations 
Additional revenue obtained by selling 
partner solutions (both direct and 
through other partners)  
The Software Vendor retains the software 
license for the core code, while the 
partners retain the licenses for the 
partner solutions they create 
Additional clients and consulting revenue 
obtained through field of specialization 
Differentiation of service offerings 
through partner solutions 
Improved customer satisfaction through 
custom-tailored solutions 
Internal points/currencies to permit 
multiple paths and embrace 
heterogeneous accomplishments 
Infrastructure to 
Create 
Structures or tools that make it 
possible for periphery 
participants to make 
enhancements to technology 
controlled by core and create 
complementary innovations, such 
as open source code, open APIs, 
integrated development 
environments, mash-ups or user 
tool-kits 
Open source-code of core applications / 
protected source code for partner 
solutions 
Education and training 
Specialized IDEs and development 
language 
Ease of customization 
Tools and templates 
Conferences 
On-line search engines to match, 
partners, business opportunities and 
applications    
Incentives to Control Perceived additional value 
obtained by periphery 
participants (that exceeds 
perceived cost) for positioning 
themselves and/or their 
innovations, through self-
selection, under greater influence 
of the core  
Perceived market value obtained through 
Software Vendor certification  
Association with Software Vendor brand, 
co-branding with Software Vendor, status 
and legitimacy  
Placement in solutions catalogue and 
ratings of certified partner solutions  
Value realized through higher levels of 
partnership: additional marketing and 
sales support, technical support, use of 
official logo, training, dedicated account 
management, financing facilities 
Infrastructure to 
Control 
Processes or structures through 
which participants self-select, 
forfeiting degrees of control of 
own processes or innovation in 
order to obtain some value 
endowed through closer 
proximity to core  
Certification of partner solutions  
Certification of personnel 
3rd party verification of solution 
compatibility  
Implementation tool 
Training centers 
Productivity centers 
New partner support centers  
System of internal points to permit 
multiple graduation paths 
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Acknowledging that the periphery is very heterogeneous suggests that there may be 
some internal logic or mechanisms that govern how periphery members co-exist with 
each other and the core.  One body of literature that addresses this is the social 
ecology literature that argues that specialists can survive on the periphery of an 
ecosystem via a process called resource partitioning, where generalists and specialists 
operate in distinct resource spaces (Caroll 1984). If specialists require distinct 
resources from the core, ecosystem cores can embrace and nourish the periphery as a 
source of non-competing specialization and symbiosis.  However, excessive 
unorganized growth in the periphery also poses several well-known risks. Extreme 
heterogeneity in the complements and complementors can lead to fragmentation on a 
variety of levels. Current and potential adopters of the core platform may have 
difficulty navigating a portfolio of highly disparate and possibly incompatible 
complements, resulting in a perceived lack of cohesion between the core and 
complements, as well as amongst complements. Secondly, the costs of fragmentation 
may actually be 'real' in the sense that technical compatibly standards are not 
sufficiently defined and enforced.  One of the benefits of tightly controlled ecosystems 
is the cohesive user experience resulting from highly interoperable complements. In 
fact, where very high levels of cohesion or integration are needed, research prescribes 
the use of even stronger governance mechanisms, including vertical integration 
(Wolter and Veloso 2008). But this challenge does not stop at technical compatibility. 
Shared competencies, reciprocal exchanges, and norms amongst the members of the 
periphery also serve to bring greater cohesion to the ecosystem by driving common 
values and codes of conduct (McKelvey 1982, Astley 1985). Ideally, adoption of the 
platform core should not be driven by the existence of a single complement, but 
rather, a portfolio of complements, combined with a liquid pool of qualified technical 
consultants to maintain and further evolve both core and complement modules. In 
other terms, the current and future availability of a variety of applications and service 
resources renders the platform attractive. Access to multiple complements requires 
both market and community based mechanisms that render a potentially fragmented 
ecosystem transparent and accessible via common search and transaction norms, and 
operationally cohesive in implementation and use. 
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 Finding 3.3a Control infrastructures function as search, filtering, and 
coordination  mechanisms to aggregate heterogeneous and specialized contributions 
into a more  cohesive ecosystem.    
Our analysis indicated that access to the Software Vendor's ecosystem at the first level 
of entry was without any significant requirement (first time partners are required to 
register and be validated by the Software Vendor). Low barriers to ecosystem entry 
present challenges to the core. Multiple responses from the Software Vendor 
consistently indicated that substantial heterogeneity on the periphery often leads to 
excessive variance in the quality of both complementors and complements. Variable 
quality poses a risk to the core to the degree that it bears the negative costs of the 
poor performance of the periphery; association with lower status or poor quality firms 
can lead to agency costs and a consequent decrease in status a reputation (Li and 
Rowley 2002, Stuart 2000). Our case findings suggest that this was a very large concern 
of the Software Vendor. Moreover, any isolated negative quality incidences can have 
reputation effects and may ultimately damage the overall position of the Software 
Vendor´s platform by encouraging potential adopters to migrate towards competing 
platforms.   
 Finding 3.3b Control infrastructures serve to reduce quality variance for both  
 complementors and their complements as they self-select themselves through 
higher  graduations of control.   
Low barriers to ecosystem entry also present challenges to complementors. On the 
outskirts of the periphery, new entrants can suffer from low status and illegitimacy 
due to a liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965). Given a lack of reputation and 
experience, they can choose to compete directly with incumbents, or attempt to carve 
a defendable niche and differentiate themselves as specialists in a specific sector. 
Economic theory argues that uncertainty exists concerning the quality of a firm’s 
products in market exchanges (Akerloff 1970). As such, high status can serve as a signal 
or proxy of quality to help mitigate the problems of information asymmetry and 
uncertainty in economic exchanges (Podolny 1994). Hence, a mechanism must be 
designed to: a) validate the quality of the products, services and organizations on the 
periphery, and; b) where warranted, transfer the reputation stock to the periphery 
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partners in a manner that is commensurate with the quality achievement of the 
complementor's organization or products, yet does not expose the core to excessive 
risk of reputation deterioration.  In this respect, status serves as a currency that the 
core can award to partners on the periphery via mechanisms of affiliation based upon 
merit (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010).  
 Our evidence clearly indicates that status was awarded to periphery partners 
based on evaluations of performance, achievement or quality. The most obvious 
mechanism is the graduated certification levels, where higher levels of certification 
confer greater legitimacy to the complementors. Moreover, co-branding is also a 
graduated device, where partners with higher certification levels are permitted to use 
logos and other co-branding tools more liberally than lower level partners. As partners 
achieve greater certification levels, their overall image often assumes a higher degree 
of similarity with the core in terms of color, appearance, etc. As mentioned in the 
analysis, we found several partner applications that were virtually indistinguishable 
from the core's.  
Finding 3.4 The ecosystem core confers legitimacy and status to participants 
and complementors on the periphery in graduated levels. As complementors 
fulfill the requirements of the higher certification levels and come under greater 
influence of the core, the core confers upon them greater legitimacy and status. 
The literature suggests that most external innovation ecosystems are characterized by 
mechanisms derived from both markets and communities (Boudreau and Lakhani 
2009).  Specifically, market mechanisms such as explicit search and transactional 
mechanisms make the ecosystem increasingly standardized, accessible, transparent 
and liquid.  However, informal governance norms also support the goal of internal 
cohesion by reducing fragmentation and cultivating a common community culture. 
One of the main findings of our research that may stand in contrast to the findings 
from pure open source communities is the salient concept of purposeful action by the 
core, with emergent responses on the periphery. The core is motivated by an ideal of 
profit maximization to generate creation and growth in the ecosystem and therefore 
erects specific mechanisms and infrastructures to achieve this. The core can directly 
affect incentives and mechanisms that are explicit; that is, it can control the market 
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based mechanisms. However, the intrinsic, community based norms that emerge 
around the explicit infrastructures are, to a much greater degree, beyond the direct 
control of the core. One can think of an artificial coral reef as a metaphor. The 
architects can place new structures in the ocean floor, but how the sea life 
congregates to form a sustainable ecosystem is largely an emergent phenomenon 
which is only partially influenced by the infrastructure designers. One possible 
consequence of this is that the community norms that emerge may not always be 
desirable by the core. Small communities that form on the ecosystem periphery may 
develop intra-group, clan-based loyalties (Ouchi 1980) that supersede any loyalties to 
the core. We certainly found some evidence of this in our study, where many partners 
expressed dissatisfaction with some components of the infrastructures, and further 
shared these opinions on community blogs or web sites not refereed by the core. 
Implicitly, partners that choose not to pursue higher levels of certification may also do 
so as a statement of disagreement or discontent with the requirements of the core. 
They may develop a sustainable niche on the periphery with only partial affiliation with 
the core, and develop stronger loyalties towards similar sub-communities, or 
alternatively, competing platforms. Similar to open source communities, there is no 
requirement that participation in a for-profit technology ecosystem is exclusive, 
although this obviously does happen in some licensing agreements, or may result as a 
natural consequence of developing critical mass as a complementor.  As such, the 
ecosystem designer enacts market based mechanisms and infrastructures to frame 
and guide the dynamics of the ecosystem. Around these infrastructures, they hope 
that community based norms will emerge to provide intrinsic incentives and a strong 
communal culture which reinforce goals of cohesion, accessibility and integration 
across a heterogeneous periphery. However, it is important to note that: a) community 
responses may not emerge; b) they may emerge, but not always in a form desirable by 
the core, and; c) complementors on the periphery may have partial loyalties to the 
core, participate in multiple competing platforms, and arbitrage the contributions of 
one ecosystem across others.  
Finding 3.5 Technology ecosystem cores can purposefully construct 
infrastructures and explicit market based mechanisms with the desire that 
intrinsic community based norms and competencies emerge as a result. 
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Although it is beyond the scope of this manuscript, an interesting topic for future 
research is how ecosystems contend with conflict, discontent or undesired behaviours 
of the participants. Clearly the control infrastructures we have described are intended 
to control the most central work processes. However, as mentioned above, there will 
be cases of those complementors who do not adopt the control processes, as well as 
other forms unforeseen behaviours that can emerge in an ungoverned community.  
3.5 Limitations and Future Research  
As in all inductive studies, the traditional caveats of case-based theory 
development apply. While we are confident that the insights of this analysis are valid 
for this case, validation of the Findings across other forms of technology ecosystems is 
pending. Clearly, one would expect that the underlying economics of the specific 
business will dictate the structure and dynamics of the ecosystem and some variance is 
to be expected. Our analysis was based upon a provider of business software. It is 
feasible that an ecosystem operating in, say, consumer markets, may exhibit different 
dynamics. As such, a feasible path for future research could include validation across a 
number of vendors of business software, and, thereafter, increasing the heterogeneity 
of the core product across industrial and consumer sectors.     
Our theory relies upon population ecology which has been criticized for being 
excessively deterministic, ignoring the role of managerial agency and free will that 
would be salient in a more voluntaristic model (Astley & Van de Ven 1983, Singh and 
Lumsden 1990). By explicitly modelling self-selection, our framework partially avoids 
this criticism. Specifically, we acknowledge the role of managerial decision and agency 
in choosing the level of proximity to the ecosystem core. 
The concept of internal currencies used to negotiate numerous paths to higher 
status levels is not unlike educational systems with its system of standard degrees and 
academic credits.  Clearly, the literature of mechanism design in educational 
institutions may have value for further theory development in technology ecosystems. 
However, one major caveat is worth noting. Most educational institutions teach for 
generalizable and universally applicable knowledge. This is not the case for our for-
profit ecosystem, which have a clear economic incentive to lock participants into their 
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platform. Switching costs can be erected in a variety of ways, including introducing a 
high level of proprietary, platform specific knowledge into the ecosystem.   
As mentioned in the discussion, it is often assumed that the for-profit motive of 
ecosystem participants moderates behavior, and all emergent community-based 
phenomenon are desirable by the core. This may not be the case. We assume that all 
action by the core achieves the desired results. However, research on platforms and 
technology ecosystems has paid less attention towards how the core might contend 
with unsuccessful mechanism design, deviant or undesirable conduct, although some 
literature exists on how on-line communities govern this (Chua et al. 2007).  
As a final consideration, one specific concern of our focal platform was the 
distribution of complementors. In some specializations or markets there was an 
abundance of complementors, whereas in others there was a lack thereof, with 
oligopoly-like structures emerging.  How the platform can influence this distribution of 
complementors is also a topic of interest for future research.   
3.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis is based upon an in-depth study of a major software vendor and its 
technology ecosystem in the business software segment. The main results and Findings 
are summarized in table 3 below.   
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Table 3.3. Summary of Research Results 
Research 
Question 
Results Relevant 
Findings 
RQ 3.1 What 
are the primary 
platform 
mechanisms 
required for the 
coordination 
and control of 
technology 
ecosystems?  
 
Technology ecosystems are built around 
explicit market-based mechanisms enacted 
by the ecosystem core based upon 
incentives for self-selected participation. 
These include infrastructures or tools that 
facilitate creative activity by 
complementors in the periphery of the 
ecosystem. Ecosystem architects desire a 
vibrant portfolio of complements that serve 
specialized niches that would be outside of 
the capabilities of a generalized core, but 
offer potential value to clients and 
encourage adoption of core platform. 
 
Infrastructures for creative activity also 
embed complementary or interdependent 
control processes that reduce quality 
variance and provide search and 
coordination mechanisms to bring greater 
cohesion to a heterogeneous, evolving 
portfolio of complements. 
 
Around the infrastructures, community 
based phenomenon may emerge that may 
provide further cohesion via common 
norms or an ecosystem culture. While the 
core will attempt to influence community 
phenomenon to their benefit, it lies outside 
of their direct control, and is further subject 
to the divergent interests of its members.   
Finding 3.5 Technology 
ecosystem cores can 
purposefully construct 
infrastructures and explicit 
market based mechanisms 
with the desire that intrinsic 
community based norms 
and competencies emerge 
as a result. 
 
Finding 3.3a Control 
infrastructures function as 
search, filtering, and 
coordination mechanisms 
to aggregate 
heterogeneous and 
specialized contributions 
into a more cohesive 
platform.    
 
Finding 3.3b Control 
infrastructures serve to 
reduce quality variance for 
both complementors and 
their complements as they 
self-select themselves 
through higher graduations 
of control.   
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RQ 3.2 How do 
platform 
mechanisms 
interact to 
foster creativity 
and innovation, 
and ensure 
value 
appropriation 
and control in 
technology 
ecosystems? 
The infrastructure of our technology 
ecosystem had five graduated levels. The 
decision to pursue certification at a higher 
level by a complementor is similar to a 
market transaction, ecosystem participants 
offer something in exchange for some 
perceived benefit. As an example, the use 
of tools or templates that impart higher 
quality to the processes or final product of 
the complementor or client. In exchange for 
higher quality, the complementor forfeits 
some freedom over the development or 
implementation process by subjecting it to 
the tool. 
 
Each graduated certification must offer an 
attractive bundle of benefits to the 
complementor if they are to pursue it. In 
general terms, these are operational 
improvements (development, 
implementation, financing), marketing 
support or increased legitimacy. Likewise, 
having complementors pursue higher 
certification also confers commensurate 
benefits to the core. These included 
increased software license revenue of core 
products, as well as the indirect network 
effects of having a larger, more qualified 
ecosystem of complementors and 
complements that add potential value to 
the core product and therefore increase its 
adoption by end-users. 
 
The requirements and benefits to both 
periphery and core are summarized in table 
1. That benefits simultaneously accrue to 
both the periphery and core suggest that 
the creation and control infrastructures 
must be complementary, but are often 
completely interdependent.  
Finding 3.2a Technology 
ecosystem participants self-
select themselves through 
higher levels of control. 
 
Finding 3.2b The decision to 
self-select through higher 
control levels is similar to a 
market transaction. 
Ecosystems participants 
offer or forfeit something in 
exchange for some 
additional value. 
 
Finding 3.2c Although 
distinct, creation and 
control mechanisms should 
be complementary, and are 
often interdependent. 
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RQ 3.3 How do 
incentive and 
control 
mechanisms 
accommodate 
ecosystem 
heterogeneity?  
 
Our focal technology ecosystem created a 
certification structure with five discrete, 
graduated levels. Pursuit of higher levels of 
certification is voluntary; that is, a 
complementor may enter the periphery at 
the lowest level and remain there, or they 
may pursue higher ones based upon their 
profiles, preferences and capabilities. 
 
Advancement to higher certification levels 
is in several cases permitted by the 
acquisition of internal points which can be 
acquired through a wide variety of 
accomplishments. These include 
operational goals such as selling a specific 
quantity of the core´s licenses, individual 
skill certifications, or organizational 
competency profiles. This standard 
currency permits multiple paths towards 
higher graduations for partner 
organizations as well as horizontal mobility 
for individuals throughout the ecosystem. 
 
As entry in to the periphery of the 
ecosystem has few formal requirements, 
new entrants must compete with 
established partners with strong 
reputations. Via advancement to higher 
graduations of certification, they can obtain 
greater legitimacy and status as bestowed 
by the core. 
Finding 3.1a Control 
infrastructures in 
technology ecosystems can 
be graduated, with greater 
value offered to 
complementors in exchange 
for submitting to higher 
levels of control by the 
core. 
 
Finding 3.1b To embrace 
heterogeneity, technology 
ecosystems can develop 
internal currencies to 
permit: i) common 
measurement standards to 
assess heterogeneous 
accomplishments, ii) 
multiple paths through 
higher graduations of 
certification, and iii) 
horizontal mobility through 
the ecosystem. 
 
Finding 3.4 The ecosystem 
core confers legitimacy and 
status to participants and 
complementors on the 
periphery in graduated 
levels. As complementors 
fulfil the requirements of 
the higher certification 
levels and come under 
greater influence of the 
core, the core confers upon 
them greater legitimacy and 
status. 
 
 
Our study and subsequent theorizing are novel on a variety of levels. First, where a 
number of studies of open source movements exist that explore their community 
dynamics and intrinsic motivations, less empirical research has analyzed for-profit 
technology platforms and ecosystems where market mechanisms are explicit and 
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governed by a profit seeking core, and economic incentives that are also prominent 
amongst the periphery of complementors. Second, we pay specific attention to the 
problems of coordination and control which have also been underserved in the 
literature. Third, we identify the important role of heterogeneity in ecosystems, as well 
as how governance mechanisms can be designed to accommodate a heterogeneous 
periphery through standardized currencies, graduated status and legitimacy, multiple 
advancement paths and horizontal mobility throughout the ecosystem. Finally, we 
examine the role of ecosystem infrastructures in increasing cohesion through a 
portfolio of fragmented complementors, and explore how community-based norms 
can follow from - and complement - the market based infrastructures to further 
advance such cohesion. 
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4 RATIONALIZATION OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis includes two distinct empirical studies. In the first (chapter 2), the classical 
theories of transaction cost economics and agency theory are applied to the domain of 
affiliate marketing. In the second study (chapter 3), the emerging theories of 
ecosystems and platforms are applied to a business software domain, which is 
characterized as a technology ecosystem consisting of a strong, profit-seeking firm at 
the core and many surrounding entities which both depend on the core, and 
contribute to the overall ecosystem’s development. While the first study is primarily an 
application of extant theory (transaction cost economics and agency theory) to a novel 
domain which has been understudied to date (and also includes a significant normative 
component), the second study applies an inductive treatment to a particular domain, 
and incorporates significant theory development in a relatively new area of theoretical 
discourse: ecosystems and platforms. What both studies have in common principally is 
the objective of explaining the organization and control of each domain, what has 
been traditionally defined as governance, or “a multidimensional phenomenon, 
encompassing the initiation, termination and ongoing relationship maintenance 
between a set of parties” (Heide, 1994, p. 72).  
The dominant theory for studying governance in prior literature has been 
transaction cost economics (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975).  The original goal of TCE is 
to explain a firm’s choice between two governance forms: markets and hierarchies. 
Analysis in TCE focuses on the attributes of a transaction that determine variations in 
its costs, and which consequently may be used to determine the most appropriate 
governance form. Three major characteristics of transactions are germane to the 
determination of the appropriate organizational form in TCE: asset specificity, 
exchange uncertainty, and transaction frequency (Williamson 1985). An analysis of the 
levels of each of these characteristics suggests the most appropriate governance form 
for a given domain. Williamson (1991) later added the possibility of hybrid forms, 
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which he defined to include “various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal 
trading, regulation, franchising, and the like” (p. 280). In chapter 1, we have also 
discussed other efforts in the literature to classify and analyze these intermediate 
forms as networks (Jarillo 1988, Powell 1990, Thorelli 1986).  
At several points in this thesis we have suggested that the choice of a 
governance form does not adequately address the issue of how firms may govern a 
heterogeneous network of partners. The election of a particular governance form, 
whether hierarchy, market, or hybrid/network, is merely the first step, as there are an 
infinite number of ways to organize these relationships within each governance form. 
More recent developments of transaction cost theory have focused on governance 
mechanisms as a more detailed assessment of the inner workings of the hybrid form. 
Wathne and Heide (2000) research a range of alternative governance mechanisms 
which form the primary theoretical basis for the analysis in chapter 2, and in chapter 3 
we likewise identify several governance mechanisms at work in the Business Software 
ecosystem (figure 3.1). Nevertheless, in the Wathne and Heide paper, the authors 
criticize the ad hoc nature of what they also term “control mechanisms”, and the need 
for a systematic study of their interdependencies and antecedents, grouping the 
mechanisms into three approaches to control: partner selection, incentive design, and 
monitoring.  
While attempts of this kind to create a taxonomy of governance mechanisms 
may help to better organize the field, the issue remains that agency theory and 
transaction cost economics “view relationship management as a problem of deploying 
control mechanisms to manage partner opportunism, with the overall goal of 
minimizing governance costs” (Stump and Heide 1996, p. 431). In this thesis, 
particularly in chapter 3, we have taken the position that identifying the many 
governance mechanisms at work should be followed by a deeper analysis of ecosystem 
dynamics. 
Chapter 3 focuses on two alternative theories for understanding the 
organization of interfirm relationships: platforms and ecosystems. These theory bases 
complement TCE theory in that they focus on a particular type of hybrid/network 
governance form, which may resist the generalities applied to hybrid/network forms. 
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Unlike TCE, which tends to take a dyadic approach to transactions between two (or 
more) firms, ecosystem and platform theories apply a more holistic view of the activity 
between multiple firms. The perspective in both cases is primarily from the perspective 
of the core firm, also known as the keystone firm in ecosystem theory, though the role 
of complementors or niche players is also deemed critical to the growth and overall 
health of the ecosystem. In addition, theory on ecosystems and platforms focus on 
how to manage a platform/ecosystem in order to maximize value creation and 
appropriation, a concept which is not prevalent in TCE. In chapter 3, we have studied 
one domain in detail (business software) in order to describe observations which we 
hope will extend the existing theory base of platforms/ecosystems.  
The motivation for the research in chapter 3 is based on certain empirical 
observations which we do not believe have been satisfactorily addressed by prior 
research. First, there is the critical tension between creation and control. Studies of 
ecosystems and platforms to date have tended to focus more on value creation, and 
hence there is a need for more research on governance and control mechanisms.  In 
addition, prior research tends to view ecosystems as homogenous, in that governance 
mechanisms may be created unilaterally by the core and applied to all parties equally. 
In contrast, we have observed a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in the types of 
partners and economic activity in our domains, requiring a greater degree of flexibility 
in the initial design and evolution of creation and control mechanisms.  
At this point in the thesis, we have applied TCE to one type of ecosystem in the 
affiliate marketing domain, and applied ecosystems and platforms theory to a separate 
platform in the enterprise software sector. Both domains in this thesis may be 
considered ecosystems, since both revolve around keystones which make platform 
decisions and guide overall ecosystem development, but are dependent on the 
contributions of other participants who expand the core offerings and create diversity. 
However, the two domains have significant differences, as the Business Software 
ecosystem in the second study is based around a single core firm, while the affiliate 
marketing ecosystem is more fragmented, with multiple platforms, none of which has 
dominant market share.  
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Our objectives at this point are to explore the value and limitations of TCE in 
explaining observed phenomena in our two domains; to examine how theory on 
ecosystems and platforms may complement TCE based on our research findings; and 
to suggest avenues for future research. Therefore, we will now undertake a more 
uniform application of TCE to both domains studied, and an exploration of the 
similarities and differences in both theory and domain in the two studies as a means of 
further rationalizing the theory development exercise begun in chapters 2 and 3. Next, 
we engage in an analysis of how theory on platforms and ecosystems may complement 
TCE. Finally, we discuss additional observations which have not been adequately 
addressed by existing theory on platforms and ecosystems. In section 4.5 we introduce 
theory from the paradox literature, suggest two additional tensions, and provide 
additional observations from the Business Software ecosystem. 
Accordingly, our research questions are the following: 
RQ 4.1: What aspects of ecosystems/platforms as a new organizational form 
are explained by transaction cost economics and agency theory? 
RQ 4.2: What additional explanatory value is provided by platform/ecosystem 
theory? 
RQ 4.3: What additional conceptual development is needed? 
4.2 Analysis of Strong Core and Fragmented Ecosystems along TCE 
Dimensions 
We address research question 4.1 by applying the primary dimensions of transaction 
cost analysis to each of the two domains explored in this thesis, the fragmented 
affiliate marketing ecosystem with multiple platforms, and the platform-centric 
business software ecosystem with activity revolving around a single, dominant core 
firm. The dimensions used in the analysis include the primary constructs from 
transaction cost economics (asset specificity, transaction frequency, and 
environmental and behavioral uncertainty). The table below summarizes our 
assessment of each domain for each of the four primary constructs: 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of strong core and fragmented ecosystems along TCE dimensions – 
Valuations 
Dimension Strong core  
(Business Software) 
Fragmented  
(Affiliate Marketing) 
Asset specificity Varies Low to Moderate 
Transaction frequency Varies Varies (Low to Moderate) 
Environmental uncertainty Medium to High High 
Behavioral uncertainty Medium to High High 
 
The remainder of this section will have the following structure: 
Table 4.2: Comparison of strong core and fragmented ecosystems along TCE dimensions – 
Analysis 
Dimension Strong core  
(Business Software) 
Fragmented  
(Affiliate Marketing) 
Asset specificity Section 4.2.1 Section 4.2.2 
Transaction frequency Section 4.2.1 Section 4.2.2 
Environmental uncertainty Section 4.2.3 Section 4.2.4 
Behavioral uncertainty Section 4.2.3 Section 4.2.4 
 
4.2.1 Asset specificity and transaction frequency: Business Software 
The first key dimension in transaction cost economics is asset specificity, or the degree 
to which assets developed for a particular relationship are limited outside of that 
relationship. When asset specificity is high, the resulting lock-in could result in a 
possible “hold-up” of one or both parties. In the Business Software ecosystem, 
partners develop idiosyncratic assets specific to that software platform in the form of 
software complements, certifications of both personnel and software solutions, skills 
obtained through training and experience in software development and 
implementations, etc. These assets retain little value outside of this relationship since 
software solutions are based on proprietary standards, and certifications are specific 
to particular software. Therefore, the possibility of a hold-up problem does exist in this 
case.  
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that investments in relationship-
specific assets are made primarily by the periphery participants and not by the core. 
The Software Manufacturer must invest in developing the core software product, 
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creating software development kits, maintaining the software implementation 
methodology, maintaining the software roadmap, etc. However, these are 
infrastructure elements common to all partners, and thus easily redeployed if a 
particular partner leaves the relationship.  
Nevertheless, we must also take into account the level of control to which 
partners self-select. At higher levels, there is also a corresponding higher investment 
by the partner in the relationship, since the asset-specific investments identified 
earlier (i.e. software solution development, software and personnel certification, 
advanced training) tend to occur at higher levels of control. At higher levels, there is 
also greater investment by the core in relationship-specific assets in the form of 
offering training, dedicated customer support, co-marketing and co-branding 
campaigns, and potentially co-development of products and services. When partners 
self-select to higher levels of control, this hybrid organizational form shows greater 
levels of inter-firm integration due to higher levels of co-investment in relationship-
specific assets.  Therefore, while the hold-up problem seems to exist at lower levels of 
control, at higher levels there appears to be less risk of a hold-up problem as both 
parties make investments in relationship-specific assets. 
Transaction frequency complements asset frequency in that when both asset 
specificity and transaction frequency are high, the tendency is toward a more closely 
integrated governance form (Stuckey and White 1993). In the case of the Business 
Software ecosystem, we have identified annual license sales as the proxy for 
transactions. Partners with high transaction frequency will tend to self-select into 
higher levels of control, while those with lower transaction frequency correlate with 
lower levels of control. This is due to the fact that while partners are given the choice 
of whether or not to participate in higher partnership levels, each successive level has 
higher requisites in terms of annual license sales. And, as detailed in the prior chapter, 
higher partnership levels provide greater incentives and access to valuable 
infrastructure mechanisms provided by the Software Vendor. In other words, partners 
with low asset specificity and low transaction frequency will tend to elect lower levels 
of control, while those with higher asset specificity and higher transaction frequency 
tend towards higher levels of control (and integration between the parties). Therefore, 
Page 112 de 245 
 
while the Software Vendor creates incentives to encourage partners to choose higher 
levels of control, the choice of the level of investment in relationship-specific activities, 
the level of transaction activity, and the consequent choice of control level remain 
with the partner. 
4.2.2 Asset specificity and transaction frequency: Affiliate Marketing 
In analyzing asset specificity and transaction frequency in the Affiliate 
Marketing ecosystem, one important aspect to consider is its fragmented nature, 
where no individual platform (primarily affiliate networks, though some large 
merchants like Amazon or eBay manage their own affiliate platforms) has dominant 
market share. Affiliates choose merchants (and by extension affiliate networks) based 
on their commission structure, the tools they offer, their brand recognition, and the 
niche in which they operate (AffStat 2009, PartnerCentric 2006). In a 2009 survey of 
over 450 affiliates by AffStat, 41% of respondents said they represented more than 21 
merchant programs, and 30% represent 51 or more programs.  
Wareham (2003) observed that information and communications technologies 
have the potential to reduce asset specificity through, for example, common and open 
standards: “Where investments in computer hardware, telecommunications 
infrastructure and training certainly represent up-front investments, applications are 
increasingly becoming more open and amenable to redeployment in other 
environments at minimal cost, if not conceived for multiple deployments from design” 
(p. 337). Therefore, an important factor in affiliate marketing which reduces asset 
specificity is that many of the tools provided by merchants are based on open 
standards including HTML, Javascript, iframes, XML and CSV, and banner sizes. 
However, in affiliate marketing some tools, such as application programming 
interfaces (api’s), require more integration and higher relationship-specific 
investments on the part of the affiliates. API’s allow affiliates to import robust content 
from merchants into the affiliate’s site. API’s are best used for information which 
changes frequently (such as flight and hotel rates and availability), and updates are 
provided in real-time. Therefore, in most cases asset specificity is low in the Affiliate 
Marketing ecosystem, but for affiliates who use api’s it may be moderate to high. 
Page 113 de 245 
 
In the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, incentives focus primarily on transaction 
frequency, with commissions based on visitors referred, leads, and sales, or some 
combination of the three.  In Spain, these incentives can be classified into five basic 
commission pricing models, which are chosen depending on the program objectives of 
each merchant (see table 2.6 for details). Therefore, the nature of transactions in 
affiliate marketing depends on conditions set by each merchant.  
As described in section 2.4.3, many merchants offer different commission levels 
depending on the number of transactions an affiliate generates, with promotions 
based on superior performance and demotions based on inferior performance. The 
number of transactions required to reach the next level is generally shared with the 
affiliates, though not always, and affiliates who achieve superior performance 
(primarily through higher transaction frequency) may renegotiate their agreement 
from a one-to-many arrangement (covered by a standard agreement applied to the 
majority of affiliates) to a one-to-one (where the terms and conditions apply to the 
individual merchant-affiliate arrangement). The advantages of higher levels of 
integration with a given platform are primarily outcome-based in the form of higher 
commissions and bonuses. In our analysis, we have assumed low to moderate 
transaction frequency, since our sample is based on affiliates under a one-to-many 
arrangement. Affiliates with higher transaction frequency might achieve higher 
bargaining power and negotiate a more favorable one-to-one contract. Consequently, 
consistent with transaction cost economics theory, the low to moderate asset 
specificity in the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem combined with low to moderate 
transaction frequency would tend towards using more market-based mechanisms to 
govern the relationship. Those with higher asset specificity (more extensive use of 
api’s), and higher transaction frequency would indicate a closer (more vertical) 
relationship between the parties. 
4.2.3 Uncertainty: Business Software 
As summarized by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), there are two types of uncertainty: 
environmental uncertainty, where the context of the exchange is difficult to identify 
ex-ante; and behavioral uncertainty, where performance is difficult to verify. The main 
issue with high environmental uncertainty is an adaptation problem, where it is 
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difficult to modify contracts in reaction to changing circumstances. High behavioral 
uncertainty may lead to a performance evaluation problem, where it is difficult to 
establish whether an exchange partner is in compliance with contract terms.  
 A critical issue in all ecosystems is the portion of overall value creation which 
will be retained by each contributor, and this is directly determined by incentives, both 
financial and behavioral, included as part of the contracts (whether formal or 
relational). In other words, first we must determine what is meant by “performance” 
prior to assessing whether exchange partners are in compliance. In the case of the 
Business Software ecosystem, partners are measured based on their ability to 
generate license sales of the core product, and revenues from license sales are divided 
between the Software Vendor and the partner. However, there is medium to high 
environmental uncertainty in this domain since customers have specialized needs. 
Partners become experts in particular sectors according to their ability to identify 
these particular needs, and offer solutions which meet these needs. Each client 
implementation of the software tends to require some degree of customization, and 
partners may also offer their own partner solutions (complements to the core software 
solution). The partner retains all revenues related to customization and partner 
solution sales. Therefore, while there is high environmental uncertainty related to the 
specific needs of the customer, this is treated as outside of the scope of the core-
partner relationship. By solely focusing on sales of the core software product and 
leaving the remaining issues to the partner, the Software Vendor greatly simplifies the 
contracting environment, albeit at the cost of abandoning a share of other revenue. As 
a result, behavioral uncertainty is greatly reduced since performance is limited to 
assessing license sales.  
However, these decisions have consequences. First, as mentioned above, the 
core forfeits any share of revenues from other sources besides license sales. Second, 
critical performance issues are left outside of the scope of the Software Vendor-
partner relationship, such as whether a software implementation is successful in terms 
of providing a solution to the customer’s requirements on time and on budget, the 
quality of training and technical support provided, ongoing maintenance, etc. An 
important consideration is that if the partner performs poorly in those areas left 
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outside of the scope of the Software Vendor-partner contract, they reflect poorly not 
only on the partner but on the core firm as well.  
TCE proposes vertical integration as the preferred governance from when 
uncertainty and transaction frequency are high as the solution to incomplete 
contracts. This is not a practical option in this situation since partners choose to 
operate independently from the core firm. As discussed earlier, Williamson has broadly 
proposed the selection of hybrid governance forms as a solution to this dilemma. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, simply choosing a hybrid governance form 
does not completely address this issue since there are an infinite number of ways to 
configure this relationship. More recent developments of transaction cost theory have 
focused on governance mechanisms as a more detailed assessment of the inner 
workings of the hybrid form. In fact, our study of the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem has 
the explicit objective of analyzing the application of the governance mechanisms of 
partner selection, incentives, and monitoring as complements to the primary 
mechanism of formal contracts. 
4.2.4 Uncertainty: Affiliate Marketing 
Similar to the Business Software context, in Affiliate Marketing performance is 
defined based on the number of transactions completed (which may be sales, leads, 
clicks or some combination depending on the commission structure for each program). 
In addition, many programs specify rules governing email marketing, privacy policies, 
search engine marketing, and the use of merchant trademarks (see section 2.4.1 for 
more detail). Nevertheless, we have identified environmental uncertainty as high due 
to the extreme information asymmetry in the channel. Similar to the Business 
Software context, performance in the formal contract is defined in terms of 
transactions, yet how affiliates achieve these transactions is not given sufficient focus. 
 Table 2.1 summarizes the biggest challenges in managing affiliate programs 
according to merchants, with approximately 50% of the concerns related to properly 
managing affiliates, fraud and monitoring for trademark infringement and brand risks. 
Chapter 2 explores this issue in more detail, with the conclusion that while there are 
some limitations in formal contracts regarding the use of trademarks and merchant 
brands, there are little or no explicit guidelines related to areas where affiliates have a 
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significant degree of independence (such as the content of advertisements or the use 
of email), thus increasing the importance of the other governance measures.   
Behavioral uncertainty in the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem is likewise 
identified as high. Again, similar to the Business Software ecosystem, performance is 
defined in terms of transactions, and requirements for affiliate behavior are generally 
not given considerable attention in the formal contract. The check for behavioral 
uncertainty is through monitoring mechanisms, and in chapter 2 we analyzed the 
sample for both outcome-based and behavior-based monitoring. We conclude that 
monitoring of outcomes is generally effective in identifying the number of transactions 
completed. However behavior-based monitoring is affected to a greater extent by 
information asymmetry, and while merchants perform random checks on affiliate web 
sites, and monitor their own brand and trademarks in search engines, efforts are 
typically nonsystematic.  
Therefore, high environmental uncertainty and high behavioral uncertainty in 
the Affiliate Marketing context result in both difficulty in crafting effective contracts, 
and difficulty in monitoring behavior. The measures used to address these issues as 
observed in our study in chapter 2 primarily focus on reducing affiliate commission 
levels or cancelling an affiliate’s contract when infractions are observed. In addition, 
the actions taken by the merchant depend in large part on the transaction frequency 
of an affiliate; those with a high transaction frequency are given greater attention, are 
promoted to higher commission levels, and may even negotiate a specialized contract 
between the parties. Affiliates with low transaction frequency are given far less 
attention. Merchants monitor changes in transaction frequency closely, since a sudden 
and dramatic increase in performance may be an indicator of fraud.  
4.3 Theory Development 
Based on the analysis in the prior section, we may reach several conclusions 
regarding the value of transaction cost economics in providing insights to our two 
chosen domains. First, TCE is generally effective in addressing the broad issue of 
determining the most effective governance form for a dyadic relationship. The theory 
has explanatory value regarding issues of hold-up costs and partner lock-in, the 
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completeness of contracts, and the difficulty of monitoring exchange behavior. When 
considering the relationship between the core firm and an ecosystem participant, our 
analysis has generally pointed towards a hybrid or network form based on the 
guidelines provided in the theory.  
Choice of Governance Form 
The principal objectives behind analyzing a domain along the four dimensions 
of TCE are either explanatory - to explain why different governance forms exist; or 
prescriptive - to choose the appropriate governance form given the particular 
characteristics of that domain. Our analysis would suggest that TCE is perhaps more 
effective as an explanatory theory, where the four factors serve as a lens through 
which to evaluate the appropriateness of the previously chosen governance form. 
First, TCE excludes key characteristics which determine the governance form such as 
the independent agency of the parties (we have discussed how partners self-select the 
program level in both ecosystems – see Findings 3.2a and 3.2b), value creation, and 
innovation. Islamoglu and Liebenau (2007), citing prior literature, suggest that while 
TCE may have explanatory value for exchange behavior resulting from efficiency 
considerations, it excludes factors related to power and the behavioral characteristics 
of exchange participants such as issues of consensus and cooperation. In chapter 1, we 
provide examples from the literature on motives for choosing hybrid or network forms 
of governance (for example, Ebbers 1999). While this review is not intended to be 
comprehensive, it does illustrate that firms may choose their governance form based 
on factors other than those proposed by TCE.  
Moreover, we should address the adequacy of transaction cost theory for 
completing its principal objective: explaining the most appropriate governance form 
for an exchange relationship. In their research of multinational firms, Hwang and Gaur 
(2009) argue that the choice of organizational mode is not a “make-buy” decision as 
classically posited, but rather a “make-cooperate-or-buy” decision. Consequently, 
while the initial transaction cost analysis framework focused on this choice between 
two forms of organization, more recent updates acknowledge that “the features of 
internal organization can be achieved without ownership or complete vertical 
integration” (Rindsfleisch and Heide 1997, p. 32), but also through hybrid mechanisms. 
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As opposed to the choice of organizational form, which has traditionally been viewed 
as a “make-or-buy” decision, this use of governance mechanisms applies where the 
choice of a hybrid organizational form is considered to be ex-ante.  
In a similar vein, Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) claim that an important 
limitation of TCE is that the direction of causality is not clear, and that certain factors 
such as asset specificity may be the result of governance form choice. In our two 
domains, we have observed that the levels of at least some of these factors may be 
determined by the choice of governance form, and not vice versa. For example, 
partners in the enterprise software ecosystem may self-select a higher level in the 
ecosystem. As a result, the partner will make greater investments in marketing, 
training, software development, etc. associated with the software product. In addition, 
at this higher level, the Software Vendor makes corresponding investments in co-
marketing, training, sales support, etc. which are specific to that relationship. In other 
words, the higher level of asset intensity is due at least in part to the higher 
partnership level, not vice versa. A similar phenomenon occurs in the Affiliate 
Marketing ecosystem, where higher level affiliates in a given merchant program 
receive higher commissions, and as a result will make higher asset-specific investments 
in marketing that merchant. Therefore, we suggest the following as a result of our 
analysis: 
Finding 4.1: TCE has explanatory value for the choice of a hybrid/network 
governance form, but excludes many of the key factors which determine (and 
result from) this choice; the levels of some factors may be the result of the 
choice of governance form, not vice versa. 
Solar System Model 
While we have observed that TCE offers certain explanatory value for a 
particular dyadic relationship, we immediately run into a level of analysis problem, as 
the goal of our research is not to consider how the core firms may structure 
relationships with a single trading partner. Transaction cost economics reduces the 
scope of analysis to that of a series of exchanges between two firms.  These exchanges 
may take the form of hierarchy or market at either extreme, but may also take on an 
intermediary, or hybrid form. Many studies have visualized this choice of governance 
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form as a continuum, and a particular arrangement may be classified along this 
continuum based on the degree of intensity of each of the three primary TCE factors 
(asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty). This is the exchange view, or 
“linear” model. Since a key premise in this thesis is that ecosystems/platforms 
represent a governance form which deserves special consideration due to its particular 
characteristics, we should then ask how these forms might be different from the 
contexts in which TCE has been applied previously. 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) survey 45 empirical studies from the literature 
and found TCE applied to vertical integration decisions to move either forward into 
distribution and sales, or backward into production inputs; outsourcing decisions; 
vertical interorganizational relationships in lieu of ownership; and horizontal 
interorganizational relationships such as co-marketing. Outsourcing decisions fit well 
with the linear model since they generally represent a single make-or-buy decision for 
a particular functional activity such as information systems, human resources, 
manufacturing, etc. While vertical integration issues often involve multiple trading 
partners, the similarity of the activities (sales, distribution, etc.) under consideration 
allows for extrapolation of the governance form decision to all potential parties. In 
other words, these are generally homogeneous activities. Vertical and horizontal 
interorganizational relationships make similar assumptions about the trading partners, 
the main difference being that the hierarchical relationship is achieved through formal 
and relational contracts rather than through integration into a single firm. 
As mentioned above, the bulk of the empirical research on TCE seems to 
assume either a dyadic relationship, or a relationship with multiple, similar trading 
partners. In either case, there is a single consideration of the appropriate governance 
form for all parties. In our observations, rather, the issue is how a core firm may design 
a broader program which incentivizes multiple, heterogeneous exchange partners to 
engage in economic activity around the core firm’s products and services, while 
maintaining a degree of control. When we take this macro view, we have observed 
core firms creating multiple, distinct hybrid forms for the same economic activity. 
Looking at the ecosystem from the perspective of the ecosystem core, the issue of 
creating a model which accommodates a heterogeneous set of trading partners and 
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types of activities becomes more complex. Neither is the organizational model static, 
since the portfolio of partners and complements tends to evolve over time, requiring 
core mechanisms to evolve as well in order to maintain balance.  
Of course, the body of research on TCE has embraced organizational forms 
which go beyond simple, dyadic relationships. We have discussed various examples in 
the literature on inter-firm networks and hybrid forms, and have found key differences 
in the assumptions regarding the orchestration of the models. While networks 
presume coordination between firms and generally suggest a shared governance 
structure, ecosystems and platforms assume the presence of a keystone or platform 
leader responsible for the creation and evolution of the core platform, linkages 
between the core and complements, and general rule-setting for participation in the 
ecosystem. One explanation for this difference is that one stream of literature in 
organizational theory (Thorelli 1986, Jarillo 1988, Powell 1990) has tended to classify 
all intermediary organizational forms between pure markets and hierarchies as 
networks, a broad classification for relationships between two or more firms. 
However, we believe that one type of network, ecosystems, has particular 
characteristics which merit separate consideration. Consequently, we propose the 
following: 
Finding 4.2: In contrast with a dyadic focus on each inter-firm relationship 
individually, core firms in an ecosystem manage their relationships with 
multiple, heterogeneous partners through a coordinated portfolio of distinct 
relationship types which correspond to the various partner roles, and which 
may be graduated in nature.  
Throughout this thesis we build on ecosystems/platforms as an alternative view of 
inter-organizational relationships focusing on the role of a core firm in creating a 
platform and orchestrating creation and control mechanisms to encourage 
participation by third parties. We refer to this view as the “solar system” model, shown 
below in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Solar system model 
 
In the solar system model, the core firm must manage a coordinated portfolio 
of arrangements with other ecosystem participants, called niche players in the 
ecosystem literature (Iansiti and Levien 2004a, 2004b), or complementors in the 
platform literature (Baldwin and Woodard 2010, Boudreau and Hagiu 2009). An 
ecosystem may support hundreds, thousands, or even millions of participants. It would 
therefore be impractical to treat each relationship individually. Instead, firms must 
create a program of relationship types, which may be graduated. Firms also must 
consider different types of programs depending on the type of partner in the 
ecosystem, and the optimal control structure would reflect this heterogeneity.  
Heterogeneity 
Since it represents such a key point of differentiation from the network/hybrid 
view, we should address the issue of what we mean by heterogeneity in the context of 
our two ecosystems. Certainly, we have found differences in the size of ecosystem 
participants in terms of the volume of transactions, annual revenues, number of 
employees, etc. In the enterprise software ecosystem, one key difference among 
partners is the software packages supported; the Software Vendor offers four separate 
packages targeting different needs of small and midsize firms, and the modular nature 
of the software means that partners can become specialists in particular modules such 
as customer relationship management or supply chain management. Furthermore, 
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partners may engage in different roles, such as software development, sales and 
installation, training, or technical support. Partners may focus on a single role, or may 
develop competencies in multiple roles. Finally, partners may specialize in one or more 
industry sectors, and may focus on a local, national, or international market.  
We illustrate this heterogeneity for the Business Software ecosystem in Table 
4.3 below, which depicts possible activities and domains. Complementors can have a 
combination of geographical focus, functional focus, or specific expertise of an 
industrial sector, and perform support, training, implementations, and add-on 
development across these domains.   
Table 4.3 Complementor activities and domains 
        Domain 
 
 
     Activity 
Geographic 
(National, regional, 
international) 
Functional 
(SW package, accounting 
and finance, 
manufacturing, HR, CRM, 
etc.) 
Industrial 
(Consumer goods, light-
heavy manufacturing, 
chemicals, transportation, 
hospitality, etc.) 
Support A, B, C A C 
Training A A  
Implementation/ 
customisation 
A, C A C 
Add-on development B, C B C 
  
Consider the following examples, which describe each complementor and its 
development path in the ecosystem, and include in parentheses the types of 
governance mechanisms which would help with this development: 
Complementor A may be a German partner with a broad profile, specialised in 
accounting, finance, tax and HR modules. As such, the firm could be considered a 
generalist partner providing support, training, and implementation in the German 
market, with deep knowledge of the accounting, tax, and HR regimes. Complementor 
A’s development path with the Software Vendor ecosystem would consist of 
developing new software modules (software development kits, product certification, 
directory listings), maintaining compatibility with Software Vendor upgrades (product 
roadmaps), improving sales and marketing efforts to increase market share in the 
German market (co-branding and co-marketing, sales training), and improving 
efficiency and quality of implementations (standardized methodologies, costing 
templates, technical support and training assistance, benchmarking). 
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Complementor B may be an American partner that has developed a global CRM add-
on to support advanced on-line marketing, segmentation, and pricing. It does not 
handle generalist implementations, but simply develops and supports its product 
across all regions and industries. The development path for this complementor would 
mirror some of the product development-related challenges that Complementor A 
experiences such as developing new modules and maintaining software compatibility 
with upgrades, but would include additional challenges related to localization 
(language packs, consulting on legal restrictions) as well as marketing and sales 
(contacts with local implementation partners, distribution contacts, country-specific 
co-marketing and co-branding). 
Complementor C may be a vertical specialist with deep knowledge of the food 
processing industry. It would perform general implementations for clients across a 
broad geographical region (e.g. South America), and sell and support several of its own 
vertical add-ons for specific industries. Complementor C would need many of the same 
areas of supports as both complementors A and B, and additionally the type of 
governance regime for the core firm, either tightly or loosely coupled comes into play.  
From our data, we observed that The Software Vendor tends to take a passive role in 
the determination of which vertical sectors are supported, letting partners decide 
which sectors to target. As a result, some sectors may become overcrowded with 
vertical add-on offerings, while others may have very few offerings. We have also 
observed other software vendors who take a more direct role in determining vertical 
offerings, recruiting new partners based on their expertise in a particular vertical 
sector which is under-served, and limiting competition in sectors which have sufficient 
coverage. In section 4.4.4 we discuss this phenomenon in more detail. 
In the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, affiliates vary in terms of the level of their 
economic activity and commitment to a particular merchant program; they may 
pursue one or more different business models (blogs, email marketing, price 
comparison sites, etc.); and may focus on a particular industry sector or sectors. As we 
have discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and earlier in this chapter, both ecosystems from 
this thesis feature multiple control levels to which ecosystem partners self-select. In 
addition, we suggest that key elements of the platform/ecosystem infrastructure may 
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need to be adjusted for different types of partners. In the model in Figure 4.1, we 
represent different types of partners in different quadrants; partner size is represented 
by the size of the circles; and partner control level is shown by their distance from the 
core.  
Tools 
Tools play a key role in ecosystems and platforms, and we would assert that the 
tools offered by the core firm should take into account the heterogeneity of partners. 
In describing what they call “state-of-the-art tools and building blocks for innovation”, 
Iansiti and Levien (2004b) state “these shared elements increase the productivity of 
network members, quickly propagate new innovations through the network, and 
encourage potential members to join the keystone’s ecosystem” (p. 93). 
The user innovation literature has focused on “toolkits” as an example of 
mechanisms which encourage innovation on the part of customers and end-users (Von 
Hippel 2001, Jeppesen and Molin 2003, Prugl and Schreier 2006). In the context of 
product development, Von Hippel (2001) explores how company-provided toolkits 
enable companies to decentralize information collection regarding end-user needs by 
giving customers the means to customize select aspects of products themselves. 
Jeppesen and Molin (2003) examine how toolkits work in a consumer community as 
opposed to at an individual user level. In the context of video game development, the 
authors describe “a cross-fertilization through which consumers are actively integrated 
into the strategy process” (p. 379). The resulting innovation occurs both within 
parameters set by the manufacturer, as well as challenging these boundaries.  Prugl 
and Schreier (2006) studied the behavior of users who employ toolkits to innovate 
around the computer game The Sims, concluding that the innovation behavior of lead 
users is long term and evolving, that they often use their own tools to complement 
those provided by the manufacturer, and that user innovations are in high demand 
among other users.  
In the enterprise software ecosystem, different tools are required for different 
types of partners. Development partners require software development kits to aid 
with the creation of new software add-ons; implementation partners are supported 
through methodologies, and technical support and training; and education partners 
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require support from training materials, which would necessarily be different for each 
software product. These tools also must be modified for each software product, and to 
support various languages and regulatory regimes. In the Affiliate Marketing 
ecosystem, tools vary depending on the type of affiliate and the activities they engage 
in while promoting merchants. Affiliates who engage in email marketing are provided 
with newsletters and other email promotional materials; price comparison sites 
require data feeds which are frequently updated, or API’s which allow them to access 
merchant product information in real-time; and mobile marketers require promotional 
materials designed for that format.  
The prior research on toolkits cited above has tended to focus on individual 
firms offering a single type of toolkit in order to enable a group of contributors to 
innovate around a single product. Our observations in chapters 2 and 3 have shown 
greater complexity in the use of toolkits: namely, various types of tools supporting 
various types of partners. Additionally, these tools do not necessarily originate 
exclusively from the core. Other community members may create tools to support 
their own activities, and may share these with the community, either for free or as a 
separate line of business. Consequently, we propose the following: 
Finding 4.3: Core firms may support different types of partners by creating 
multiple tools, each of which supports a different type of partner activity. New 
tools, in turn, may enable new types of partner activities, and partners may 
contribute new tools themselves. 
Value Appropriation 
We have observed that support by the core firm for different partner types 
may be explicit or implicit. Explicit support for a particular partner type would 
necessarily include specific tools to support that partner’s activity, as well as a 
mechanism for value appropriation by the core firm; in other words, in exchange for 
supplying the niche player with certain tools and support, the core would retain a 
portion of the value created by the niche player. This can be illustrated through the 
case of application development for the iPhone by third party developers. At its 
inception, Apple would retain 30% of the revenue for any application sale made 
through the Apple App Store.  In other words, app sales were explicitly supported. 
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Meanwhile, Apple implicitly supported a wide variety of business models for iPhone 
applications. Developers could place advertising in the apps, or sell subscriptions to 
premium services, for example. These other business were implicitly supported; Apple 
permitted developers to earn money through these other means, but Apple did not 
retain any of the value. Apple has since added explicit support for in-app purchases 
(sales of additional virtual goods and downloadable content once an application is 
installed) and for advertising through their recent iAd service (Pietrelli 2010). 
 We have observed varying degrees of this phenomenon in our two ecosystems. 
In the Business Software ecosystem, the single value appropriation mechanism 
supported by the core is retaining a percentage of core software license fees 
generated by partners. Therefore, the core extracts value from add-on sales by 
partners, to the extent that an add-on developed by a partner requires a customer to 
purchase additional software licenses. The core does not offer any mechanisms for 
participating in any other related products or services offered by partners which do 
not include additional sales of core software licenses. In contrast, the Affiliate 
Marketing ecosystem includes multiple compensation structures. Table 2.6, 
reproduced below for the convenience of the reader, demonstrates that affiliates are 
compensated based on generating clicks (visits to the merchant websites), sales, leads 
(the visitor fills out a form), or some combination of these three structures.  
Table 2.6: Commission pricing models used in Spain 
Pricing Model Number of 
programs 
Percentage of Total 
CPS  60 44.12 
CPC + Sale 30 22.06 
CPL  22 16.18 
CPC  12 8.82 
CPC + Lead 12 8.82 
 
Therefore, we suggest the following:   
Finding 4.4: While multiple tools may support a variety of partner activity, 
multiple value appropriation mechanisms allow the core to extract value from a 
wider range of partner activity. 
In the preceding sections of this chapter we have analyzed the two domains of 
the thesis using transaction cost economics, and have discussed the value of this 
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theoretical lens as well as its perceived shortcomings in explaining our observations. In 
the following section we will examine how a focus on platforms and ecosystems may 
complement this analysis. 
4.4 Discussion  
4.4.1 External Value Creation and Innovation 
Both empirical studies in this thesis include a substantial focus on the issue of 
governance, and governance mechanisms are identified in each. However, due to the 
distinct theory bases applied, the methodology for identifying and analyzing these 
mechanisms differs in each case. In the Affiliate Marketing study, four governance 
mechanisms are identified based on prior literature on transaction cost analysis and 
agency theory; governance mechanism constructs were deliberately selected based on 
their applicability to our analysis of the Affiliate Marketing domain, and were not 
intended to be exhaustive. The Business Software research in chapter 3 is largely 
focused on advancing theory development in the areas of ecosystems and platforms. 
The method in this second study, therefore, takes an inductive approach and allows 
the governance mechanisms to emerge. While some of the constructs identified in the 
initial study on Affiliate Marketing re-appear in the Business Software study, the 
names of specific mechanisms are mostly suppressed in order to maximize the external 
validity of the resultant theory. An expanded explanation of governance mechanisms 
which play an important role in Business Software ecosystems is included in the 
appendix in chapter 7, but these are common to a particular software sector, and 
would necessarily vary in other domains.  
The purposes behind the studies of governance mechanisms are somewhat 
varied in the two studies as well.  In the Affiliate Marketing study, formal contracts are 
created which include certain incentives to ensure that the goals of external partners 
(affiliates in this case) are aligned with those of the principal (merchants and affiliate 
networks), the merchants/affiliate networks pursue particular policies of partner 
selection, and affiliate activities are monitored. The primary goal of these activities is 
avoiding inappropriate activity on the part of the affiliates – that is, any activity which 
the merchants deem harmful to their interests. The construct in the transaction cost 
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analysis which describes this potentially negative behavior is opportunism, which can 
be defined as “some form of cheating or undersupply relative to an implicit or explicit 
contract” (p. 48, Wathne and Heide, 2000). In other words, the main goal of 
governance in transaction cost and agency theories (as applied in the Affiliate 
Marketing study) is for the principals to ensure the compliance of affiliates with the 
intentions of the merchants. The issue of opportunism, however, tends to concentrate 
more on preventing negative behavior on the part of actors rather than their positive 
contributions.  
While ecosystems and platforms require a certain level of compliance, and this 
is clearly one objective for the governance mechanisms instituted, a fundamental 
aspect of this theory base is that ecosystem participants play an important role in 
innovation. That is, through their activities, non-core players create additional value by 
targeting customers that the core would otherwise not be able to reach, identifying 
customer needs which are underserved, and providing expertise which the core does 
not possess. The open innovation literature (Chesbrough 2003, Gassmann 2006) also 
supports this notion, as does research on lead user innovation (Jeppesen and Molin 
2003, Prugl and Schreier 2006, von Hippel 2001). 
Therefore, while the transaction cost analysis and agency theory literature view 
the value chain as the deliberate product of principals who must control the activities 
of their agents and ensure their compliance, the new literature on ecosystems and 
platforms takes a more organic view of heterogeneous actors each pursuing their own 
economic ends. The flow of control, then, is not uni-directional compliance but rather 
bi-directional inter-dependence, and the resultant ecosystem is developed through a 
combination of the intentional design of the core and emergent design through the 
efforts of many external actors. Consequently, while the primary objective of 
traditional governance theory is control, new theory bases such as ecosystems and 
platforms must necessarily focus on both ensuring control and enabling creation.  
In the course of our analysis of the dynamics of creation and control, we have 
identified several themes which we believe complement the contributions of 
transaction cost economics. The following sections will elaborate on these themes. 
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4.4.2 Graduation and Self-Selection of Control Mechanisms 
Finding 3.1A (section 3.4) states “Control infrastructures in technology ecosystems can 
be graduated, with greater value offered to complementors in exchange for submitting 
to higher levels of control by the core”. We observed five levels of partners in the 
Business Software ecosystem (table 3.1). At each successive level partners are offered 
additional benefits for submitting to higher levels of control by the core firm, and 
partners self-select to higher levels of control while forfeiting some degree of 
independence. The base qualification for entry in a higher level is the amount of 
license sales generated by partners. We observed a similar phenomenon in the 
Affiliate Marketing domain, though the fragmented nature of the ecosystem means 
that each merchant maintains its own criteria for program levels, and these are not 
always transparent to affiliates. Regardless, the base criterion is transaction frequency 
as measured by visits, sales, or leads generated by the affiliate depending on a given 
program’s commission structure. In addition, affiliates are offered participation in 
special promotions by the merchants. Since affiliates choose which merchants to 
represent and whether or not to participate in these special promotions, we would 
maintain that there is a high degree of self-selection in the Affiliate Marketing domain 
as well.  
 We would suggest that this graduation of control is not directly contemplated 
in transaction cost economics, primarily because the level of analysis is the dyadic 
relationship between two firms. In section 4.2 we analyzed each of the two domains 
studied in this thesis along the dimensions of transaction cost economics, and one 
could argue that each level of control may be considered a distinct hybrid governance 
form determined to a large extent by degrees of transaction frequency and asset 
specificity (since uncertainty deals primarily with the completeness and enforceability 
of contracts). Nevertheless, we believe self-selection to be an important aspect of 
these types of relationships, as it emphasizes the autonomous nature of the parties; in 
contrast, transaction cost economics suggests that the governance form is an 
inevitable result when certain conditions exist. In other words, while TCE sees the 
selection of a more integrated structure as a movement towards a more hierarchical 
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structure which more closely resembles a firm, we would assert that this choice 
essentially remains a market decision.  
4.4.3 Balancing Creation and Control 
Table 3.2 identifies specific incentives and infrastructures for creation, and incentives 
and infrastructures for control in the Business Software ecosystem, and in Finding 3.2c 
we emphasize that while these creation and control mechanisms are distinct, they 
should be complementary and are often interdependent. In fact, some mechanisms 
may even have both creation and control roles. For example, the specialized integrated 
development environment and development language provided by the Software 
Vendor are powerful tools to help partners develop complementary solutions through 
which they may earn additional revenue. At the same time, these mechanisms enforce 
Software Vendor development standards, ensuring compatibility of software solutions 
with core software. The specialized knowledge which partners much acquire in order 
to utilize these tools draws them closer to the Software Vendor, thus increasing 
Software Vendor control.  
Still, core firms must be careful not to exercise so much control that they stifle 
innovation. In Chapter 3 we cited an analysis by West and O’Mahoney (2008) which 
noted the tension between control and growth in sponsored source communities; in 
the study the authors’ found that higher levels of controls were associated with 
restricted growth. In the same study, the researchers identified two types of openness 
which are positively associated with active participation by contributors: transparency, 
which allows developers to follow the sponsors’ production efforts; and accessibility 
which allows developers to participate in that production. Efforts to limit these factors 
by sponsors tended to restrict community growth.  
 A recent example of this tension may be found in the Apple App Store review 
process. This process for determining which iPhone and iPad applications gain 
approval to be sold through the Apple App Store has been criticized as being overly 
restrictive and lacking transparency. Recently, however, the company has decided to 
allow the use of third-party development tools after previously banning their use, and 
has succumbed to pressure to share the exact guidelines used to decide whether a 
particular application should be admitted to the App Store (Geere 2010). In this 
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example, the developers’ desire for transparency and accessibility influenced the 
decisions of Apple, which relies on the contributions of these developers for the health 
and growth of the iPhone/iPad ecosystem. 
In the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, we observed a higher level of control in 
certain commission structures (pay-per-click), and a lower level of control for programs 
with other types of compensation. The reason for this has to do with the desire of the 
merchants and platform providers to stimulate the maximum number of visits which 
might convert into sales. When a merchant is paying for each visit under a pay-per-
click compensation scheme, the quality of the visits is paramount and a higher level of 
control is required. When the merchant only pays a commission on sales, however, 
merchants have less of an incentive to exercise a high level of control since visits which 
do not convert to sales have no cost to the merchant. Therefore significant leeway is 
given to affiliates to be as innovative as possible in their promotion of merchants’ 
products and services. As we will discuss in the following section, this lower level of 
control also has an influence on the degree of heterogeneity and variability in the 
ecosystem.  
4.4.4 Heterogeneity and Variability 
The primary unit of transaction cost economics is the transaction. In the Business 
Software domain transactions are manifested as license sales, while in affiliate 
marketing they may be visits, leads, or sales, depending on the commission structure 
for a given merchant program. Meanwhile, a core characteristic of ecosystems is 
diversity. While the ecosystem could not survive without revenue, without diversity 
the ecosystem would not be considered “healthy” (Iansiti and Levien 2004). We have 
observed that an excessive focus on transactions as the primary measure of value 
causes some degree of conflict in the affiliate marketing ecosystem; merchants tend to 
focus on measuring the sales which result from affiliate activities, but place little 
emphasis on the activities used to generate these sales. This likewise occurs in the 
Business Software ecosystem, where the core firm measures partners based on core 
license sales. However, what truly increases diversity and improves the health of the 
ecosystem are the number and variety of complements created. Complementors bring 
their unique expertise and business focus, and also their ability to address a wide 
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range of customer needs which otherwise would be extremely difficult and costly for 
core firms to identify and satisfy. 
In transaction cost economics, variation is considered a threat to the stability of 
an interorganizational relationship. Since the primary governance mechanism is the 
contract, exchange uncertainty is associated with the problem of incomplete contracts, 
resulting in an adaptation problem when there is variation in the exchange 
circumstances. However, in the ecological literature, diversity increases the ability of a 
system to absorb external shocks and to innovate productively. While variability in the 
quality of goods and services exchanged in the system may be considered negative, 
diversity in the types of goods and services provided represents positive variability.  
Niche creation is a measure of an ecosystem’s ability to create meaningful diversity in 
a business ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). 
Findings 3a and 3b in the prior chapter address the issue of creating measures 
to encourage and manage diversity, or heterogeneity, in the ecosystem while limiting 
variation in quality. We have suggested that both creation and control mechanisms 
should be designed with the intention of reducing quality variance, while creation 
mechanisms should be designed to maximize heterogeneity. When there is a high level 
of heterogeneity, however, the challenge of matching supply and demand becomes 
more difficult. Search and coordination mechanisms serve to create greater cohesion 
within a diverse ecosystem. In the Business Software ecosystem, participation from the 
community in such measures as forums, ratings systems, case studies, and 
recommendations helps ensure meaningful diversity by strengthening the reputation 
of partners and complements of high quality, and penalizing those which are of lesser 
quality.  
We have also observed that core firms may either take an active or passive role 
in determining the degree of heterogeneity in the ecosystem. In the Affiliate Marketing 
domain, merchants generally take a passive approach, accepting most affiliate 
applications and providing few restrictions of the activities used to generate 
transactions. We did note certain cases where management was more active, such as 
the case of a major financial institution which preferred to accept affiliates focused on 
travel and entertainment, and tended to reject those whose core business was based 
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on financial services. The motivation in this case was to limit direct comparison 
between the merchant’s products and similar financial products. 
Furthermore, we observed various approaches to heterogeneity in different 
business software ecosystems. As part of the research of the Business Software 
domain, we conducted interviews with two other manufacturers in the enterprise 
software sector with different profiles from the Software Vendor of our study. While 
both were manufacturers of enterprise resource planning software for small 
businesses and therefore direct competitors with the Software Vendor, one of these 
other businesses delivers an open source product and relies heavily on community-
based development and distribution, while the other produces a proprietary software 
product and exercises a much higher degree of control over their partners. For the 
Software Vendor discussed in chapter 3 (which we considered to pursue a middle 
ground between the other two approaches to control), we found that the core does 
not pose limits on the number of partners, nor on the type of activities they engage in 
or whether or not they develop complementary software solutions. The risk of this 
strategy is that some geographic regions and vertical or horizontal sectors may be 
saturated with partners and with complementary solutions, while others may have 
relatively few. The Software Vendor relies on market forces to drive partners towards 
sectors where there is the greatest need and away from those where competition is 
excessive. The community also plays a vital role in aggregating demand and 
rationalizing supply.  
In contrast, the manufacturer which maintains tight control actively selects new 
partners based on their capabilities in a region or vertical or horizontal sector, and 
rejects new partners working in an area which is already saturated. This active 
approach both ensures high quality partners and complementary solutions, as well as 
ensuring a healthy diversity in the offering available to customers. It might be argued 
that this strategy requires the dedication of greater resources from the core firm, and 
relies less on the capabilities and insights of partners who are closer to the end 
customer. This also may limit the efficiency of market forces in determining which 
partners and complements will be successful, and may block access to many partners 
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and complements which might have a greater chance at success in a more open 
system. 
The core firm in the open source software ecosystem currently takes a passive 
approach, allowing partners and developers of complements to self-select, and for the 
market to decide which are successful. The CEO of this firm confirmed that this was 
out of necessity due to the company’s limited resources and the need to grow quickly. 
However, he did express the desire to take a more active approach to controlling the 
heterogeneity of the ecosystem once the company reaches a more mature stage.  
Encouraging heterogeneity in the ecosystem may have negative consequences, 
though. In both the Affiliate Marketing and Business Software studies we observed 
that while the core firms were effective in monitoring transactions, they had difficulty 
monitoring the behavior of participants in achieving those transactions. In both cases 
there was a dearth of formal mechanisms (such as incentives or terms in the formal 
contract) prescribing acceptable and prohibited behaviors. This may be due to cost 
considerations, a lack of effective monitoring technology, or some other effect which 
we have not observed. 
4.4.5 Legitimacy and Status 
In Finding 3.4, we observe that the ecosystem core confers legitimacy and status to 
participants and complementors on the periphery in graduated levels, with 
participants receiving greater legitimacy and status the closer they position themselves 
to the core.  This was evident in the Business Software ecosystem as partners 
participated in co-branding and marketing activities, co-sponsorship of events, and 
coordinated development activities, all of which served to tie the reputation of the 
partner more closely to the core.  
 In the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem we observed a similar phenomenon. While 
affiliates choose which merchants to promote for many reasons, the most important 
include commission rates (24%), program management (23%), and brand awareness 
(23%) according to a recent survey of 450 affiliates by AffStat (2009).  In this case, 
brand awareness may be considered a proxy for legitimacy and status. By accepting an 
affiliate to a merchant program, and allowing the affiliate to use the merchants’ 
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marketing materials and trademarks, legitimacy and status associated with the 
merchant brand is conferred to that affiliate. In chapter 2, we suggested that the 
transfer of brand equity could have negative consequences as well. If an affiliate 
engages in illegal or unethical practices, this negative activity may become associated 
with the merchants that they represent while engaging in such practices.  Our 
conclusion was that while merchants are generally effective in their monitoring of 
outcomes, they should be more vigilant in their monitoring of affiliate behavior. In 
other words, the sole focus on transactions runs the risk of negative affiliate behavior 
harming the legitimacy and status of the merchant. The graduated control levels in 
affiliate marketing are the primary mechanism used to reward and punish affiliate 
behavior. High-performing affiliates are promoted to a higher commission level, and 
those who engage in negative activities are punished by lowering their commission 
level or excluding them from the program altogether.  
Agency and transaction cost theories view the contract as the primary 
mechanism for controlling the exchange relationship, but negative activities on the 
part of the agent (in the above case, the affiliate) not contemplated in the contract 
may still impact negatively on the principal (the merchant in this case). However, these 
negative activities would not constitute non-compliance unless they were expressly 
prohibited in the contract. Therefore, we observe a gap in the ability of traditional 
economic theory to explain this phenomenon, and see the need for further 
exploration. 
4.4.6 Firms, Markets, and Communities 
We concur with Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) in their assertion that most external 
innovation ecosystems are governed by both market and community mechanisms.  In 
addition, and possibly in contrast with extant theory, we have found purposeful action 
by the core, with emergent responses on the periphery (Finding 3.5, chapter 3). We 
described how in the Business Software ecosystem, the core creates market 
mechanisms through incentives and infrastructure with the intention of stimulating a 
high volume and diversity of activity by partners. In addition, community activities are 
desirable by the core, such as the creation of partner organizations around particular 
software products, regional markets, partner levels, etc. Other community activities 
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may be less desirable by the core, such as negative discussions and ratings in 
independent forums, for example.  
 In the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, community forums and conferences are 
important mechanisms for sharing information on new programs, discussing best 
practices, selling complementary products, etc. However, these community 
mechanisms may also be a setting for complaints about certain merchants’ 
commission structures, slow payment, low conversion rates, or poor response from 
affiliate managers.  Another general area within affiliate marketing where this 
phenomenon is important is in the area of adoption of new technologies. In chapter 2 
we describe several tools created by merchants and affiliate networks for use by 
affiliates such as banners, registration forms, data feeds, etc. Many of these tools are 
costly to create and to maintain, and require a high level of adoption by affiliates in 
order to be worthwhile. In other words, the creation of the tools is not enough; the 
active participation of the community in finding new applications for applying the tools 
is also required.  
4.5 Additional Conceptual Development 
We began this chapter with an analysis of the two domains from this thesis along four 
dimensions of transaction cost analysis (asset specificity, transaction frequency, 
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty). Following this analysis, in 
section 4.3 we considered the capacity of transaction cost economics to explain the 
observed phenomena from the two domains. We concluded that TCE has certain 
explanatory value in dyadic exchange relationships, and our analysis pointed towards a 
hybrid or network form in both domains. However, we identified several shortcomings 
of the theory. First, based on both our analysis and conclusions in the extant literature, 
we suggest in Finding 4.1 that the factors which determine governance form are 
incomplete; and that the direction of causality between these factors and governance 
form is not always clear. In Finding 4.2 we found that the core firms in each of our 
research domains tend not to consider each dyadic relationship individually in 
determining governance form, but rather develop a coordinated portfolio of distinct 
relationship types, each of which may have several levels. This is primarily due to the 
extreme degree of heterogeneity which is both necessary and desired, and which is 
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not contemplated by TCE’s assumption of a single principal and either a single agent or 
homogenous group of agents. In addition to multiple governance forms, the 
heterogeneous nature of our domains requires multiple sets of tools to support 
complementor activities, an additional aspect not present in transaction cost and 
agency theories. Finally, we address the issue of value appropriation which is key to 
the success of the principal, core firm. While TCE does not address this issue directly, 
we have observed that the configuration of value appropriation mechanisms can 
present a major challenge for core firms, citing the case of Apple and how their explicit 
and implicit mechanisms have evolved. 
 In section 4.4 we engage in a deeper discussion of themes raised in chapter 3 
regarding the additional value offered by ecosystem and platform theory.  Here we 
contrast the objective in transaction cost theory of controlling agent opportunism with 
the dual goal in ecosystem and platform theories of both ensuring control and 
enabling creation; we emphasize the importance of agency on the part of ecosystem 
participants since, while core firms establish creation and control mechanisms, 
complementors must self-select their level of participation in the ecosystem; we echo 
prior research in emphasizing the need to balance creation and control in the 
ecosystem; we consider the role of heterogeneity and variability, exploring the idea 
that core firms may take multiple approaches in their efforts to balance creation and 
control, ranging from a tight control regime to a more passive approach; we addressed 
the role of legitimacy and status as a factor in complementors’ self-selection of their 
involvement with a given ecosystem; and finally we considered the issue of the co-
existence of both market and community mechanisms in our observation that, due to 
the autonomy of ecosystem participants, ecosystem structure is ultimately determined 
by the interaction between purposeful action from the core and emergent responses 
on the periphery. 
 This last is perhaps the best way to summarize our overall conclusions based on 
our analysis that while governance is purposefully designed by the core, there are 
multiple possible outcomes for a similar set of theoretical antecedents, something 
which transaction cost economics does not anticipate. We see this most clearly in our 
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description of the three different governance regimes we observed in the enterprise 
software industry which take very different approaches in similar circumstances.  
In the introduction to this thesis we discussed the overriding research question 
of this thesis as the “Goldilocks governance problem” as identified by Tiwana et al. 
(2010). We state this question as the following: 
RQ 1: How do platform owners design their ecosystems for generativity, while 
maintaining the right level of control over the evolution of the platform?  
While we make detailed observations in our two domains of the configuration 
of mechanisms which encourage generativity as well as mechanisms for instituting 
control over complementor activities, we are left with the desire for a deeper 
understanding of these forces, and what might constitute the “right” configuration. 
However, as we have observed, the ongoing interaction between core and periphery 
means that an ecosystem’s governance structure is continuously evolving, and so it is 
unlikely that a lasting ideal configuration is even possible. A more promising approach 
may be to gain a better understanding of the underlying tensions between the efforts 
of the core to balance creation and control through governance mechanisms, and the 
autonomous reaction from contributing firms on the periphery. 
In the remainder of this chapter we propose to address research question 4.3 
by conducting a review of the paradox literature regarding tensions, and applying this 
additional lens to our research domains. We make no pretense to advance the 
research on paradoxes. Our intention rather is to use it as a theoretical framing device 
to add to the governance literature by highlighting exemplars of tension inflection 
points, and analyzing the triggers which cause these tensions to become salient, 
contradictory, and disabling. Our observation is that when actors reframe their 
experience as either duality or dualism, there are various possible responses in terms 
of governance. What also becomes clear form our exemplars is the agency of both the 
core and the periphery; when tensions lead to conflict both parties may take action, 
either separately or in concert, and the final governance condition is a result of this 
interaction.  
Given the extreme heterogeneity in which the sector operates, our case study 
of the Business Software ecosystem is particularly relevant for the illustration and 
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analysis of these tensions. While we have less detailed data regarding tensions in the 
Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, we include a less extensive analysis of our second 
domain as well. 
Paradox studies, in their simplest forms, explore how organizations can meet 
competing demands simultaneously (Smith and Lewis, 2011). There are differences in 
the manner by which tensions can be framed or leveraged (Cameron 1986, Poole and 
Van der Ven 1989, Smith and Lewis 2011). An important notion used in framing 
paradoxical tensions in the managerial research is the concepts of dualism and duality 
(Farjoun 2010). Conceptually, tensions can be manifest as competing trade-offs that 
present either/or decisions in the form of discrete alternatives, as a dualism. 
Alternatively, tensions can function as complementary and mutually enabling 
attractors in a holistic system, as a duality (Farjoun, 2010). Given the centrality of 
tensions in ecosystem governance, we will explore how complementary or competing 
logics become manifest in the ecosystem; both in the governance mechanisms as well 
as in participant decision making.  
The idea of dualism is a well-established view typically associated with trade-
offs, tensions, conflicting alternatives and exclusive categories. Accordingly, dualism 
frames tensions as mutually exclusive, either-or, or exhaustive classes (Farjoun, 2010). 
Perhaps the most widely acknowledged dualism in the management literature is the 
classic view that exploration and exploitation are exclusive trade-offs (March, 1991). In 
simple terms, the resource pie is fixed, and efforts expended in exploration are, by 
definition, efforts not expended in exploitation. With dualism, the choice between two 
competing options is always a zero-sum game (Farjoun, 2010).  
The concept of duality, by contrast, views the two options not as competing, 
contradicting, and mutually exclusive; but rather as interdependent, compatible, 
mutually enabling and constituent of one another (Farjoun, 2010). As an example, 
consider control mechanisms. While their immediate goals are variance reduction, 
predictability, and other stable outcomes, the very existence of successful control 
mechanisms simultaneously enables innovation, exploration and other endeavors. 
Exploration cannot be achieved without the economic sustainability provided by 
exploitation. Likewise, exploitation today was enabled by exploration in the past. 
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Admittedly, this is not entirely inconsistent with the internal logic of a dualism. 
Dualisms, via a premise of competing alternatives and zero-sum games, also 
acknowledge that trade-offs require balance, and that normally the appropriate mix of 
both options is required. The main difference and augmentation of a duality 
perspective is to emphasize the enabling and interdependent characteristics of each 
option. Hence, a logic of zero-sum games is replaced by a logic of positive-sum games.  
Paradox scholars have suggested that paradoxes can be both latent and salient. 
The idea is that the process of organizing produces latent tensions that exist in an 
interdependent, mutually enabling duality, but certain environmental triggers may 
bring paradoxical tensions to the foreground as salient, contradictory dualisms. It is 
worthwhile asking what are the triggers that make them salient; that is, when and how 
do paradoxical tensions surface to frame or define specific problems or decisions? 
Smith and Lewis offer three factors that can render paradoxical tensions salient: 1) 
plurality; 2) change; and 3) scarcity (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Plurality increases options 
leading to uncertainty, which surfaces as competing goals and scarcity of resources. 
Likewise, change also highlights new options and competing opportunities, and 
increases uncertainty. Finally, resource scarcity surfaces the well-known problems of 
trade-offs; a decision to allocate limited resources in one area is a decision not to 
expend them in another. This is summarized in Table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4. Tensions in duality and dualism 
Duality Triggers Dualism 
Tensions are: 
Latent 
Complementary 
Enabling 
 
Plurality 
Change 
Scarcity 
 
Tensions are: 
Salient 
Contradictory 
Disabling 
 
The question of the source of paradoxical tensions is described in much of the 
paradox research (Cameron 1986, Poole and Ven 1989) as either: a) inherent in the 
system, or b) socially constructed, and resulting from the actor's cognition and social 
action. We have substantial evidence to suggest that the designers of governance in 
the Business Software ecosystem are highly cognizant of the underlying tensions in 
their ecosystem, and have attempted to accommodate these tensions constructively in 
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the design of the control levers. Simply stated, they have attempted to harness the 
benefits of the duality as mutually enabling opposites that enable generativity. 
However, substantial case evidence also suggests that these mechanisms do not 
always succeed as desired; conflict, anxiety and defensive behavior emerge. In this 
case, tensions, once latent enabling forces of a duality, become salient contradictory 
and detrimental forces of a dualism.  
We identify three exemplars of the logic of duality and dualism as evident in 
our data from the Business Software domain along with one exemplar from the 
Affiliate Marketing domain, and attempt to identify what triggers the transitions 
between these logics. We do so by analyzing detailed statements from interview 
respondents that exemplify these transitions. The exemplars are:   
• the use of standardized implementation strategies in heterogeneous markets, 
• the competitive balance between partners, 
• complement generativity and scale economies. 
The main premise of this analysis is that the designed purpose of the ecosystem 
governance is to embrace the tensions as a duality; that is, tensions can be harnessed 
for optimal value for the ecosystem dynamics. However, due to the realities of working 
relationships and operations, these tensions can become manifest as less-constructive 
dualisms.  
4.5.1 Example 1. Standardized implementation methodology across heterogeneous 
implementations  
ERP ecosystems are characterized by extremely high levels of heterogeneity, 
arguably more so than any other type of technology ecosystem. An important source 
of heterogeneity is the fact that each customer must address the issue of when to 
change the software to fit the business context, and when to change business 
processes to accommodate the software. The very high cost of customizing the 
software is generally the greatest single cost borne by the ecosystem collectively; core, 
complementor and therefore customers. In addition, ERP systems are, at the most 
basic level, financial accounting systems, and thereby closely bound to the accounting 
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and legal regulations applicable in the country of use; localization of the software is of 
critical importance. As stated by the core channel mangers:  
Localization affects three main areas: translation, legal requirements, and local 
business practices… It's not easy to manage the localizations at the global level, 
continent level, country level ... Localization costs remain one of our single 
largest concerns (Software Vendor).  
In an effort to reduce these localization costs, the Software Vendor has developed a 
standardized implementation method that it recommends all implementation partners 
use, and further requires for higher certification levels. The Software Vendor has 
attempted to embed a single, general-use methodology in the tool:  
[With our tool] there is a clear trade-off between quality control, PM discipline, 
and speed and agility. So what we have tried to do is embrace this flexibility in 
the tool-via filters and project profiles. Partners can use the templates more or 
less as they like... (Software Vendor).  
Yet the one-size-fits-all ideal of the method is admittedly utopian: 
Are we generating paper, or are we parameterising? Well – this is the ideal, but 
hard to achieve. We think that it is good to have a method to show to 
customers. On the negative side, it is still not easy enough to handle a 
customization. There is a risk of over-automation and it could ruin the project 
(implementation partner).  
This relates not only to the heterogeneity of projects, but also to that of partners.  
 It is important to stress the differences between the different partners. Some of 
the large partners will operate completely differently to the smaller partners. 
Especially considering the transition from sales to implementation 
(implementation partner). 
As a result, the implementation partners resort to pragmatic workarounds based on 
context and need: 
Partners think it is difficult to use a methodology completely, because there are 
differences between countries, markets, customers, specialization, etcetera that 
can affect the methodology implementation (Software Vendor).  
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Partners use methodologies provided by platform core when it makes sense. 
They use what they need and ignore what they don't. Their technicians develop 
their own tools to fill in the gaps of what is lacking from the core 
(implementation partner).  
[Software vendor] recognizes the trade-off, and further acknowledges the difficulties 
and costs of implementing extensive control regimes. They therefore attempt to 
leverage market mechanisms to supplement its control requirements:  
You cannot test for the business functionality of the product. It is totally 
impossible. This is why we require the customer references – let the market 
speak. This is a very risky strategy of course, because as mentioned above, at 
the end of the day it all comes back to [Software Vendor] (Software Vendor).  
The final statement, ‘it all comes back to [Software Vendor]’ refers to the potential 
agency costs borne by the core. They prescribe standardized implementation methods 
and client based testimonials as a market validation of complements and 
complementors to mitigate this risk. Yet, complementors adopt the standardized 
methods selectively and use their own techniques where necessary. 
Example 1. Summary - standardized implementation methodology across 
heterogeneous markets  
• Duality: Standardize control methods enable consistent, standardized quality 
control of implementations. Second order effects should include increased 
technical compatibility of complements across core implementations. 
• Dualism: Implementation partners ignore standardized implementation 
methods, either selectively or completely. Localization costs remain high, 
technological compatibility across complements constrained.  
• Triggers: Pluralism. Extreme heterogeneity of implementation projects, 
differences across legal, geographic or industrial sectors, diverse genesis of 
implementation partners, disdain for centralized control.  
4.5.2 Example 2. Competitive balance between partners  
A significant issue in the ecosystem is the competitive balance between partners. This 
relates to the number of partners in general:  
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There are no barriers to becoming a platform partner if you comply with their 
certification requirements. For example, they do not limit the total number of 
partners in the channel due to anti-trust regulations (implementation partner).  
This can lead to high levels of competition between partners in specific markets. The 
frustration from the implementation providers is evident: 
[Software vendor] is too focused on sales of licenses. Every month there is 
tremendous pressure from [Software Vendor] for the partners to report results. 
Most partners are losing money due to this excessive pressure and short-term 
focus (implementation partner).  
The competitive pressures between partners have a variety of undesirable 
consequences. For example, complementors work together in terms of training and 
cooperation on projects, but at other moments, they become competitors.  
Training is handled by external centers, certified by [Software Vendor] which are 
managed by third parties. The main problems with this external training model 
is that it creates a conflict of interest for these ‘training centers’, who also 
provide other services such as programming support for other partners, 
creation and implementation of add-ons, ... The partners doing the training are 
my competitors, and if I send my people there, well ... (implementation partner).  
Hence, there is a perception that the Software Vendor lacks loyalty to individual 
partners, and this breeds a certain defensive posture amongst some:  
If you ask a partner who their biggest competitor is, they'll say 'another 
partner'. The implication is that there is more competition between partners 
offering [application] than with competitors offering other software packages, 
like [competing packages]... If there are three partners competing for the same 
work, [Software Vendor] always wins (implementation partner).  
Frequently, partners work together successfully to combine areas of expertise to solve 
complex projects. But the competitive tendencies remain.  
Where collaboration between partners can work is in situations where you need 
special expertise for a particular project, and you create a joint venture with 
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another specialized partner. However, the large partners don't have any 
incentive to help a small partner grow (implementation partner).   
The competitive situation between partners can often result in conflicts within the 
same project or vertical. Common country-level modifications should ideally be shared 
and amortized over as wide a market as possible. However, this is not always the case. 
[Software vendor] tries to integrate the local regulations of each country into 
their software, but there are always areas which are lacking, which need 
improvement, or which have errors. And each partner makes their own 
changes, but there's no incentive to share this with other partners or even with 
[Software Vendor]. All of the localizations created by the individual partners are 
different and not necessarily compatible. So all of the partners have the 
standard version of [application] and their own ‘standard plus’ version. This 
becomes a point of differentiation, where partners claim that their standard 
plus is better than the others (implementation partner).  
The statements suggest that the extreme heterogeneity of the ERP market manifests 
itself in legitimate modifications to the software which are driven by localization 
requirements. However, there is some evidence of overcrowding in the complementor 
market that constrains cooperation between complementors in instances where the 
sharing and common development of the localizations would be optimal.  
Example 2 Summary-competitive balance between partners  
• Duality: Platform core wants to generate as much growth as possible in the 
ecosystem. This includes growth of overall license revenues via liberal access by 
partners to ecosystem. Market mechanisms will dictate allocation of resources 
by partners, and facilitate quality control. More partners generate greater 
choice, equitable pricing, and potential value for customers.  
• Dualism: Overcrowding and excessive competition amongst partners. 
Consequent downward price pressure limits potential revenue, cooperation 
and re-use of common regional modifications across partner consortia.  
• Triggers: Pluralism and scarcity. Large numbers of partners compete for limited 
clients. Heterogeneity across markets limits potential re-use and collaboration 
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across markets and specializations, thereby constraining social goods in the 
ecosystem.  
4.5.3 Example 3. Complement generativity and scale economies 
One of the main goals of a successful platform is to obtain substantial scale, longevity, 
and potential for wealth generation to attract complementors. Specifically, a potential 
complementor needs to be convinced that investments made in the platform will yield 
adequate long-term returns. Towards this goal, our case data indicates that there is 
clear evidence to suggest that the [Software Vendor]’s brand value and common 
marketing strategies have substantial positive effect for the partners.  
[Software vendor]'s brand is helping partners to sell [software application] ... 
The consolidated position of [Software Vendor] is recognized by the market.  
Now partners have more opportunities, especially access to big deals 
(implementation partner).  
More complements suggest more options and potential value for clients. However, we 
also find some indication that liberal governance of the complements leads to some 
overcrowding, both within industrial sectors and geographic regions: 
[Software vendor] has decided to allow as many verticals in the market as the 
partners wish to create…There really should be four or five broad verticals in 
[region], but instead there are about 300. The problem right now is lack of 
demand for the verticals (add-ons), because each is so specific (implementation 
partner).  
The extreme heterogeneity of the regional niches prohibits implementation partners 
from achieving adequate size and scale economies to develop truly high quality 
complements:  
The problem is that the small to midsize partners who are regional or national 
neither have the size to dedicate programmers to developing vertical solutions, 
nor do they have enough implementations to amortize the cost of developing 
the solutions. The investment needed is too high compared to the eventual 
benefit since the partner absorbs all costs related to development, registration, 
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certification, and compatibility with new version of [application] 
(implementation partner).  
Liberal governance of complements has additional negative consequences. 
Complementors must develop complements to the core, but some insecurity about 
the evolution of the core plagues their development efforts.  
Partners don't clearly know where products are going, so partners don't know if 
they are developing the products in the right way, because new versions of 
[application] can absorb the partner's developments... The partners develop an 
add-on for a specific version of [application], but when a new version appears, it 
is difficult and expensive for the partner to make the add-on compatible with 
the new version (implementation partner).  
As a result, some partners even expressed a desire for tighter governance and reduced 
heterogeneity in order to avoid what they perceived as excessive redundancy and lack 
of financial amortization across common complements.  
The situation where each partner creates their own verticals is a way for them 
to differentiate one from another, but in the end there are many versions of a 
particular vertical for a client to choose from, and in the end the client ends up 
paying for the costs of development. Having [Software Vendor] put their seal of 
approval on a handful of partner solutions in each vertical segment would result 
in lower TCO for the client and greater standardization, but it would mean less 
differentiation for each partner. [Software Vendor] would also have to 
compensate the partners for their versions of the verticals. So, while it would 
mean lower fees for the partners, it would also mean less investment in product 
development (implementation partner).  
The combination of platform evolution insecurity and overcrowding was summed up 
succinctly by one implementation partner:  
Since the evolution of products is not clear, partners invest in solutions with no 
future or with a lot of competition, and they are competing in the same 
accounts with similar solutions (implementation partner).  
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The Software Vendor does not attempt excessive regulation of the complements. 
There is a clear tendency to respect local market knowledge. However, they also 
acknowledge the implied agency problem.  
We have to believe that our partners understand the local market conditions 
best. It would be impossible for [Software Vendor] to determine these 
conditions better than them ...So officially [Software Vendor] does not have any 
commitment to the customer. However, it always comes back to [Software 
Vendor] anyway (Software Vendor). 
There is an understandable desire to respect the often substantial local knowledge 
that complementors acquire through experience. Permitting numerous complements 
to serve a specific market speaks to a logic of generativity, market responsiveness, and 
sensitivity to unique client needs. Yet excessive quantity and redundancy of 
complements creates an overcrowding problem, with limited common amortization, 
expertise sharing, and overall higher TCO.  
Example 3 Summary - generativity & complements  
• Duality: Liberally governed complementors use market mechanisms to respond 
to local market requirements. A greater number of complements implies 
increased choice and potential value for clients, subsequent growth of the 
ecosystem, and greater value for complementors.  
• Dualism: Overcrowding and excessive competition between complements. 
Consequent downward price pressure limits market value and resource 
allocation to individual complements, constraining quality. Lack of coordination 
across similar complements creates redundancy, hindering amortization of 
functions that are common at legal or sector level, and further exacerbates 
localization costs and TCO.  
• Triggers: Pluralism and scarcity. Large numbers of partners generate similar 
complements for individual clients. Where possible, re-use and collaboration 
across markets is limited due to: a) modest coordination, and b) competitive 
positioning between complementors. Uncertainty about platform evolution 
(change) provides additional uncertainty. 
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4.5.4 Example 4: Use of merchant brands by affiliates 
To add some symmetry to our analysis, in this section we will analyze an exemplar 
from the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem. In chapter 2 we explored four governance 
mechanisms in the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem: formal contract, partner selection, 
incentives, and monitoring (of outcomes, and of behavior).  
One key tension observed relates to the representation of the merchant’s 
brand by affiliates.  In a 2009 survey of over 450 affiliates (AffStat 2009) “brand 
awareness” was the second most important factor for why affiliates choose to 
represent a particular merchant, yet in our analysis of the formal contracts, the area 
where we saw the most restrictions was precisely in how affiliates are able to 
represent the trademark(s) of the merchant. In other words, the brand recognition of a 
particular merchant is a key asset for affiliates in their efforts to generate leads and 
sales. Hence the affiliate’s motivation is to display the merchant brands prominently in 
their methods of promotion wherever possible. This is generally highly beneficial to 
the merchant, as it helps to diffuse the merchant’s brand image as widely as possible, 
and often to audiences who are not part of the merchant’s core customer base. 
However, merchants perceive some uses of their brand (in the form of trademarked 
names and images) as in conflict with their own marketing efforts, and therefore 
certain uses of merchant trademarks by affiliates are restricted. 
While the full analysis is included in Table 2.4, in Table 4.3 below we summarize 
the most common restrictions on the use of trademarks for the convenience of the 
reader, included the percentage of the programs which included each restriction: 
Table 4.5. Restrictions on the Use of Trademarks by Affiliates 
Restriction Percentage 
Affiliate is restricted from bidding on the merchant’s trademark(s) 29.31 
Affiliate is restricted from using the merchant’s trademark(s) in advertising copy 18.97 
Affiliate is restricted from bidding on the trademarks of the merchant’s 
competitors 
11.21 
 
The motive behind these restrictions is to avoid affiliates’ co-opting traffic in 
search engines intended for the merchant’s own web site. In other words, if the visitor 
would have gone directly the merchant site, why should the merchant allow the traffic 
to be diverted the affiliate site resulting in a commission for the affiliate (and a cost to 
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the merchant) that they otherwise would not have earned? This seems logical, yet the 
interpretation of whether the affiliate is representing the merchant’s brand correctly 
or is in violation of program restrictions remains with the merchant. Therefore one 
conflict which we observed is that while merchants may view the trademark 
restrictions as clearly stated in program guidelines, affiliates may interpret them 
differently, perhaps in part due to the extreme importance of the merchant brand as a 
strategic asset in promotion efforts.  
As we mentioned in chapter 2, one complicating factor for affiliates is the 
ability of merchants to reduce an affiliate’s commission structure or cancel their 
participation in the program completely at any time, and which little or no explanation. 
Therefore, a perceived violation of restrictions could result in the cancellation of the 
affiliate relationship, with little recourse for the affiliate. One successful affiliate we 
interviewed told the story of how their participation in the affiliate program of a 
prominent bank was cancelled for their “repeated violation of program policies 
regarding trademarks”. Apparently the affiliate had been advertising in search engines 
for the search term “personal loans”, which inadvertently was a match with the search 
term “personal loans [prominent bank]”. In spite of the unintentional nature of the 
violation, the affiliate was given no recourse and was summarily dismissed from the 
program. 
Open policies towards partner selection exacerbate the conflict regarding the 
use of trademarks. In chapter two we observed that a small percentage of merchants 
(13.24%) include limitations in the formal contracts regarding the types of affiliates 
they accept, the vast majority have no such restriction. We therefore concluded that 
most merchants maintain a fairly liberal policy for accepting affiliates. We quoted one 
merchant as saying “the criteria are not strict for accepting sites, but rather it’s the 
tracking (monitoring) that happens later which determines whether the site is a good 
partner or not”. When it comes to monitoring, however, we found that merchants 
tended to deal with violations of trademark policies on an exception basis, lacking a 
systematic approach to monitoring affiliate behavior. One merchant offered that 
“while there aren’t currently any tools which control this behavior completely, it is still 
very controllable through coordination with our internal SEO and search marketing 
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efforts.” While powerful tools are available for monitoring affiliate performance, the 
sheer number of affiliates resulting from a liberal partner selection policy and the lack 
of tools makes it difficult for merchants to monitor affiliate behavior, particularly when 
it comes to the use of trademarks. 
Example 4 Summary – use of merchant brands by affiliates  
• Duality: Affiliates rely on the strength of a merchant’s brand as a strategic asset 
in their promotion efforts. Merchants likewise appreciate the ability of affiliates 
to achieve maximum diffusion of their brand to a diverse range of customer 
segments. 
• Dualism: Merchants work hard to establish and maintain a certain brand 
image, and some use of merchant trademarks by affiliates may cannibalize the 
merchant’s own marketing efforts. In addition, association with inappropriate 
content may damage the merchant’s brand reputation. We have observed that 
merchants lack effective tools for monitoring the behavior of large numbers of 
affiliates. At the same time, the power advantage merchants hold over affiliates 
allows them to take unilateral action which make tensions latent. 
• Triggers: Primarily pluralism, as a lack of efficient and effective monitoring tools 
make it difficult for merchants to monitor affiliate behavior. Tensions become 
latent when affiliates either inadvertently or intentionally subvert merchant 
policies regarding their brand. 
4.5.5 Reflection 
Smith and Lewis (Smith and Lewis, 2011) suggest that the triggers between paradoxical 
tensions can be both environmental, as well as products of framing and cognition. Our 
analysis certainly finds evidence of both of these, but also further pinpoints their 
specific nature. Example 1 identified the limitations to a standardized implementation 
method as a contradictory logic. Here, the main trigger of a contradictory framing was 
pluralism, specifically the extreme market heterogeneity inherent in the ERP market 
(environmental) combined with some emotional resistance to centralized control 
regimes. Example 2 identified the excessive competition amongst partners as a 
contradictory logic. In this case, liberal access to the ecosystem by partners, combined 
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with un-coordinated, self-interested behavior limited cooperation and the sharing of 
common regional standards, and accelerated downward price pressure in the 
ecosystem. Example 3 represents a similar logic at the level of complements, where 
extreme competitive behavior produces redundant investments in lower quality 
complements, overcrowded markets, and lower prices. In addition, uncertainty about 
platform evolution further constrained optimal investments in complements. In 
Example 4 we found that the plurality of affiliates is a desired outcome for merchants 
in the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem, yet the lack of effective tools for monitoring large 
numbers of partners may result in latent tensions when affiliates either intentionally or 
inadvertently violate program restrictions. 
Examples 2 and 3 specifically resemble a classic ‘market failure’ from the 
economics literature, where the outcomes are socially sub-optimal due to self-
interested behavior, bounded rationality, uncertainty, and information asymmetries 
(Bator, 1958). While our case did not emphasize them, similar issues were identified 
from the perspective of the customer; that is, excessive choice and redundancy 
resulted in customers adopting what was often a less optimal product, where superior 
products existed. However, the inability to evaluate alternatives in a transparent and 
effective manner produced a socially sub-optimal outcome. In line with this argument, 
substantial case testimonies called for greater coordination with the ecosystem to 
reduce the information asymmetries and increase cooperative behavior.  
Smith and Lewis (Smith and Lewis, 2011 p. 390) state that ‘pluralism expands 
uncertainty and surfaces competing goals and inconsistent processes (Cohen and 
March, 1974)’. Our case analysis confirms this position, and further highlights 
explanations from the economics literature as its source. The environmental pressures 
of extreme heterogeneity and competition are exacerbated by uncoordinated self-
interested behavior, information asymmetries, bounded rationality and uncertainty, 
producing sub-optimal outcomes similar to market failures. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
Table 4.6. Summary of Research Findings 
Research Question Findings 
RQ 4.1 What aspects of 
ecosystems/platforms 
as a new organizational 
form are explained by 
transaction cost 
economics and agency 
theory? 
In section 4.3 we analyze the two domains of this thesis, Business 
Software and Affiliate Marketing, according to four dimensions of 
transaction cost economics: asset specificity, transaction 
frequency, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. 
We have concluded the following: 
1. Transaction cost economics is generally effective in 
determining the most effective governance form for a 
dyadic relationship. The theory has explanatory value 
regarding issues of hold-up costs and partner lock-in, the 
completeness of contracts, and the difficulty of monitoring 
exchange behavior. 
2. However, there is a level of analysis problem, since when 
studying ecosystems we observe multiple hybrid forms 
operating simultaneously. We do not believe that 
transaction cost economics contemplates this degree of 
heterogeneity. This effect is compounded when we 
consider fragmented ecosystems. 
3. While changing the focus to governance mechanisms has 
greater explanatory value in ecosystems, we believe that a 
taxonomy of governance mechanisms has limited value in 
explaining optimal platform design, and have taken the 
perspective in our research that such an analysis is an initial 
step towards a broader analysis. 
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RQ 4.2: What 
additional explanatory 
value is provided by 
platform/ecosystem 
theory? 
In section 4.3 we identify new Findings based on what we view as 
the limitations of TCE and our observations in the two domains 
studied in this thesis. 
  
Finding 4.1: TCE has explanatory value for the choice of a 
hybrid/network governance form, but excludes many of the key 
factors which determine (and result from) this choice; the levels of 
some factors may be the result of the choice of governance form, 
not vice versa. 
 
Finding 4.2: In contrast with a dyadic focus on each inter-firm 
relationship individually, core firms in an ecosystem manage their 
relationships with multiple, heterogeneous partners through a 
coordinated portfolio of distinct relationship types which 
correspond to the various partner roles, and which may be 
graduated in nature. We have called this the “solar system” model. 
 
Finding 4.3: Core firms may support different types of partners by 
creating multiple tools, each of which supports a different type of 
partner activity. New tools, in turn, may enable new types of 
partner activities. 
 
Finding 4.4: While multiple tools may support a variety of partner 
activity, multiple value appropriation mechanisms allow the core to 
extract value from a wider range of partner activity. 
 
In section 4.4 we summarize additional themes which emerged in 
chapter 3 and which we believe to complement the traditional 
economic discourse. These include:  
• external value creation and innovation 
• the graduation and self-selection of control mechanisms 
• the treatment of heterogeneity and variability 
• transfer of legitimacy and status 
• the co-existence and interaction of market and community 
mechanisms. 
 
We expand on these themes in the Business Software ecosystems, 
and additionally explore these themes in the Affiliate Marketing 
context in order to compare and contrast their applicability to 
other ecosystems besides business software.  
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RQ 4.3: What 
additional conceptual 
development is 
needed? 
In section 4.5 we introduce theory from the literature on 
paradoxes and provide empirical data to analyze when tensions 
seem to be latent, and therefore complementary and enabling; 
when they seem to be salient, and therefore contradictory and 
disabling; and the triggers between these distinct states. Four 
exemplars are analyzed where the desired logic of duality is 
subsumed by a salient logic of dualism. These were: 1) 
standardized implementation strategies; 2) competitive balance 
between partners; 3) complement generativity and scale 
economies;4) the use of merchant brands by affiliates. 
 
Consistent with previous theorizing, we identify three important 
triggers of these transitions: 1) plurality, and 2) scarcity were most 
significant in our examples, with 3) change (uncertainty) creating 
secondary effects. These triggers produce outcomes similar to a 
market failure in the ecosystem driven by uncoordinated self-
interested behavior, information asymmetries, bounded rationality 
and uncertainty. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research journey of this thesis began with an observation in a particular domain, 
affiliate marketing, and progressed to an additional major project analyzing the 
channel organization of a major business software manufacturer. We collected 
extensive qualitative and quantitative information from dozens of contributors 
representing hundreds of projects in our efforts to address research questions with 
significant practical and theoretical implications. In the process we had the opportunity 
to apply various theoretical lenses to these two domains, as we experienced firsthand 
the value and limitations of each theory in its ability to explain our empirical 
observations. In the following sections we will describe the research journey as we 
experienced it, analyze our contributions to extant research, and propose areas for 
future research. 
Let us begin with the research from chapter 2. Working as an affiliate 
promoting various web-based travel agencies, this researcher observed that several 
other affiliates representing the same travel companies were engaging in certain 
questionable practices like spam, exaggerated statements about products and 
services, and technical tricks to re-direct traffic from visitors, often unbeknownst to 
the visitors. While many of these practices were not in direct violation of the affiliate 
contracts, they did seem to be activities of which the travel agencies, were they aware 
of them, might not approve. Therefore, the first practical question driving this research 
was how merchants promoting their services through affiliate marketing were 
currently controlling the activities of their affiliates, and how they might improve these 
practices?  
Next, we needed a theoretical lens through which to conduct our analysis. We 
first turned to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 
1973), since this seemed to be a classic principal-agent conflict. The formal contract is 
the key focus in analyzing this relationship, and there are two main problems 
addressed: a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict; and b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify the agent’s activities (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This seemed to describe our situation well, and as a member of multiple affiliate 
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networks (intermediaries who facilitate the relationship between merchants and 
affiliates), we had access to all of the affiliate contracts of the three principal affiliate 
networks in Spain.   
After analyzing these formal contracts, however, we felt we still had not found 
sufficient information in order to address our practical research question. There were 
some practices which violated the contracts and of which the merchants did not 
appear to be aware, and others which were not in direct violation of the contracts, yet 
seemed in conflict with the intentions of the merchants. Here we felt that using only 
agency theory limited our analysis since it focuses exclusively on the formal contract as 
the unit of analysis. We therefore turned to transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985) as a way to extend the analysis to a broader understanding of 
governance in the merchant-affiliate relationship.  
We decided to follow the model provided by Wathne and Heide (2000, p. 44) as 
the basis for the governance mechanisms employed in this research (partner selection, 
incentives and monitoring), along with the formal contract as used in agency theory. 
Our formal research question then became: 
RQ 2.1: How are governance mechanisms used by merchants in one-to-many, 
Internet-based affiliate marketing programs in Spain to control the activities of 
their affiliates?  
We found that there is a serious lack of transparency as to what affiliates are 
and are not allowed to do in their promotion of merchants’ products and services. The 
situation is further complicated by the existence of several sets of contracts and 
guidelines from the merchants, from affiliate networks, and even from third parties 
such as search engines. This makes the affiliate’s task more difficult when it comes to 
conforming to the expectations of merchants, and it increases the importance of the 
other three governance mechanisms discussed in chapter 2. In addition, the merchants 
have significant power in their management of their affiliate programs: they generally 
reserve the right to alter or cancel the arrangement with a particular affiliate at any 
time and for any reason (which need not be communicated to the affiliate). While this 
may be an effective governance mechanism, greater transparency may help to create 
more positive merchant-affiliate relationships. We conclude by prescribing several 
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measures that merchants may implement to improve the management of their 
affiliate programs. 
Now the question becomes: how effective were we at answering our initial 
research question? We began with agency theory and found our analysis to be 
incomplete since simply writing contracts and enforcing them is difficult in an 
environment as dynamic as affiliate marketing. The additional three governance 
mechanisms suggested by Wathne and Heide’s model gave our analysis further 
breadth, but we still have the impression that we fell short of our goal. We will 
attempt to describe what we feel are the shortcomings of transaction cost analysis and 
agency theory in explaining the observed phenomena.  
First, we should consider the types of domains where transaction cost theory 
has been applied. Transaction cost economics reduces the scope of analysis to that of a 
series of exchanges between two firms.  The affiliate marketing domain we consider in 
chapter 2 is quite complex, however, since there is a one-to-many relationship 
between each merchants and its thousands of affiliates. Each affiliate may pursue one 
or more business models, and has the option of using many different promotional 
tools to accomplish its goals. The challenge of merchants is to create a governance 
structure which supports the activities of many different types of affiliates performing 
many different types of activities. This becomes even more complex with the 
incorporation of additional entities in the channel, such as affiliate networks. We 
attempt to summarize the complexity of the channel in Exhibit 2.1, reproduced below 
for the convenience of the reader:    
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We would therefore argue that the dyadic nature of transaction cost theory is 
not scalable to a domain such as affiliate marketing as it fails to capture the complexity 
of the governance structure required. We should also note that Exhibit 2.1 is our initial 
illustration of the roles in the affiliate marketing channel. A large degree of the 
complexity in the channel is the result of efforts by the merchants to accommodate 
multiple affiliate business models through multiple commission structures and tools. 
Figure 4.1, shown below, is perhaps an illustration with more general applicability. 
The primary tool offered by transaction cost theory to manage this complexity 
is governance mechanisms. While attempts by researchers such as Wathne and Heide 
(2000) to create a taxonomy of governance mechanisms may help to better organize 
the field, the issue remains that agency theory and transaction cost economics “view 
relationship management as a problem of deploying control mechanisms to manage 
partner opportunism, with the overall goal of minimizing governance costs” (Stump 
and Heide 1996, p. 431). One major problem with this description is that it focuses on 
the potential for negative actions on the part of partners, ignoring the potential for 
positive, innovative contributions. The role of partners can be much more than simply 
delivering a particular good or service according to strict guidelines defined by the 
principal. What is missing is what is increasingly presumed by many newer theories 
Marketer 
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Ad 
Agency 
Affiliate 
Network(s) 
Affiliates Customers 
Create ads 
Place ads with 
affiliate networks 
Monitor affiliate 
network 
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Exhibit 2.1: Affiliate Marketing Channel 
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such as ecosystems and platforms as the ideal desired outcome of the activities of 
trading partners: innovation. 
Research on ecosystems and platforms (Gawer and Cusumano 2002, 
Messerschmitt and Szyperski 2003, Iansiti and Levien 2004a and 2004b) acknowledges 
the role of participants of the channel not simply as performing a hired service, but as 
taking an active role in perpetuating the growth and development of the ecosystem. 
The keystone at the center of the ecosystem recognizes that no one firm can satisfy all 
customer needs, and therefore creates a platform which enables external contributors 
to build new functionality or to open new channels in concert with the core products 
and services maintained by the keystone. This research has roots in several other 
streams of research such as user innovation, where the core firm relies on 
contributions from end-users (Jeppesen and Molin 2003, Prugl and Schreier 2006, von 
Hippel 2001); and open innovation (Chesbrough 2003, Gassmann 2006, West 2003) 
which emphasizes the importance of opening the innovation process in a company so 
that innovations created internally can find new external channels and markets, and 
the company can address its core customers’ unmet needs with solutions from outside 
the firm. 
However, we have found few studies focusing on the issue of control in these 
types of dynamic ecosystems with scarce exceptions (Markus 2007, West and 
O’Mahoney 2008). West and O’Mahoney (2008) identified one of the key issues we 
have observed in our research: the tension between control and growth. The 
researchers found that the more control core firms tried to exert over the direction of 
the community of contributors, the more they restricted the community’s ability to 
grow; thereby highlighting a need for a balanced equilibrium between control and 
innovation. This tension between the conflicting desires of the core to encourage 
innovative contributions from participants in the ecosystems, while maintaining a 
degree of control over their activities and over the direction of the ecosystem is one of 
the core issues tackled in chapter 3.  
Another key attribute to a healthy ecosystem is a mechanism or mechanisms 
for the core firm to extract some value from the activities of third party participants. 
Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) emphasize the need to balance value creation with 
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value capture. They state, “If companies cannot find ways to profit from their 
innovation activities in open initiatives – through deployment, hybridization, 
complements, or self service, they cannot sustain their participation in those initiatives 
over time (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007 p. 69)." Value appropriation is an element 
of control which needs to be considered carefully, since efforts to tax the ecosystem 
too greatly could lead to rejection by the external contributors.  
One of the key challenges for ecosystems, therefore, is to give contributors the 
tools they need to support their activities and to make a profit, while at the same time 
maintaining the health of the keystone and of the ecosystem as a whole. The success 
of the overall ecosystem depends on the success of the individual contributors, 
without overly taxing contributors for their association with the platform (Iansiti and 
Levien 2004a). 
 We were given the opportunity to test these theories in a distinct domain when 
we were engaged in an international project for a prominent manufacturer of business 
software. The project involved 3 Danish partners and 2 international partners, 
including ESADE. There were five tracks in total which were primarily technical; our 
track was the exception, as we were engaged to explore “organizational 
implementation and partnerships”. This research, similar to our efforts to analyze the 
affiliate marketing domain, began with a practical question posed by the Software 
Vendor: how is the current channel of external partners organized, and what other 
models exist which might make this organization more efficient? 
 We began our research by looking for frameworks that could help us structure 
the channel, but had difficulty finding standard models which could accommodate 
such a particular case. As a result, we began by looking at governance mechanisms, 
similar to our affiliate marketing study, but rather than focusing solely on the four 
from Wathne and Heide (2000), we allowed the categories to emerge from our 
observations. This led to the first research question in chapter 3: 
RQ 3.1 What are the primary platform mechanisms required for the 
coordination and control of technology ecosystems?  
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We respond to this question in figure 3.1 (reproduced for the convenience of the 
reader below), and in the subsequent description of a typical process from 
development, through marketing, sales, and implementation: 
Software
Vendor Partner Customer
 Core Product Development
Software Development Kit
Partner Certification
Complementary Product Certification
Translation and Localization
Technical Training
Recruiting
Product Evangelist
Roadmap
Tools
Marketing
Branding
New Partner Support
Sales Training
Partner Level
Partner Monitoring
Tools
Technical Support
Implementation Support
Implementation Methodology
Sales Support
Complementary Product Development
Industrial Sector Solutions
Customer Training 
Focus:
 Product and Channel 
Developement
Focus: Sales
Focus:
Sales and Implementation
 
Figure 3.2. Platform mechanisms in the software ecosystem 
 
We believe this taxonomy of governance mechanisms does fill a gap in the 
literature identified earlier, namely that there is a lack of frameworks describing what 
a complex development, sales, and marketing channel looks like. We hope that the 
rich data set which we have summarized in chapter 3 and included in more detail in 
the appendices may make some contribution to the research literature. Nevertheless, 
there are important limitations of this approach in terms of theoretical contribution. 
These are the mechanisms identified for this particular ecosystem, and which may 
have application to similar types of companies. Nevertheless, this analysis on its own 
we believe insufficient for exploring the issue of how keystones balance the forces of 
creation and control. Additionally, we must consider the issue of the extreme 
complexity of the many different types of partners pursuing different activities, an 
issue which we refer to as “heterogeneity” in our analysis. We therefore proposed our 
second and third research question: 
RQ 3.2 How do platform mechanisms interact to foster creativity and 
innovation, and ensure value appropriation and control in technology 
ecosystems? 
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RQ 3.3 How do incentive and control mechanisms accommodate ecosystem 
heterogeneity?  
Based on our analysis, we produce 9 primary findings which we have observed in our 
ecosystem, and which we believe may have general applicability to other ecosystems. 
Further research may serve to convert these findings into concrete propositions which 
may be tested in other domains. These findings are detailed in table 3.3, where we 
elaborate on their applicability to each of our three research questions. These findings 
may be summarized as follows: 
Table 5.1: Chapter 3 research findings: 
Finding Description 
3.1a Control infrastructures in technology ecosystems can be graduated, with greater value 
offered to complementors in exchange for submitting to higher levels of control by the 
core.  
3.1b To embrace heterogeneity, technology ecosystems can develop internal currencies to 
enable: i) common measurement standards to assess heterogeneous accomplishments; ii) 
multiple paths through higher graduations of recognition; and iii) horizontal mobility 
through the ecosystem.  
3.2a Technology ecosystem participants self-select themselves through higher levels of control.  
3.2b The decision to self-select through higher control levels is similar to a market transaction. 
Ecosystems participants offer or forfeit something in exchange for some additional value. 
3.2c Although distinct, creation and control mechanisms should be complementary, and are 
often interdependent and mutually enabling. 
3.3a Control infrastructures function as search, filtering, and coordination mechanisms to 
aggregate heterogeneous, fragmented and specialized contributions into a more cohesive 
ecosystem. 
3.3b Control infrastructures serve to reduce quality variance for both complementors and their 
complements as they self-select themselves through higher graduations of control.  
3.4 The ecosystem core confers legitimacy and status to participants and complementors on 
the periphery at graduated levels. As complementors fulfill the requirements of the higher 
certification levels and come under greater influence of the core, the core confers greater 
legitimacy and status.  
3.5 Technology ecosystem cores can purposefully construct infrastructures and explicit market 
based mechanisms and simultaneously cultivate intrinsic community based norms and 
competencies to affect greater cohesion.  
 
Our intention with this analysis is to help advance the state of the art in several 
key areas, which we then expand upon in chapter 4, where we attempt to rationalize 
the two separate empirical domains and the two separate theoretical treatments; to 
elaborate on the themes introduced in chapter 3; and to present additional findings 
based on our analysis. The research questions for chapter 4 are as follows: 
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RQ 4.1: What aspects of ecosystems/platforms as a new organizational form 
are explained by transaction cost economics and agency theory? 
RQ 4.2: What additional explanatory value is provided by platform/ecosystem 
theory? 
RQ 4.3: What additional conceptual development is needed? 
 We first engage in a detailed qualitative analysis of each of our two domains 
along the primary dimensions of transaction cost economics: asset specificity, 
transaction frequency, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. Based 
on our analysis, we conclude that TCE is generally effective in its explanatory value for 
analyzing the most effective governance form for a dyadic relationship, including hold-
up costs and partner lock-in, the completeness of contracts, and issues related to the 
monitoring of exchange behavior. However, we have found that TCE does not address 
key elements considered by firms in choosing the appropriate governance forms such 
as the independent agency of the parties, value creation, and innovation, for example. 
We refer also to prior research on motives for inter-organizational networking listed in 
table 1.2, which include many additional factors. In a similar vein, we have made 
observations in agreement with Santos and Eisenhardt’s (2005) assertion that the 
direction of causality is not clear, and that the levels of some of the key dimensions 
may be a result of the chosen governance form, not vice versa.  
Moreover, we have argued that while the TCE literature views the role of the 
principal as setting the rules of the game in contracts, and then ensuring the 
compliance of agents, the new literature on ecosystems and platforms views the flow 
of control not as uni-directional compliance but rather bi-directional inter-
dependence, and the resultant ecosystem is developed through a combination of the 
intentional design of the core and emergent design through the efforts of many 
external actors. Consequently, while the primary objective of traditional governance 
theory is control, ecosystems and platforms are concerned with both ensuring control 
and enabling creation.  
 An additional key concern with the use of TCE in our research is its dyadic focus 
on inter-firm relationships. In contrast, we have observed each core firm managing 
relationships with multiple, heterogeneous partners through a graduated system of 
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self-selected control levels, as well as multiple value appropriation mechanisms. We 
have described this as the “solar system model”, and represent it visually in Figure 4.1, 
shown below: 
    
Figure 4.1: Solar system model 
 
Thus while TCE considers a single dyadic relationship, we have observed 
systems of graduated control to which ecosystems participants self-select. Effectively, 
each level of control may be considered a distinct hybrid governance form driven to a 
large degree by different degrees of transaction frequency and asset specificity. The 
self-selection aspect is critical as well, as it emphasizes the autonomy of the various 
parties, as opposed to considering a governance form the inevitable result when 
certain conditions exist. So while TCE sees a more integrated structure as resembling a 
hierarchy, the autonomous selection of control level ensures that this is still essentially 
a market decision. 
We have seen from our two domains as well as from prior studies that a given 
ecosystem may support hundreds, thousands, or even millions of participants. For 
most core companies in this situation, maintaining a distinct contractual relationship 
with each of these participants would be prohibitively costly and would limit the ability 
of the ecosystem to scale. On the other hand, implementing a standardized structure 
which treats all types of activity equally would limit the flexibility of the ecosystem and 
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the ability to incorporate new innovation. What we have observed in each of our 
domains, therefore, is a program of relationship types which may be graduated, and 
which additionally may evolve over time as new types of partners and new activities 
emerge. 
We propose several additional findings in chapter 4: 
Table 5.2: Chapter 4 research findings: 
Finding Description 
4.1 TCE has explanatory value for the choice of a hybrid/network governance form, but 
excludes many of the key factors which determine (and result from) this choice; the levels 
of some factors may be the result of the choice of governance form, not vice versa. 
4.2 In contrast with a dyadic focus on each inter-firm relationship individually, core firms in an 
ecosystem manage their relationships with multiple, heterogeneous partners through a 
coordinated portfolio of distinct relationship types which correspond to the various partner 
roles, and which may be graduated in nature. We have called this the “solar system” 
model. 
4.3 Core firms may support different types of partners by creating multiple tools, each of 
which supports a different type of partner activity. New tools, in turn, may enable new 
types of partner activities. 
 
4.4 While multiple tools may support a variety of partner activity, multiple value appropriation 
mechanisms allow the core to extract value from a wider range of partner activity. 
 
 
In section 4.4 we summarize additional themes which emerged in chapter 3 and 
which we believe to complement the traditional economic discourse. These include:  
• external value creation and innovation 
• the graduation and self-selection of control mechanisms 
• the treatment of heterogeneity and variability 
• transfer of legitimacy and status 
• the co-existence and interaction of market and community mechanisms. 
We expand on these themes in the Business Software ecosystems, and additionally 
explore these themes in the Affiliate Marketing context in order to compare and 
contrast their applicability to other ecosystems besides business software.  
5.1 Research Agenda 
In this section we will discuss some ways in which we think researchers may extend 
our findings.  
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Affiliate marketing: We have conducted a study of 136 one-to-many affiliate 
marketing programs in Spain, with observations for four primary governance 
mechanisms. Overall conclusions are that there are a limited number of restrictions in 
the formal contracts, and that merchants tend to accept the majority of affiliates into 
their programs. We have found that monitoring of affiliate activities tends to be rather 
lax, focusing primarily on measuring performance in terms of visits, leads, and sales, 
but paying little attention to how the merchant’s brand is represented by affiliates; in 
other words, there is scarce monitoring of affiliate behavior. As a result there is a risk 
that affiliates may engage in behavior that could harm the merchant’s brand. 
Additional research could analyze whether these findings could be extended to other 
markets, or if in fact other markets have more effective methods of monitoring 
behavior which could be applied to the Spanish market, perhaps though the 
application of newer technological innovations. 
Graduation and self-selection of control mechanisms: We have observed several 
levels of control in each of our ecosystems, and have called into question the dyadic 
assumptions of transaction economics in favor of a more complex program of 
relationships with multiple, distinct hybrid forms for the same economic activity, which 
we have called the Solar System model of governance. There are several potential 
ways to extend this analysis. First, this model is admittedly a static model of 
governance. It does not currently explicate the flows between parties, and the co-
creation activity which exists (Sarker et al. 2012). A more robust process model could 
be developed from the base that we have established. Second, the model is able to 
explain the levels of control for each set of complementors for a given ecosystem, but 
does not contemplate whether a model is the most effective model for the ecosystem. 
For example, we have observed three different approaches to control in section 4.4.4, 
ranging from the open source model of community-based development, to a 
proprietary software product which exerts a high degree of control. We found that the 
Software Vendor in our sample pursues a middle ground between these two extremes 
of control. Further research could explore the antecedents which determine the most 
appropriate form of control, and the contingencies which apply to specific governance 
mechanisms under each regime. Finally, we have studied two different types of 
ecosystems in this thesis, which we call Strong Core (Business Software) and 
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Fragmented (Affiliate Marketing) in section 4.2. With further theoretical development 
one could develop an ecosystem typology to build contingencies for platform 
mechanisms deployment. 
The treatment of heterogeneity and variability:  In this thesis we have made detailed 
observations of the heterogeneous nature of the two distinct ecosystems we have 
studied. In exhibit 2.1 we describe the heterogeneity of affiliates based on the 
different business models they use and the various tools they apply in their 
promotional activities. In table 4.3 we describe the various combinations of activities 
and domains which complementors may engage in. We have also indicated 
governance mechanisms which could aid the complementors in their efforts according 
to these domains and activities. Further empirical analysis could explore new domains 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of heterogeneity in different contexts, and the 
implications for governance mechanism development. Furthermore, this analysis is 
primarily descriptive. Additional theory development could suggest a more 
prescriptive model of actions that might be taken to create a more effective match 
between different types of complementors and the governance mechanisms which 
support their activities. 
In the following section we make specific recommendations for managers of 
core firms based on our findings. 
5.2 Implications for Managers 
We began this chapter describing a business challenge for managers of affiliate 
marketing programs. Our study of the Business Software ecosystem likewise originated 
with a challenge from the core firm to develop a deep understanding of the current 
business model for the partner channel, and to study competing models. In chapter 2 
we concluded with implications for managers of affiliate marketing programs. The 
following are additional recommendations for core firms in managing a business 
ecosystem based on our additional findings in chapters 3 and 4: 
• Design for maximum heterogeneity. As we have found throughout the thesis, 
the greatest advantage to relying on complementors is that they can target 
niches which would be difficult or impossible for the core firm to reach on its 
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own, and that the health of these complementors affects the health of the 
overall ecosystem. In section 4.4, for example, we discuss various ways for the 
core firm to enable heterogeneity, ranging from a market approach to giving 
complementors the freedom to choose their particular niche, to the core’s 
direct involvement in giving complementors exclusive access to particular 
sector or type of activity. Although our focus has mostly been on downstream 
complementors, Adner and Kapoor (2010) have also found that firms need take 
into account both upstream providers of components as well as downstream 
providers of complements. 
• Take a proactive approach to understanding and balancing tensions such as 
that between creativity and control. In the future research section we discuss 
the need for managers to develop strategies to deal with salient tensions in 
their ecosystem (Smith and Lewis). Managers should gain a deep understanding 
of the needs of complementors so that they may provide the right incentives to 
help them develop their own activities, while not limiting their ability to 
compete through overly restrictive control measures. There is no silver bullet 
for achieving this balance, but communication seems to be the key. West and 
O’Mahoney (2008) have discussed the importance of transparency and 
accessibility in the pursuit of this balance. We have seen core firms in both 
ecosystems maintain close contact with complementors through direct contact 
with account managers, but also through web forums, advocacy groups, and 
industry conferences.  
• Match creation and control mechanisms to the needs of a diverse range of 
complementors. Complementors vary in many ways as we detail in section 4.3. 
As we show in figure 4.1, different types of partners may require different 
types of incentives and control mechanisms. In the Business Software 
ecosystem, for example, independent software vendors are primarily focused 
on the creation and sale of software complements. Some mechanisms which 
appeal to these types of complementors include development tools like 
software development kits, official certification of software complements, and 
priority listings in software directories. Value added resellers on the other hand 
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are more focused on client implementations, and might benefit more from co-
marketing and co-branding efforts, standardized implementation 
methodologies, and sales training. We also found varying partner levels to be 
an effective way to incentivize partners to grow, to tie the partners more 
closely to the core, and to reward successful partners with increasing 
legitimacy and status. 
• Performance is more than sales. One key finding in both ecosystems is that 
complementor performance is primarily measured through the number of 
transactions completed. In the case of affiliate marketing this could mean visits, 
leads generated, or product sales, and for the Business Software ecosystem this 
includes sales of the core software product. However focusing solely on 
transactions may undervalue, for example, complementors focusing on 
strategic niches which represent strong potential future growth, or additional 
revenue from training and customization in software implementations (in the 
case of Business Software). This singular numbers focus also may ignore key 
quality indicators such as customer satisfaction, repeat sales, and referrals. One 
of our key findings in the affiliate marketing case, for example, is that 
merchants tend to focus solely on sales but not how these sales are achieved, 
which could be due to spam or other unethical practices. We therefore 
recommend that core firms complement a quantitative approach to 
performance measurement with a qualitative approach by observing other 
critical factors. 
• Take a reciprocal, flexible approach to value appropriation. In finding 4.4 (at 
the end of section 4.3), we state “While multiple tools may support a variety of 
partner activity, multiple value appropriation mechanisms allow the core to 
extract value from a wider range of partner activity”. The core firm should be 
vigilant in its identification of new ways to extract value from partner activity, 
but must be careful not to overly tax  the activities of complementors. One 
solution to this dilemma is to provide tools which both enable complementors 
to achieve higher rents, thus allowing the core firm to take a percentage of a 
larger pie. Apple has been quite successful at this strategy by creating a 
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mechanism which makes it easy for app developers to charge for in-app 
purchases, to post banner ads (through their iAd service), and through the 
Game Center, Apple’s social gaming network.  
• Plan for the evolvability of the platform: It is clear not only from our findings 
but from observing other ecosystems, that planning for the growth and 
evolution of a platform is critical to ecosystem development. There is 
significant risk in undertaking a unilateral strategy, where the core firms set the 
rules and partners are expected to toe the line. The most successful platforms 
take a reflexive approach to governance, where they experiment with new 
functionality, observing the reaction of external contributors and customers. In 
section 4.4.6 we discuss our finding that the actual governance of our 
ecosystems tends to be the result of purposeful action by the core, with 
emergent responses on the periphery (Finding 3.5, chapter 3). There are specific 
steps that companies can take to involve complementors as the platform 
evolves. We mentioned above the importance of communication through 
direct contact, forums, and conferences. There are also mechanisms such as 
training and product roadmaps, and in software designing to ensure forward 
and backward compatibility.  
5.3 Future Research 
Based on our analysis of two distinct domains using various theoretical lenses, we have 
identified three primary areas where we feel the research literature is complete, and 
which we propose as part of a plan for future studies. These include: 1) research on 
domains which we denote as “galaxy” ecosystems, consisting of multiple competing 
platforms; 2) research exploring the relationship between enabling dualities and 
conflicting dyads, including the triggers which cause transitions between the two 
states, and management strategies for dealing with these tensions; and 3) additional 
research on organization boundaries with a focus on boundary-spanning organization 
forms, including theory development in areas which have received less attention to 
date.  
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5.3.1 Multi-platform “galaxy” ecosystems 
We begin our discussion with an observation regarding the nature of digital 
ecosystems which have been studied in the literature to data, namely that the majority 
of empirical research on ecosystems and platforms analyzes activity surrounding a 
single, strong core firm, what Provan et al. (2007) refer to as “egocentric networks”. 
The problem with this level of analysis is that it downplays the fact that these 
platforms exist in a competitive context, namely that there are other platforms vying 
for the attention of partners and customers. Basole (2009) for example describes the 
fragmented mobile ecosystem, where firms must maintain relationships with a wide 
variety of other firms as the balance of power is continuously shifting.  The affiliate 
marketing ecosystem studied in chapter 2 is one such domain, where we observed the 
complexities for affiliates of maintaining a relationship with multiple platforms, and for 
platforms to maintain relationships with multiple affiliates who are constantly lured by 
offers from competing platforms. We suggest that these types of ecosystems 
represent the rule rather than the exception, and that additional empirical studies are 
needed to understand the forces at work in such configurations.  
In chapter 4 we described the Business Software ecosystem as having a strong 
core firm, and the Affiliate Marketing ecosystem as fragmented. The discussion of how 
the core firm in the Business Software ecosystem manages its exchange relationships 
has led to the view of multiple hybrid forms co-existing. If we consider the fragmented 
Affiliate Marketing system, and shift the focus to the affiliates (the participants rather 
than the core), we encounter even greater complexity. An affiliate’s business requires 
combining assets in the form of tools and content from multiple platforms 
simultaneously. From the affiliate’s perspective, the issue of how to combine these 
elements seamlessly is paramount. Therefore, the affiliate must consider how to 
participate in multiple hybrid forms from multiple platform providers simultaneously. 
Examples of ecosystems in the literature include those of Wal-Mart and 
Microsoft (Iansiti and Levien 2004a, 2004b), Google and Qualcomm (Gawer and 
Cusumano 2008), Procter and Gamble (Chesbrough 2007, Huston and Sakkab 2006) 
and Cisco (Li 2009). Neither are the examples limited to profit-seeking enterprises. 
Gawer and Cusumano (2008) and Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) analyze the case 
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of the open-source software platform Linux. While operating in a diverse collection of 
industries, what these ecosystems have in common is that the analysis is typically 
focused on a single keystone, and the ecosystem is defined from the perspective of 
this firm. 
However, we assert that in many if not most ecosystems, there is no one 
dominant platform but rather a heterogeneous, constantly evolving array of platforms 
which both compete against and complement each other. For example, software 
programmers must adopt strategies to maintain compatibility with multiple user 
interfaces and operating systems for desktop computing devices as well as a large 
variety of mobile devices and mobile operating systems; videogame developers must 
decide whether to create content for a single hardware platform or deal with the 
complexities of optimizing their content for multiple platforms; hotels and airlines 
must navigate a large number of reservation systems, online travel sites, and travel 
agents (each of which has its own proprietary system) in promoting their offerings. All 
actors in a multi-platform ecosystem must find ways to navigate the complexities of 
their environment, but the most successful niche players are able to combine elements 
from the various platforms to create their own unique solutions.  
Basole (2009) provides an important case in point through an analysis of the 
converging mobile ecosystem, identifying 14 distinct segments and concluding that 
four of these segments create the technological foundation for the ecosystem. 
However, they also concluded that a single hub segment has yet to emerge, and that 
successful firms must “form the right balance of relationships with a variety of players” 
(p. 13). Similarly, Iyer et al. (2006) perform a network analysis of the software 
ecosystem. The authors identify several hubs, akin to keystones, including IBM, 
Microsoft, SAP, etc. They describe the case of Vignette, a company which creates 
products combining elements from multiple platform providers; Vignette maintains a 
close relationship with Microsoft to ensure interoperability of its product with .NET 
and Java, while also partnering with IBM and Accenture for system integration. This 
research would seem to indicate that a broader view of business ecosystems consisting 
of multiple keystones and platforms may complement the company-centric view. 
Although the focus on links between companies and the roles that firms play in the 
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ecosystem yields important insights, we suggest that a more detailed discussion of the 
specific mechanisms which ensure the health of the ecosystem would complement 
these contributions. 
Interorganizational networks have been studied in other contexts, with a 
growing preference for network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The advantage 
of network analysis is that it can provide a view of the “whole network”, studying the 
impact of multilevel actions and structures on collectivities of organizations (Provan et 
al. 2007). A detailed review of network analysis research is outside of the scope of this 
thesis, though Provan et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive review of the literature. In 
this review, the authors found that the vast majority of network studies focused on 
“egocentric networks”, or those networks revolving around a single keystone firm. Out 
of a survey of over 50,000 articles on networks, they found 26 dealing with whole 
networks. These represented a variety of industries with a large number devoted to 
health services, but also included other industries such as manufacturing, 
biotechnology, and video game development. Further, social network analysis focuses 
on “how strategic alliances, partnerships, and collaborations are formed in a network 
context and what impact network formation, structure, and participation have on firm 
performance, innovation, and market evolution” (Basole 2009, p. 146). We suggest 
that there is a need to for more research on the specific mechanisms which govern the 
creation and sharing of value in hybrid organizational forms. These constructs are 
central to the ecosystem literature, yet their study has generally been anecdotal to 
date, and typically focus on activities surrounding a single keystone. 
In chapter 4, we have discussed the dyadic relationship model at the center of 
transaction cost economics. In Finding 4.2 we described a second “solar system model” 
with a strong firm at the core and multiple types of partners contributing to the 
success of the ecosystem. In the following discussion we analyze a third view which we 
believe merits further study. In this view there are multiple platforms in a given 
ecosystem. Niche players must choose whether to work with a single platform, to 
customize their offerings so they are compatible with multiple platforms, or to 
combine elements from multiple platforms in creating their own offering. This third 
view we call the “galaxy” model since it assumes the existence of multiple “solar 
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systems”.  The implications for governance on the part of the various keystones in this 
model are significant as well, since they must decide whether to create their own 
proprietary mechanisms (tools, standards, etc.) in an attempt to lock in 
complementors to their platform, or to embrace more open, shared mechanisms. The 
risk of focusing on proprietary mechanisms may backfire, since open standards make 
complementor investments more scalable across platforms.  This model is best 
represented by an ecosystem such as the mobile telephony sector, in which many 
types of players including mobile operators, handset manufacturers, application 
developers, media companies, etc. must manage relationships with multiple 
competing platforms, each of which is in a state of constant and rapid evolution.  
There is also the decentralized model, or open model, which may be seen as a 
subset of either the solar system or galaxy model (depending on whether or not there 
is a single, strong central core). In the open model, standards for compatibility are not 
determined by a single, central firm but rather by a combination of negotiation and 
market forces among ecosystem members (Langlois and Robertson 1992). Prime 
examples of the open model include the personal computer with its open architecture, 
the Internet based on open standards, and open source efforts such as Linux. 
Additional research is needed to test whether the findings from this thesis are valid in 
these new models of organization. 
We discuss at various points in the thesis the importance of planning for the 
evolvability of the platform, and we observe that ultimately governance is reflexive in 
that it is determined by purposeful efforts from the core firm and emergent response 
from complementors. Nevertheless we acknowledge that the model in Figure 4.1 is 
fundamentally a static one. An important area for future research would be to develop 
process models for the various types of ecosystems, identifying the contingencies 
which might result in one type of ecosystem or another (solar system, galaxy, open) 
and the resultant implications for governance considerations, as well as the flows 
between ecosystem entities for each type. 
5.3.2 Paradox, tensions, dualities and dualisms 
Smith and Lewis (2011) make a laudable effort to classify organizational tensions 
into 4 categories, including exemplars of each: learning, belonging, organizing, and 
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performing. They further suggest that tensions operative, both within and between 
these categories. While this research may help to organize discourse on a macro level, 
we have made an effort to provide empirical observations of specific tensions on a 
more granular level. 
The control-creativity  tension (also called control-autonomy in studies subsequent 
to our analysis in chapters 3 and 4) has been addressed conceptually in the literature 
(Yoo et al. 2010, Tilson et al. 2010, Tiwana et al., 2010), and we have attempted to 
extend this analysis through our own observations and subsequent findings. In a 
recent transcript submitted to Organization Science (currently in the third round of 
revisions), we extend this analysis to include 2 additional tensions. We would suggest 
that the discourse on tensions in digital ecosystems is still relatively immature, though 
there have been recent attempts to explore specific tensions (Tilson et al. 2010, 
Tiwana et al. 2010). The following summarizes the three tensions we have identified: 
1. Control-creativity: One of the best understood tensions in ecosystem 
governance is the need for an effective balance between control and creativity 
(Tiwana et al., 2010). Organization theory argues that creativity is required 
when addressing uncertainty and solving previously undefined and novel 
problems (March, 1991). Control and coordination are required where the 
tasks are complex and the work is distributed across a disparate set of actors 
who work interdependently, and expose themselves to various forms of 
transactional risk (Adler and Chen, 2011).Where creativity is about multiplying 
options, control is about identifying and mitigating elements that can threaten 
the creative endeavor; in the simplest terms, the objective is to increase 
desired variance while reducing undesirable variance simultaneously.  
2. Standardization-variety: The core of the ecosystem must be highly 
standardized, enabling a high level of reusability in myriad contexts. 
Complements, by contrast, must embrace heterogeneity and permit the 
customization required to address the niches being served, while maintaining 
substantial evolvability over time (Baldwin and Woodard, 2008). This has been 
called the ‘paradox of change’ by Tilson et al. (2010 p. 6), where opposing logics 
of stability and flexibility operate simultaneously across infrastructural layers 
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and components. Change and variety are enabled through the existence of a 
predictable platform core that requires common, standardized interfaces and 
connection protocols. Without predictable standards, complementors have no 
assurance of the eventual scalability and reuse of their innovations across 
different contexts and users.  
3. Individual-collective: Technology ecosystems must allow for a variety of 
extrinsic motivations pursued at an individual level. At the same time, 
ecosystems require coordination and cohesion, permitting the emergence of 
public collective goods (Ibarra et al., 2005). The problem is similar to 
organizations; individual motivations must be harnessed for expertise, 
creativity and generativity. Yet individual incentives must also be subjugated to 
the benefit of a cohesive whole (Smith and Lewis, 2011). By definition, 
ecosystems function like quasi-marketplaces where complementors channel 
specific expertise to occupy defendable, often exclusive, niches. As such, self-
interested behavior is not only assumed, but necessary in a for-profit 
commercial platform. Nevertheless, a lack of platform cohesion may limit the 
benefits of standardization, scale, and direct and indirect network effects. The 
challenge is to establish and maintain platform unity without having significant 
adverse effects on the creative efforts of niche participants. Ecosystem 
participants must somehow, either knowingly or unknowingly, subsume their 
self-interested conduct to some form of direction giving (Demsetz, 1997) that 
orients their behavior towards the desired collective outcomes of the platform.  
In section 4.5 we synthesize work by Smith and Lewis (2011) on latent and salient 
tensions, and that of Farjoun (2010) on dualisms and dualities. We observe 3 specific 
exemplars in the Business Software ecosystem, and one in the Affiliate Marketing 
ecosystem, and analyze instances which manifest as latent, complementary, and 
enabling dualities, and others which appear as salient, contradictory, and disabling 
dualisms. In addition, we comment of possible triggers which cause transitions from 
positive dualities to conflictive dualisms. While we intend our analysis as a first step to 
add empirical definition to these emerging theories, thus far we have not ventured to 
offer a more prescriptive component for dealing with these tensions. 
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While we have adopted Smith and Lewis’ (2011) constructs of latent vs. salient 
tensions, including their suggested factors which render tensions salient, the authors’ 
take the discussion a step further, suggesting that salient tensions can lead to different 
types reinforcing cycles. The researchers propose “a dynamic equilibrium model of 
organizing, which suggests that tensions are inherent and persistent and depicts how 
purposeful and cyclical responses to paradox over time enable sustainability—peak 
performance in the present that enables success in the future” (p. 382). This model 
assumes that any response to salient paradoxical tensions leads to a reinforcing cycle 
which may be either negative and vicious, or positive and virtuous. Negative vicious 
cycles result primarily from avoiding change due to “cognitive and behavioral forces 
for consistency, emotional anxiety and defensiveness, and organizational forces for 
inertia” (p. 391).  
Smith and Lewis (2011) propose two primary management strategies for dealing 
with salient tensions in order to enable virtuous cycles: acceptance and resolution. 
Acceptance involves viewing tensions not as an either-or dilemma, but rather as an 
opportunity that requires “attending to competing demand simultaneously” which 
“requires cognitive and behavioral complexity, emotional equanimity, and dynamic 
organizational capabilities” (p. 391). The objective is to change the actors’ way of 
thinking to consider both seemingly conflicting possibilities rather than reacting 
defensively and forcing an either/or scenario. Cognitive and behavioral complexity and 
emotional equanimity are about changing individual attitudes toward the tensions, 
while dynamic capabilities represent a response at the organizational level. According 
to the authors, “dynamic capabilities provide collective tools to enable organizational 
leaders to respond to environmental shifts and, in doing so, enable members to be 
more open and accepting of the dynamic environment of paradoxical tensions” (p. 
392).  
Resolution strategies entail responding to paradoxical tensions either by splitting 
and choosing between competing tensions, or by finding synergies between them. 
Smith and Lewis (2011) suggest that splitting and synergies can be used simultaneously 
through “purposeful iterations between alternatives in order to ensure simultaneous 
attention to them over time” (p. 392). In other words, actors make choices in the 
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short-term between alternatives while accepting tensions in the long-term. The 
researchers claim that this requires “consistent inconsistency” as decisions are 
continually changing, alternating between one aspect of the contradiction and the 
other. Consistently inconsistent behavior embeds tensions within the organization’s 
strategies, rules, processes, and identities. Smith and Lewis (2011) claim that the 
objective of management strategies to deal with salient tensions is sustainability 
through three mechanisms: enabling learning and creativity, fostering flexibility and 
resilience, and unleashing human potential.  
The dynamic capabilities model is an effort to structure a disparate set of literature 
dealing with similar phenomena. According to the authors, “At its core a paradox 
theory presumes that tensions are integral to complex systems and that sustainability 
depends on attending to contradictory yet interwoven demands simultaneously” (p. 
397). From the beginning of this thesis we have observed the existence of certain 
tensions between the core firm and third-party participants in our two domains, so we 
clearly concur with this observation. We have focused primarily on the “control-
creativity” tension, but earlier in the section we identify the additional tensions 
“standardization-variety” and “individual-collective”. Once we accept the ubiquity of 
paradoxical tensions, and conclude that tensions must be managed rather than 
avoided, the question then is to form a plan for future research in order to extend 
paradox theory. Smith and Lewis (2011) propose three primary areas for paradox 
research relating to tensions in platforms and ecosystems: explore additional 
methodologies for exploring tensions; consider the message to practitioners regarding 
paradoxes, and pursue a more prescriptive approach; and expand the use of paradox 
as a tool for theorizing. 
5.3.3 Organizational boundaries 
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) observe that transaction cost economics and 
related exchange-efficiency theories have dominated the discourse on organizational 
boundaries. The researchers propose a broader view, including four conceptions of 
organizational boundaries: efficiency, focused on the legal-ownership view of 
boundary decisions, with research in this area primarily through transaction cost 
economics ; power which deals with the sphere of influence of the organization and 
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whose theoretical roots rely on resource dependence; competence, which focuses on a 
firm’s portfolio of resources and is based on contingency theory and the resource-
based view of the firm; and identity which addresses the mind-set through which the 
organization defines itself, based on managerial cognition and organizational identity 
theory.  
As avenues for future research, the authors first suggest a move away from 
exchange efficiency studies which tend to focus on “atomistic make-or-buy decisions in 
the context of established industries or stable parts of organization” (p. 503). In 
addition, they propose an emphasis on more longitudinal and processual research 
which explores the relationships between different boundary conceptions. Third, is a 
move towards normative evidence and theories of the firm. Finally, they suggest an 
increased emphasis on “problem-driven” boundary phenomena, which we will discuss 
further below.   
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) further argue that research on organizational 
boundaries is typically theory-driven, however the current business landscape includes 
many non-traditional settings and new boundary decisions. They therefore assert 
(without discounting the value of theory-driven research) that an alternative problem-
driven approach would lead to fresh theoretical ideas which are “out of the box” of 
known theory (p. 505). In fact, the Business Software research in chapter 3 originated 
not as a study to extend extant theory but rather as the expression of a business 
problem experienced by the core firm, namely “what is the business model of the 
software development and implementation channel?” The mere fact that the central 
orchestrator of this channel need ask the question of how it is organized and 
functioning in actuality is an acknowledgment that not all factors are within the central 
firm’s control, but rather are the product of their deliberate efforts at organization 
combined with the emergent organization of the community. This type of hybrid form 
lends itself more to an inductive exercise of theory development than a rationalization 
of extant theory.  
Zott and Amit (2007) look at how business model design, which they describe 
as the design of an organization’s “boundary-spanning transactions” impacts the 
performance of entrepreneurial firms. They claim that “organizational design should 
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extend beyond internal design to include a focus on the architecture of the 
transactions that a focal firm engineers with its partners, suppliers, and customers” 
(Zott and Amit, 2007, p. 194).  The goal of their study is to explain how value is created 
and captured by firms. The authors operationalize and measure two types of business 
model designs, efficiency-centered and novelty-centered, and observe a positive 
relationship between novelty-centered business design and firm performance. 
Therefore, extending theory on boundary-spanning business models to include 
complex platforms and ecosystems may provide additional insights into our observed 
phenomena. 
An additional observation from our research is that control systems for the 
domains studied are not static, but rather dynamic in nature. Traditional theorizing on 
transaction governance has emphasized variance theories, where transactional, 
institutional, or environmental antecedents change; and governance forms and control 
outcomes respond in some linear fashion (Klein et al., 2011). Thrane (2007) has 
investigated the possibility that different models of governance may be present for the 
same set of antecedent conditions, oscillating between several archetypes, or evolving 
with the maturity of the relationship, and thus offering preliminary evidence that 
governance archetypes may be both evolutionary and pluralistic in their fundamental 
logic. The topic of an evolutionary or dynamic view of ecosystem governance warrants 
additional research. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
Our research has been an iterative process of experimenting with different 
theoretical lenses in our efforts to explain these phenomena. We began by analyzing 
our first domain with transaction cost economics, as the predominant theory applied 
in prior research to explain how economic activity is organized between firms. 
However, we found this theory to have certain shortcomings in its capacity to fully 
address our research questions. While researching our second domain, we therefore 
turned to the newer theories of ecosystems and platforms, stating our observations 
and conclusions terms associated with those areas of research. We finished our 
analysis with an attempt to rationalize the contributions from each theory, and to pave 
the way for future research. We make an initial foray into paradox theory, suggest 
Page 182 de 245 
 
specific ways in which other researchers may extend our findings in section 5.1, 
describe implications for managers in section 5.2, and in section 5.3 we identify three 
primary areas for future study: multi-platform ecosystems, paradox research of salient 
tensions, and various theoretical lenses for studying boundary-spanning organizations.  
Throughout the research journey, we have made a concerted attempt to focus 
on practical business problems, while grounding our research in extant theory. In this 
way we hope to both aid business managers in solving difficult issues, while making 
some small contribution to advancing the state of the art in the areas of management, 
information systems, and economics. 
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7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF PLATFORM MECHANISMS 
The following is a summary of the primary platform mechanisms identified in the study 
of the Business Software ecosystem analyzed in chapter 3.  
7.1.1 Focus: Product and channel development 
Core Product Development: The Software Vendor is responsible for the development 
of the core enterprise software suite, as well as the software development kit. The 
partner is responsible for configuring and customizing the core software for individual 
customers. Revenue from sales of software licenses is shared between partners and 
the Software Vendor. 
Software Development Kit: The Software Vendor is responsible for maintaining the 
SDK, which contains the development tools for customizing the software and for 
creating complementary products The SDK includes information such as the software 
architecture, entity model, security model, etc. 
Partner Certification: As a condition for representing the Software Vendor’s products, 
partners must have certain certifications (technological, functional, product, etc.), 
which are handled by training centers run by third parties. 
Complementary Product Certification: Product certification is the responsibility of third 
parties with the direction of the Software Vendor. By certifying their complementary 
products, partners receive the “seal of approval” from the Software Vendor which 
helps differentiate the partner in relation to its competitors. 
Translation and Localization: Adapting the core software to local languages and 
regulatory requirements is the responsibility of the Software Vendor. However, 
partners often make additional modifications to address perceived gaps in the 
localized solutions. 
Technical Training: Technical training is the responsibility of external training centers 
with the certification of the Software Vendor. The Software Vendor also implements 
training programs in conjunction with universities. 
Recruiting: Recruiting is the responsibility of the partner, though the Software Vendor 
influences the supply of qualified consultants through its university programs. 
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Roadmap: The Software Vendor maintains the product roadmap, which keeps the 
partners informed as to the timing of future updates and upgrades, as well as the 
specific changes to the software included in the updates/upgrades. This is a critical 
area since partners are responsible for maintaining compatibility between their 
complementary products and the core software.  
Product Evangelist: Product evangelists are employed by the Software Vendor to 
promoting the core product to partners and customers, helping them understand the 
product roadmap including the benefits of new product features.  
Product and Channel Development Tools: To support the relationship between the 
Software Vendor and the partners, the Software Vendor maintains an extranet which 
provides up-to-date information on the various platform elements such as the product 
roadmap, certification requirements, software development kits, the availability of 
complementary products, etc. 
7.1.2 Focus: Sales (relationship between Software Vendor and partner) 
Marketing: While the Software Vendor and partners engage in their own marketing 
campaigns, there are some co-marketing efforts where the cost is shared between the 
parties. 
Branding: The Software Vendor is responsible for developing and maintaining the 
brand of the core software products. Partners are responsible for developing and 
maintaining their own company and product brands.  
New partner Support: Third parties, with the support of the Software Vendor, maintain 
external centers to help train new, generally smaller, partners in marketing, sales, and 
product implementation issues. These centers are evaluated based on their ability to 
impact the sales growth of new partners. 
Sales Training: Third parties are responsible for sales training with the support of the 
Software Vendor. 
Partner Level: There are three partner levels which roughly relate to partner size. 
Higher levels include more extensive technical support, training, marketing and sales 
support, use of Software Vendor logos, and access to international projects. 
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Partner Monitoring: Partners are primarily monitored via the Software Vendor’s 
extranet, where the partners report their license sales. There are also third party 
centers for comparing a partner’s performance with channel benchmarks. 
Sales Tools: The Software Vendor’s extranet provides tools to report sales and to 
maintain information on a partner’s sales pipeline. There are also requests for 
proposal for collaboration opportunities between international partners. 
7.1.3 Focus: Sales and implementation (relationship between partner and customer) 
Technical Support: Technical support to the customer is the responsibility of the 
partner, however the Software Vendor may provide additional support depending on 
the partner Level.  
Sales and Implementation Support: On most projects, the partner retains sole 
responsibility for selling and implementing the Software Vendor’s solutions. However, 
on larger implementation projects the Software Vendor gives additional, direct 
support to the partners in areas such as sales, technical support and project 
management. On very large projects the Software Vendor takes on the role of primary 
contractor and subcontracts areas of the project to partners. 
Implementation Methodology: The partner may use no methodology, the partner’s 
own methodology, or the methodology developed by the Software Vendor. Consistent 
use of implementation methodology is critical as a way to reduce project time, 
increase project success, and reduce total cost of ownership. 
Complementary Product Development: partners may create their own complementary 
products for customer needs which are not adequately addressed in the core product. 
There is a high degree of variation in size and scope of these products. The partner 
owns the software licenses for its complementary products, and is responsible for 
technical support, customer training, and for maintaining compatibility with future 
versions of the core software. 
Industrial Sector Solutions: While these are also a type of complementary product, 
they represent much more comprehensive solutions that address a given industrial 
sector. These may be for a specific geographic region and a highly-focused industry 
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niche, or they may have broader application. Larger partners may develop solutions 
that become part of the core software product. 
Customer Training: While the Software Vendor is responsible for creating the software 
manuals for the core product, the high level of customization and the large number of 
complementary products result in vastly heterogeneous implementations. Customer 
training is therefore ultimately the responsibility of the partners. 
8 APPENDIX – SUMMARY OF 3GERP PROJECT AREA E: ORGANIZATION 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PARTNERSHIP MODELS 
June, 2008 
8.1 Participants 
Jonathan Wareham, ESADE 
Josep Lluis Cano, ESADE 
Paul Fox, ESADE 
8.2 Introduction 
The following is a summary of the research conducted for the 3gERP project in Spain 
under the direction of Jonathan Wareham and with the participation of Josep Lluis 
Cano Giner and Paul Fox. 12 interviews were conducted between September, 2007 
and February, 2008. The interviewees included representatives from Microsoft 
Dynamics as well as Dynamics partners. Included in the latter category were both 
national partners focused on Spain, as well as International partners with operations in 
multiple countries. The goals of this exploratory research phase were to analyze the 
current Microsoft Dynamics ecosystem with a focus on the Spanish market, to offer 
normative guidance on how to improve the channel structure and processes, and to 
identify potential areas for further research. This summary will focus on two 
deliverables which have been completed: The Verticals Certification Process, and the 
Partner Structure.  
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8.3 Add-ons and Vertical Solutions  
Partners can create what are called “add-ons”, or custom solutions for a particular 
vertical. This is a critical area for Microsoft and for the partners, since it has the 
potential to provide additional functionality in Dynamics which is specific to a 
particular industry vertical or region at a lower TCO. Add-ons may also include 
horizontal solutions such as taxation or payroll applications, for example. The partner 
who creates the add-on is the owner of the solution. These add-ons are first registered 
by Microsoft once they have been implemented with a minimum of 10 customers and 
have passed Microsoft’s quality control. Once registered, add-ons must meet certain 
requirements to become certified by Microsoft. All work required to develop the add-
on, and to get it registered and certified is paid for by the partner. 
Once an add-on is registered and certified, the partner negotiates a revenue-sharing 
agreement with Microsoft for further installations of the add-on. Normally, the partner 
receives between 60 and 80 percent of the revenue, and Microsoft receives the 
remainder. Add-ons are shared with other partners, locally and internationally, and the 
fee distribution is negotiated individually with each partner. However, this is done on a 
case-by-case basis and there are no guidelines provided by Microsoft to govern these 
transactions. 
The investment required to develop and maintain an add-on is quite high compared to 
the potential benefit since the partner absorbs all costs related to development, 
registration, certification, and compatibility with new version of Dynamics. In addition, 
since each add-on is specific to a particular industry and often to a particular 
geographic region, it is difficult to generate sufficient sales volume to amortize these 
costs in the face of competition. This is particularly true for regional and national, 
small- to mid-size partners. 
Therefore, small and mid-size partners must look to larger partners for vertical 
solutions, and they must negotiate fees with the large partner. However, the large 
partners do not have much incentive to share their vertical solutions, and some will 
only agree to a sharing arrangement if they do the installation themselves in order to 
ensure quality. Again, this is an area where Microsoft does not provide much guidance, 
nor do they usually take an active role in specific situations. 
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Microsoft has decided to allow as many verticals in the market as the partners wish to 
create. As a result, there can be as many as 200 construction verticals. Until recently, 
none of these verticals have received any particular seal of quality to say “this is the 
definitive, recommended construction vertical”, for example. As a result, it can often 
be difficult for customers to find an appropriate vertical solution. On the other hand, 
this system does afford partners a way to differentiate themselves from other partners 
through their vertical solutions. 
The add-on certification process is another way for partners to differentiate 
themselves, and may offer the “seal of quality” that larger partners are looking for. The 
process is new however, and so far only 16 solutions have been certified (as of 
January, 2008). Once a partner is certified, they receive a ranking in the Dynamics 
solution finder and appear in the MS Dynamics Solution catalogue. This process is most 
relevant for larger international partners, who can leverage sales across a larger 
market. 
Add-ons are often very narrowly defined, and vary from small, regional localizations, to 
horizontal applications, to complete vertical solutions. However, there is also an issue 
with terminology, since the term “add-on” is often used interchangeably with 
“vertical”, while only some add-ons represent a full vertical solution.  
8.4 Fee Structure  
Revenue is shared between Microsoft and the partners in the following areas: 
software licenses, maintenance, and technical support. For licenses, partners pay 
Microsoft and bill the customer directly, receiving a margin between 35% and 50%. 
Licenses are generally charged on a per-user basis on a sliding scale based on volume. 
Licenses may be covered under a VPO (volume purchase order), or multi-site 
agreement. Discounts are applied to the license fee paid from the partner to 
Microsoft, before adding the partner’s profit margin to arrive at the final cost to the 
customer. In other words, the partner’s profit margin is applied to the net license fee 
after discounts. Partners also receive tables and objects “for free” in return for paying 
Microsoft a portion of the sales price. 
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The standard maintenance fee is 16% of the license fee. The partners receive a margin 
of 25% on the maintenance fee. Partners can charge more than 16% if they offer 
additional value-added services. Partners are responsible for supporting customers 
directly. 
One issue raised by the partners is that there is no standard price established for add-
ons, and therefore partners have free reign in establishing add-on prices. Partners 
suggest that there is a need for a pricing policy which takes into account the total cost 
to the customer – including the core application plus add-ons. In addition, there is no 
established model for sharing revenue either between Microsoft and the partner who 
creates the add-on, or between partners. Price has to be negotiated in each instance 
and in each new country when a partner wishes to use a particular add-on.  
Similar to Dynamics licenses, the add-ons are charged per user. The problem is that 
under the current scheme, the price is designed to include the full functionality of 
NAV. For many add-ons, the customers do not need the full functionality of NAV in 
order to use the add-on.  There is a similar problem for maintenance and support, 
which is charged as a percentage of the total price of the NAV and add-on package. 
8.5 Recruiting  
Recruiting and training are two topics which are closely related. According to the 
partners interviewed, if there were more trained consultants in the market, recruiting 
would be less of a problem. Also, once an employee is recruited, the general lack of 
personnel trained in Dynamics in the market means that it may take over six months 
for the average employee to be fully trained and productive, and therefore billable to 
clients.  
Microsoft is trying to grow the ERP market by 25% every year, but the shortage of 
consultants contributes to salary inflation and also can produce projects with 
problems. Also, the rapid growth of the market means that there is a greater need for 
consultants than in a stable market. As much as half of a partner’s workforce is 
contracted on a freelance basis in order to meet market demands, to make up for 
employees who are not as efficient as they should be, and to cover worker attrition.  
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Several partners also hire consultants with experience with other competitors’ 
solutions (SAP, BAAN, etc.) 
In discussing recruiting (and training) it is important to differentiate between technical 
people and consultants. Technical training can be given fairly easily, while finding and 
training consultants is more difficult. One technique used by a large partner is to 
recruit “business experts” with experience in a particular industry segment, then train 
them in the technical aspects of Dynamics.  
8.6 Training of Consultants  
Training is handled by external centers, certified by Microsoft, which are managed by 
third parties. However, many feel that this should be handled internally by Microsoft 
employees with extensive field experience, or at the very least monitored more 
closely. The main problem with this external training model is that it creates a conflict 
of interest for these “training centers”, who also provide other Dynamics services such 
as programming support for other partners, creation and implementation of add-ons, 
and Dynamics implementations.  Previously, training was conducted (and paid for) by 
Navision, and the partners hired these professionals. Currently the partners providing 
the training are often competitors of the partners who need their employees trained. 
In addition, the training centers charge high fees for training services, since this is a 
significant revenue stream for them. As a result, not only do partners need to recruit 
people in a separate process, they often train them internally rather than the 
alternative of paying their competitors high fees for training services, and risking losing 
their employees to said competitor. 
Another criticism of the training programs is that they primarily address technical 
skills; there is a lack of training focused on “business” skills. Finally, while Microsoft has 
made some efforts to increase the number of training programs, primarily focusing on 
universities, there is still as shortage of well-trained consultants, both technical 
personnel as well as those with a business focus. The overall market would benefit 
from greater investment and attention from Microsoft in this area. 
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8.7 Activation of Partners  
In general, partners are only able to run a profitable business once they reach a certain 
size. According to the partners interviewed, they become profitable when they have at 
least 15 people. Therefore, new partners have a very difficult time getting started.  In 
many cases these partners may be aware of the technical aspects of Dynamics as 
applied to a particular industry segment, but may need help learning how to handle 
the business issues. 
Partner Activation Centers are external entities whose function is to activate partners.  
In each training area, the partner comes in for a day and leaves with a business plan. 
They also do specific workshops. The Partner Activation Centers help the new partners 
on a practical level by participating in the sales process, helping to close a deal for 
example. They also help on a practical level by participating in implementations. 
However, they only sell services to partners, not to end clients. The client sees them as 
part of the partner’s team.  They are evaluated by Microsoft based on a comparison of 
partner sales before and after training. 
This is another area, similar to training and recruiting, where Microsoft has allowed 
external parties to provide the service. However, like those other areas, there is a 
potential conflict of interest here, since these companies who are given the label 
“Partner Activation Center” are also certified Dynamics partners who provide other 
services, including development of verticals and Dynamics. So in the end, they are in 
competition with the new partners on some level. The research team was only able to 
interview one Partner Activation Center. Further research is recommended in order to 
gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of the model. 
8.8 Relationship Between Partners 
The general consensus from the partners interviewed was that there is more 
competition than cooperation between the partners, and that this atmosphere is 
encouraged by Microsoft. One partner stated “If you ask a partner who their biggest 
competitor is, they’ll say ‘another partner’”. The implication is that there is more 
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competition between partners offering Microsoft Dynamics than with competitors 
offering other software packages, like SAP or Oracle. 
Collaboration between partners seems to work best in situations where one partner 
needs special expertise for a particular project, and creates a joint venture with 
another specialized partner. However, the large partners do not have any incentive to 
help a small partner grow. Microsoft has helped the Partner Activation Centers create 
programs to help smaller partners, but other than that there is a lack of guidelines to 
help structure relationships between partners.  
 
The perception is that currently Microsoft does not get involved at all in the 
relationships between partners. This is in contrast to the approach taken by Navision, 
who actively helped partners to connect and thereafter moderated disputes. Microsoft 
does not do this, in part for practical considerations: there are many more partners 
with Dynamics than there were under Navision. However, there has been a general 
request that Microsoft should create some basic rules for collaboration between 
partners. 
On an international level, there are more incentives for partners to work together. AX 
has an organization called AXPACT and NAV has an organization called Partner Power. 
AXPACT is an association of international partners, who contact each other for 
international projects, and each partner performs its part of the project. Partner Power 
is more organized – there is a lead country which brings the project to the group and is 
incentivized to implement it. Each partner gets a percentage of each of the projects in 
the various countries. Within this structure, partners are incentivized to perform the 
implementation and to become the lead partner. Those partners who just perform 
their potion of the project but do not make the marketing or sales investment receive 
smaller margins because their costs are lower.  
8.9 Certification of Partners  
In order to represent Microsoft Dynamics products, partners must have certain 
certifications in various areas (technological, functional, by product, etc.), which are 
handled through training centers run by third parties (certified by Microsoft). 
Page 208 de 245 
 
Microsoft measures the partners/countries based on the number of certified 
personnel. One large partner suggested that they are not interested in certifying their 
employees because once they do, their employees are worth more in the market. They 
claimed that once employees become certified they become more difficult to retain. 
As a result, they resist certifying their people and only do the minimum required by 
Microsoft. Microsoft would like to say “we have 2,000 people certified in Dynamics in 
Spain” but it is very difficult to achieve because of this disincentive. However, it should 
be said that the information gathered in this initial stage of research is anecdotal in 
nature, and further research is recommended in order to assess the impact of the 
certification process. 
8.10 Localization  
Localization affects three main areas: translation, legal requirements, and local 
business practices. There are many differences between countries, including: different 
criteria of boundaries, differences between the amount of new regulations and their 
frequency, etc. It is difficult to manage the localizations at the global level, continent 
level, country level, and even regional level. 
MS develops Dynamics in a centralized way, which makes it difficult to comply with the 
legal and regulatory requirements of the individual countries. Microsoft tries to 
integrate the local regulations of each country into their software, but there are always 
areas which are lacking, which need improvement, or which have errors.  Therefore, 
partners tend to fill in the gaps with their own solutions. These partner localizations 
are different from each other, and not necessarily compatible. However, there is no 
system in place for sharing these solutions between partners on a national, or even 
regional, level. As a result, most partners have the standard version of Dynamics and 
their own “standard plus” version. This becomes a point of differentiation, where 
partners may claim that their standard plus is better than the others.  
8.11 Partner Monitoring  
One promising initiative is Productivity Centers (e.g. Centro de Productividad in 
Manresa). These focus on all Microsoft products including Dynamics, and offer 
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benchmarks to customers and partners. The Microsoft Productivity Center helps 
partners to improve communication levels, trains partners, assists with project 
implementation, and provides sales training. The main objective is to demonstrate 
how partners can integrate various technologies in order to increase customer value.  
The Productivity Center in Manresa is leading an initiative to measure ROI on projects, 
and also benchmarks projects in different countries. 
However, currently there does not appear to be much in the way of quality evaluation 
of implementation projects. According to the partners interviewed, there is 
tremendous pressure to sell licenses, but little focus on the results of the 
implementation such as schedule, budget, whether the customer achieves the planned 
benefits, and overall customer satisfaction. There appears to be a disconnect here that 
would benefit from further research: while Microsoft insists that they are measuring 
quality and checking customer references, the partners insist that the focus is on 
quantity not quality, and on short-term rather than long-term results. This is a key area 
to investigate, since unsatisfied customers can hurt the channel in the long run.  
8.12 Methodology (Sure Step)  
Microsoft is very active in developing the Sure Step implementation tool. Microsoft 
sees Sure Step as an important way to control quality in the market. SureStep could 
also be a useful tool to help with scope management, a key factor in reducing TCO. 
However, most partners are currently using their own methodologies, many of which 
are based on tools from Navision which the partners have continued to modify and 
develop on their own. At the time of this research, the methodologies that Microsoft is 
rolling out are in version 1.0 and will need significant modification. Nevertheless, a 
single methodology for all partners and clients seems to appeal to partners in general. 
Microsoft is expected to release the next version in the very near future, and is 
considering making the use of Sure Step mandatory as part of the partner certification 
process. 
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8.13 Product Updates (roadmap)  
The main issue with product updates is that there is a lack of a roadmap for Dynamics, 
which would keep partners informed as to upcoming changes in future versions. 
Partners are responsible for keeping their vertical solutions compatible with the latest 
version of Dynamics, but not knowing where the product is going makes this more 
difficult and expensive. 
8.14 Partner Levels 
Microsoft has an internal classification of partners in three categories based on 
revenues: 
Top, Core and Emerging. Top partners may be national or international, while Core and 
Emerging are usually national. Top and Core partners are assigned a dedicated partner 
account manager (PAM), while Emerging partners may access the services of Partner 
Activation Centers in order to develop their businesses. There are public partner levels 
as well: Registered, Certified and Gold Certified. However, this is not an area which the 
partners emphasized in the interviews, and therefore additional research would be 
required to analyze the effectiveness of this classification scheme. 
8.15 Sales Support from Microsoft  
One of the primary impediments to growing the Dynamics channel is that more 
experienced partners who have the best possibilities for growth often are not as 
motivated to grow their businesses as quickly as Microsoft would like. They are often 
more experienced and more cautious, and are satisfied with having a stable, profitable 
business. On the other hand, new partners are more driven to grow since below a 
certain level of activity, their business is not profitable. However, the latter category of 
partners requires more resources and support due to their lack of experience and 
financial resources. To help the larger and more experienced partners to grow, they 
need help with recruiting and training employees and with marketing. An international 
partner also expressed a need for greater “financial flexibility”, which they defined as 
extending more generous terms to fast-growing partners in order to help them with 
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short-term cash flow issues. The smaller partners are supported by the Partner 
Activation Centers, but we were unable to confirm the effectiveness of this model 
during this initial research phase.  
The consensus from partners is that Microsoft focuses very much on the short-term. 
While medium- to large-size partners are assigned a partner account manager (PAM), 
these individuals tend to be very focused on short-term license sales and not on 
helping the partners to grow their businesses profitably. The function of the PAM is 
important as an aggregator of information, but there is a need for a more strategic 
partner advisor who would be able to make recommendations to partners on how to 
grow their business, what to change, provide special assistance, etc. 
8.16 Marketing and Branding  
While this was not an important focus area for the partner interviews, it was 
mentioned that the Microsoft brand is strong and there is generally a strong 
recognition of the consolidated position of Microsoft in the market. Microsoft engages 
in various types of co-marketing campaigns with partners where the cost is shared 
between Microsoft and one or more partners. They also conduct campaigns to focus 
on certain vertical markets. However, the general consensus is that these initiatives 
are mostly tactical in nature, and that there is a need for a more integrated, strategic 
marketing program in Europe in general and in Spain in particular.  
8.17 Technical Support and Maintenance  
Technical support and maintenance is another area which needs further investigation, 
but the initial comments were that Microsoft charges partners for support, but adds 
limited value. The partner is responsible for supporting the customer directly, and this 
can often be costly to manage. 
8.18 Tools (e.g. PartnerSource) 
The PartnerSource portal is an extranet where partners manage all of the information 
related to their relationship with Microsoft including the status of their certifications, 
technical support (by partner level – registered, certified, gold certified), revenues, 
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add-ons, etc. Most partners claimed that while Partner Source contains all the 
necessary information it is very difficult to find the information that you need. It is also 
difficult to find partner’s solutions. Finally, the Microsoft web site is not viewed as a 
source for new customers, because it is very difficult to identify a partner with the 
solution that the customer wants. New customers usually come from the partner’s 
sites. 
8.19 Training of Customers  
This is an area which could potentially have a high impact on customer satisfaction, 
since it was revealed by Microsoft that only about 5% of the Dynamics licenses sold are 
in use, which could be caused by part by an insufficient level of user training. However, 
this was not a significant area of focus in the initial study, and would require further 
research. 
9 ANALYSIS AND SELECT QUOTES FROM 3GERP INTERVIEWS IN SPAIN 
9.1 Abstract: 
Important quote from Microsoft: “At the end of the day however, it all comes back to 
Microsoft, because it is MS software”. However, a tremendous amount of autonomy is 
given to partners and external service providers (training, recruiting, partner 
activation) in terms of how they customize the software and run their business. 
Meanwhile, there is very limited quality control and monitoring by Microsoft, whether 
in terms of software development, implementations, or technical support. In addition, 
there is very little Microsoft involvement in the relationships between partners. 
Microsoft’s monitoring efforts are primarily focused on the number of licenses sold. 
This is a very risky strategy since, as mentioned above, at the end of the day it all 
comes back to Microsoft. The general consensus is that Microsoft is very focused on 
generating license sales in the short-term, but does not get involved in helping 
partners craft strategies for long-term growth and development of their businesses.  
Verticals are an important area for potentially reducing TCO, but Microsoft currently 
does not manage this area very well – there is very little structure around how add-ons 
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are created, maintained, and shared between partners. Microsoft sees SureStep as an 
important way to control quality in the market, but it is a very new methodology, and 
has not yet been widely adopted by the partners. Most of the larger partners have 
developed and are using their own methodology. SureStep could also be a useful tool 
to help with scope management, a key factor in reducing TCO.  
9.2 Interviews Included: 
 Name Company/Position Purpose Date Int.  Analysis 
1 Eva Sachse Senior Product 
Manager, Channel 
Development. 
Obtain overview of MS 
verticals certification 
program. Identify 
strengths and 
weaknesses as well as 
barriers to use by 
partners. 
02/01/2008 JW JW 
2 Sven Mortensen Sven is responsible for 
the "Surestep" 
implementation tool 
developed by MS for 
their partners. 
Gain insight into 
Surestep methodology. 
Identifty 
strengths/weaknesses as 
well as factors 
influencing adoption and 
use by partners. 
02/01/2008 JW JW 
3 Joan Vinas Manager of Partner 
Business 
Development, 
Microsoft Spain 
Microsoft 9/27/07 PF & JLC PF 
4 Octavi Busquets 
Balsells, Ferran 
Cabanes Conesa 
General Director and 
Sales Director of IRIS 
(large MS imp. part) 
Partner Interview 10/16/07 PF & JLC PF 
5 Eugeni Rodríguez AFIRMA Partner Interview 12/10/2007 PF & JLC JW 
6 Antoni Mateu y 
Carles Moles 
Marjinsa Partner Interview 12/19/07 PF & JLC JW 
7 Frederic Barberà Olivia Systems Partner Interview 12/27/07 PF & JLC JLC 
8 Tomas Navarro 
Casbas 
Manager of Regional 
Requirements & 
Global Development 
Localization 
Microsoft 01/10/2008 PF & JLC JLC 
9 Miguel Ángel 
Ortuño 
IBDos Partner Interview 01/10/2008 PF & JLC PF 
10 José María 
Sánchez 
Qurius Partner Interview 1/14/08 PF & JLC JLC 
11 Carlos Buil IFR, Lleida Training 
Center 
Microsoft 1/29/08 PF & JLC PF 
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12 Albert Esplugues Manresa Productivity 
Center 
Microsoft 1/29/08 PF & JLC JLC 
 
9.3 Fee Structure 
9.3.1 Fee Structure - General 
Margins are higher than they were under NAV, and Microsoft uses this as an excuse 
when you ask for additional assistance – the response is that it’s already factored into 
the margins. The problem is, due to competition, you start out with a 20% or 30% 
discount. 
What we recommend is that partners pay diagnostic upfront – but customers resist. 
One solution is a hybrid, where we say we do the high level diagnostics is included in 
prices. If we need to go to details, that is payable. The same is true for an 
infrastructure analysis. Another problem is that there are often more than one partner 
involved in the diagnostic phase. So it is hard to force payment in that type of 
competition. 
Price increases are dramatic and the partners have no say in the matter. For example, 
the maintenance fee has just increased from 10%-16%. 
 
The objective of reducing TCO is clear, but this will be difficult to achieve without 
reducing  
partner income compared to what they are earning under the current business model.  
 
Income from Dynamics is less than under Classic products, but the criteria to assign 
resources are the same as for Classics. 
 
Partners need to make up for inefficiencies in the products, which is difficult to do with 
the current margins. 
 
There are fewer CRM projects than ERP projects, so the cost of managing these 
projects is greater than for an ERP project. 
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Revenue is shared between Microsoft and the partners in the following areas: 
software licenses, maintenance, and technical support. 
Microsoft: Well we do provide a legal addendum that they can use, but we do not 
police the contracts between partners - other partners, and customers. They also 
determine the prices. They tell us the price and we put it in the system. We have to 
believe that our partners understand the local market conditions best. It would be 
impossible for MS to determine these conditions better than them. 
9.3.2 Fee Structure - Software License Pricing: 
For licenses, partners pay Microsoft and bill the customer directly, receiving a margin 
between 35% and 50%. 
Licenses are generally charged on a per-user basis on a sliding scale based on volume. 
Licenses may be covered under a VPO (volume purchase order), or multi-site 
agreement.  
9.3.3 Fee Structure - Maintenance Fee Pricing: 
The standard maintenance fee is 16% of the license fee. The partners receive a margin 
of 25% on the maintenance fee. Partners can charge more than 16% if they offer 
additional value-added services. 
Discounts are applied to the license fee paid from the partner to Microsoft, before 
adding the partner’s profit margin to arrive at the final cost to the customer. In other 
words, the partner’s profit margin is applied to the net license fee after discounts. 
Partners are responsible for supporting customers directly. 
Licenses are paid once (per user). Upgrades and maintenance is paid yearly. This is a 
standard pricing model. If the partner goes out of business, then the customer only 
pays maintenance fees to MS. 
Partners also receive tables and objects “for free” in return for paying Microsoft a 
portion of the sales price. 
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9.3.3.1 Fee Structure - Add-on Pricing 
There’s no general price established for add-ons. There should be a policy that takes 
into account the total cost to the customer – including the core application plus add-
ons.  
In addition, there is no established model for sharing revenue between Microsoft and 
the partner who creates the add-on, nor between partners. Price has to be negotiated 
in each instance and in each new country when a partner wants to use a particular 
add-on.  
The add-ons are charged per user. The problem is that under the current scheme, the 
price is designed to include the full functionality of NAV. For many of the products, the 
customers do not need the full functionality of NAV.   
There is a similar problem for maintenance and support, which is charged as a 
percentage of the total price of the NAV and add-on package. 
9.4 Recruiting 
 
9.4.1 Recruiting - General 
Recruiting and training are two topics which are closely related. If there were more 
trained consultants in the market, recruiting would be less of a problem. Also, once an 
employee is recruited, the general lack of training in the market means that it may 
take over six months for this employee to be fully trained and productive, and 
therefore billable to clients.  
MS is trying to increase the ERP market 25% every year but there is a lack of 
consultants, this situation increases the inflation of salaries and also can produce 
projects with problems. Also, the market is rapidly growing so the need of consultants 
is higher than in a stable market.  
As a result, there is a lack of qualified resources, causing an increase in salaries that 
becomes an impediment to growth. What Microsoft needs to do is inject more 
qualified people into the market through training. Navision understood this well, and 
opened up their calendar of courses to both their partners as well as those distributing 
to their partners. However, Microsoft’s policy has always been to outsource training, 
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letting anyone manage it, which means that they end up not being responsible for 
anything.  The problem is in the end it becomes Microsoft’s problem directly.  
Partners need contract 50% of their workers to support the growth of the market, 
people who are not as efficient as they should be, and also to cover worker attrition.  
Several partners also hire consultants with experience with other competitors 
solutions (SAP, BAAN, …) 
It takes over 6 months from the time a worker is hired until they are fully trained and 
productive, and therefore billable.  
9.4.2 Recruiting - Microsoft Support 
Microsoft also invests to help partners recruit qualified employees, working with 
various regional governments. For example, Microsoft has started a “Plan Emplea” in 
Spain to train more resources, focusing primarily on universities and a series of 
courses. However, they haven’t yet arrived to the next logical step of creating a well-
funded Resource Training University. This would allow the partners to achieve lower 
salaries, which is what’s really hurting them. Because they still haven’t yet reached the 
level that they had under Navision.  
9.4.3 Recruiting – Type of Resource 
In discussing recruiting (and training) you need to differentiate between technical 
people and consultants. Technical training can be given fairly easily, while finding and 
training consultants is more complicated. Some Swedes came to visit us and told us 
that in Sweden they don’t try to hire consultants experienced in a tool similar to 
Navision. Instead, they look for Business Experts, with experience in pharmaceuticals 
for example, then they train them in the technology. In the end, when it comes to 
consulting, their experience is more valuable.  
9.5 Training of Consultants 
9.5.1 External Training Centers 
Training is handled by external centers, certified by Microsoft, which are managed by 
third parties, but many feel that this should be handled internally by Microsoft 
employees with extensive field experience. The main problems with this external 
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training model is that it creates a conflict of interest for these “training centers”, who 
also provide other Dynamics services such as programming support for other partners, 
creation and implementation of add-ons, and Dynamics implementations.  Previously, 
training was done (and paid for) by Navision, and the partners hired these 
professionals. Now, training is done by external partners, who are often competitors of 
the partners who need trained people, and who charge a lot since this is a significant 
revenue stream for them. So, not only do the partners need to find people in a 
separate process, they often train them internally rather than the alternative of paying 
their competitors a lot of money for training their employees, with the added risk 
losing their employees to said competitor. 
 
The external training model works well for “classic” products, but does not seem to 
work as well for more complex products like Dynamics. Perhaps the model needs to be 
redefined to take into account the complexity of Dynamics, combining technical 
product knowledge with field implementation experience. Oracle, for example, uses 
their consulting resources to train channel partners. 
IFR is one of the external training partners. IFR has initiatives to train the students at 
the University of Lleida in Axapta. Microsoft recruited one or two students to train at 
their development center in Denmark for a year. They went through a selection 
process, but in the end no one ended up going. But there have been very few courses – 
one course during the year and one in the summer. The courses are focused on 
programming, not implementation. 
IFR also does implementations, primarily of AX. They also do programming for other 
Microsoft partners, but claim that they have a lot of difficulty recruiting people. They 
maintain a “Software Factory”, developing solutions using AXAPTA, 50% for their own 
implementations, and 50% for external Dynamics partners. They also develop their 
own Vertical solutions. 
The goal of IFR is to train students, hopefully one or two go to Denmark for extra 
training, and then to hire them to work in IFR. 
IBDos: Under NAV the training was done internally, and each year I would say “I need 
10 people, or I need 20”, and they’d send them to me. It’s only recently that Microsoft 
has changed this to an external model, where existing partners add Training to the 
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services they offer. However, the partners doing the training are my competitors, and 
if I send my people there… In addition, the training ends up being very expensive. This 
isn’t like what we used to have, where Navision or Microsoft said “I’m going to train 50 
people this year, how many do you need?” and they would give me 10 or 15 without 
my having to pay. This was a very neutral system because Navision was doing the 
training. What you can’t do is let a partner earn money providing training services. 
For example, there’s a company called Hability which does the training. Originally, they 
were going to find people and train them, and then if you wanted this person you paid 
for them. However, now you need to find a person and send them there for training 
when you’re not sure yet if this person is worth the investment. You pay high fees for 
the training, and it’s only later that you see if this person was worth the investment.  I 
prefer to train the people myself, and maybe they’ll work out for me or not. But it will 
always be cheaper for me to train my own people than to send them to someone who 
earns money doing the training.  
9.5.2 Training – Type of Resource 
The training programs primarily address technical skills, but there is a lack of training 
focused on “business” skills.  It’s very difficult to find well-trained technicians. 
IBDos: In discussing recruiting (and training) you need to differentiate between 
technical people and consultants. Technical training can be given fairly easily, while 
finding and training consultants is more complicated. Some Swedes came to visit us 
and told us that in Sweden they don’t try to hire consultants experienced in a tool 
similar to Navision. Instead, they look for Business Experts, with experience in 
pharmaceuticals for example, then they train them in the technology. In the end, when 
it comes to consulting, their experience is more valuable.  
9.5.3 Training – Microsoft Support 
Microsoft has made investments in local university programs, but they are more 
focused on developing consultants rather than technicians. For much of the work, 
university training isn’t necessary. IRIS prefers well-trained technicians. These are less 
expensive and more effective. 
 
Page 220 de 245 
 
There is a general lack of actions to train new consultants and programmers by MS. 
They need to improve the business focus. 
9.6 Vertical Solutions and Add-ons 
9.6.1 Add-ons - General 
Partners can create what are called “add-ons”, or custom solutions for a particular 
vertical. The partner who creates the add-on is the owner of the solution. 
These add-ons are first registered by Microsoft once they have been implemented 
with a minimum of 10 customers and have passed Microsoft’s quality control. Once 
registered, add-ons must meet certain requirements to become certified by Microsoft.  
All work required to develop the add-on, and to get it registered and certified is paid 
for by the partner. 
Once an add-on is registered and certified, the partner negotiates a revenue-sharing 
agreement for further installations of the add-on. Normally, the partner receives 
between 60 and 80 percent of the revenue, and Microsoft receives the remainder. 
Add-ons are shared with other partners, locally and internationally, and the fee 
distribution is negotiated individually with each partner. 
The investment needed is too high compared to the eventual benefit since the partner 
absorbs all costs related to development, registration, certification, and compatibility 
with new version of Dynamics. 
The problem is that the small to midsize partners who regional or national neither 
have the size to dedicate programmers to developing vertical solutions, nor do they 
have enough implementations to amortize the cost of developing the solutions. 
The problem right now is lack of volume of demand for the verticals (add-ons), 
because each one is so specific. 
 
Since add-ons include any kind of additional functionality for Dynamics, they can 
include anything from a small localization application, to a horizontal application like 
taxation, to a full-blown industry vertical. The problem is the terms “add-on” and 
“vertical” are used almost synonymously.   
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9.6.2 Add-ons - Number of Verticals 
Microsoft has decided to allow as many verticals in the market as the partners wish to 
create. So, there can be 200 construction verticals. And none of these verticals have 
any particular seal of quality to say that this is the definitive, recommended 
construction vertical. This is Microsoft’s philosophy, and, as a result, they don’t make 
any investment, or they don’t have to make an investment. They can’t say “since 
you’re investing in developing verticals, I’ll give you financial assistance”, because 
they’d have to do the same for everyone. 
The concept of “vertical” is poorly defined in Dynamics, and not well-understood by 
partners. There really should be 4 or 5 broad verticals in Catalonia, but instead there 
are about 300. The add-ons are too narrowly defined, and therefore aren’t true 
verticals. 
The situation where each partner creates their own verticals is a way for them to 
differentiate one from another, but in the end there are many versions of a particular 
vertical for a client to choose from, and in the end the client ends up paying for the 
costs of development. Having Microsoft putting their seal of approval on a handful of 
partner solutions in each vertical segment would result in lower TCO for the client and 
greater standardization, but it would mean less differentiation for each partner. 
Microsoft would also have to compensate the partners for their versions of the 
verticals. So, while it would mean lower fees for the partners, it would also mean 
lower investment in product development. 
Microsoft does not directly certify the vertical solutions – they allow partners to create 
add-ons. Microsoft doesn’t manage this process, or help the partners to develop the 
verticals. 
 
9.6.3 Add-ons - Certification 
The certification program is based on all solutions for MS Dynamics. Currently there 
are tests for AX, NAV, GP. Coming soon are SL and CRM. We are also working with the 
mobile team and the entrepreneur team. We have 16 solutions currently certified. This 
is not many, but we began the program in July 2007, and it does take some time to 
have the partners certify the solutions.  
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Certification consists of 5 criteria: 
1. Solution test 
2. 10 customer references 
3. Solution profiled in solution finder system 
4. Service plan with MS (access to training material/source code) 
5. Must be on highest level of partner plan (gold certified) 
Getting to Gold status is difficult, but by completing the other requirements, you help 
yourself on the way. Hence, obtaining solution certification reinforces achieving Gold 
status. 
The customers tell us that the solution test and the customer references are the 2 
most difficult criteria. The solution is completed by 3rd party company Veritest. Testing 
process emphasizes 25 different components. It is primarily a compatibility test – that 
it is compatible and functions with the Dynamics solutions. That it also uses similar 
developments, that the user interface is similar, etc. The way we test business 
functionality is the 10 customer references; a market validation (I am willing to 
recommend solution to other customers). The solution needs to be running on the 
latest or second latest version of the software.  
Competitors have similar testing requirements, but few have the issue of customer 
references and certification. The partners like it because it is a manner in which they 
can differentiate themselves. They receive a ranking in the Dynamics solution finder. 
They also come into the MS Dynamics Solution catalogue. In the future we will only 
have marketing resources for certified solutions. We believe that the partners gain an 
ROI of 10 if they go through this certification process. This is most relevant for larger 
international partners that can leverage sales across a larger market. 
However, the certification does not necessarily only for large partners. It is for existing 
solutions that have been there for 2-3 years. Our target is 500 solutions by end of 
2008. (1 solution sold in 10 countries is 10 solutions). So 80-100 solutions. Testing 
process takes 3-4 weeks. Veritest is world-wide. 
The partner owns the solution. So officially MS does not have an official commitment 
to the customer. However, it always comes back to MS anyway. We make the test 
difficult on purpose. We had an easier test before, and hence had very limited value.  It 
is the partner’s responsibility to explain who owns what. The partner will always have 
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access to the source code. It could be an issue that partners can disappear, but this is 
one goal of the certification process – to prove longevity of the partner.  We cannot 
police everything that they do. There are no requirements for training for partners. 
You cannot test for the business functionality of the product. It is totally impossible. 
This is why we require the 10 customer references – let the market speak. Veritist asks 
for 5 scenarios when they do scripted testing of the product.   
There is another program called MDIS (Microsoft Dynamics Industry Solutions) which 
are exclusively for AX. This is really more of an OEM program. Their solutions are on 
the MS pricelist and MS has support responsibility. MS owns responsibility and support 
obligations. This is a new program. These solutions are not certified. The producers of 
these products are invited; it is not open for many. It is a very select group -  and the 
testing validation is far more rigorous. We look at their financial data, etc. 
For the regular certification program we have 30-40 involved in testing and 30-40 in 
certification process. But we have a mid-April cutoff to get into the catalogue.  
IBDos comment: For years IBDos didn’t believe in certifying verticals because without 
certification, they were dependent on the implementer for changes and upgrades. 
However, certification protects the code and only Microsoft has the key. So in the end 
the certification protects the partner who developed the vertical. But it benefits the 
partner more than the customer. 
Partner comment: Add-ons can be certified as “Dynamics Compliant” by a 3rd party by 
paying a large amount of money (14.000) and by complying with some basic standards. 
There is a discount for finishing the certification in an absurdly short period of time. If 
they agree to the add-on, there are given certain development object for free. 
However, if a customer changes partners, there are no clear rules for how MS should 
handle the situation.  
9.6.4 Add-Ons – Microsoft Support 
There is no support for selling Add-ons through partners, there isn’t a model to help 
partners to sell or buy add-ons from other partners. 
Page 224 de 245 
 
There is a clear necessity to establish a process to validate Vertical Solutions and Add-
ons by MS, something like a quality certificate to put order between the vertical 
solutions and add-ons that are now in the market. 
There is a necessity to establish a clear classification over the Vertical Solutions and 
Add-ons based on how these solutions use NAV.  
There is a lack of price politics with Vertical Solutions and Add-ons. 
There is a lack of actions to show potential customers what the vertical solutions are. 
There is a risk in technological changes to adapt Vertical Solutions and Add-ons and 
partners need to mitigate. 
Partners have to develop Vertical Solutions and Add-ons over the different products. 
 
Since it the evolution of products is not clear, partners invest in solutions with no 
future or with a lot of competition, and they are competing in the same accounts with 
similar solutions.  
For the large partners, there is significant marketing support for vertical solutions. 
When a customer asks for a vertical solution, Microsoft just shows the catalog – they 
don’t make any effort to rate, or to assess the quality, pricing, etc. of one vertical vs. 
another. 
9.7 Relationship Between Partners 
9.7.1 Relationship Between Partners – General 
There is more competition than collaboration, and this is encouraged by MS. For 
example, some ex-employees of one partner consulted opened their own new 
business, and MS helped them with this.  
One partner was recently audited by MS. 3 people came and looked at their operations 
for the last 3 years.  They were told that they were being audited, but nothing was 
found. They were given very little information about the audit, and learned little from 
it. They also did not know if they were the only ones being audited.  
Where collaboration between partners can work is in situations where you need 
special expertise for a particular project, and you create a joint venture with another 
specialized partner. However, the large partners don’t have any incentive to help a 
small partner grow. Microsoft has helped Afirma create programs to help smaller 
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partners, but other than that there’s a lack of guidelines to help structure relationships 
between partners.  
 
9.7.2 Relationship Between Partners – Microsoft Support 
 
“If you ask a partner who their biggest competitor is, they’ll say ‘another partner’”. The 
implication is that there is more competition between partners offering Microsoft 
Dynamics than with competitors offering other software packages, like SAP or Oracle. 
MS needs to create some basic rules for collaboration between partners. Currently 
they do not get involved at all. Navision used to do this in a much better way; they 
actively helped partners to connect and thereafter moderated disputes. MS does not 
do this. Under Navision, everyone understood the rules of conduct. 
There are too many Dynamics partners in Spain competing for too few clients: “If there 
are 3 Dynamics partners competing for the same work, Microsoft always wins.”  
Microsoft should place a limit on the number of partners. 
Microsoft organization in Spain has very little to offer their partners. They do not 
manage the 200 partners in the channel at all. They propose many new initiatives to 
MS. MS thereafter studies the problem and then finds reasons not to push the 
initiative forward.  
Under Navision, the partner relationships were established in international meetings. 
Instead of there are national meetings it seems that is not enough because partners 
don’t share a significantly number of experiences and solutions. 
There is a problem with the access to the code developed by old partners because new 
ones can take advantage over the work done by old ones, so this affects the 
relationships. Maybe there should be a system to compensate the old ones. 
It seems that partners collaborate because they want to ; MS is not helping them to 
establish the relationship. 
When there is a problem with an end customer and one partner there is a lack of 
procedure on how to solve it. 
Sometimes there are problems with the project, but sometimes there are difficulties 
with the customer, but there is a lack of processes to share it.  
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There are problems with the access to the code when a customer decided to change 
partners, in case that there is a vertical in the project is the worst situation. 
9.7.3 Relationship Between Partners - Add-ons 
The Partner Development Centers help moderate when there is a conflict between the 
developer of a vertical and other partners who want to use the vertical solution. If the 
conflict cannot be resolved, they either bring in a vertical from outside, or they 
develop the vertical solution themselves. 
IBDos claims that they make agreements with other partners who are interested in 
their vertical solutions, but that IBDos does the installation themselves. We don’t let 
others install our products because we can’t trust that they’ll maintain the same level 
of quality. We only allow certain partners in other countries, with whom we have a 
relationship of trust, install our add-ons. 
If I’m a small partner, I would like for a larger partner to offer me a vertical that I can 
sell because I don’t have the resources to make the investment in developing a vertical 
- I’m small, a generalist, and I don’t have that much to offer. As a large partner, 
however, you’ve made the investment in developing the vertical yourself and don’t 
have any intention or incentive to give away your products.  
9.7.4 Relationship Between Partners – International 
On an international level, there are more incentives for partners to work together. AX 
has an organization called AXPACT and NAV has an organization called Partner Power. 
AXPACT is an association of international partners, who contact each other for 
international projects, and each partner performs it’s part of the project. Partner 
Power is more organized – there is a lead country who brings the project to the group 
and is incentivized to implement it. And you get a percentage of each of the projects in 
the various countries. This is the structure that works best – you’re incentivized to do 
the implementation because you want to be the lead partner. Those partners who just 
do their piece of the project and don’t have to make the marketing or sales investment 
receive smaller margins because their costs are lower.  
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9.8 Certification of Partners 
9.8.1 Certification of Partners - General 
Microsoft - We have considered in the next round of partner certification we require 
that they are using Sure Step. But we do not have a clear idea what “using it” means. 
Controlling “use” of Sure Step is difficult. We could say that a requirement for 
certification if there are some escalation cases, we could ask for Sure Step.   Well yes – 
they could “offer” it, which is not the same as using. 
There are no barriers to becoming a Microsoft partner if you comply with their 
certification requirements. For example, they do not limit the total number of partners 
in the channel due to anti-trust regulations. 
In order to represent Microsoft Dynamics products, partners must have certain 
certifications in various areas (technological, functional, by product, etc.), which are 
handled through training centers run by third parties (which are certified by 
Microsoft). 
There are also different levels of certification: Registered, Certified and Gold Certified. 
They have a system for assigning “points” according to the activity of the partner. 
There are two types of certification: certification of partner companies, and 
certification of personnel.  
Microsoft measures the partners/countries based on the number of certified 
personnel. IBDos, for one, doesn’t want to certify their people because once they do, 
their employees are worth more in the market. You make the investment in training 
your people but once they become certified they become more difficult to retain. So 
they resist certifying their people and only do the minimum that’s required by 
Microsoft. Microsoft wants to say “we have 2,000 people certified in Dynamics in 
Spain” but it’s very difficult to achieve. 
The former partners of Navision were accustomed to a lower number of total partners, 
so their relationships with Navision were closer, and also they used to compete less 
with other Navision partners.    
Maybe the relationships with Navision were less regulated but they had more 
flexibility to solve the problems. 
Partners need to operate in a global focus, and they need the MS support. 
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9.9 Localization 
9.9.1 Localization – General 
Localization affects three main areas: translation, legal requirements, and local 
business practices. 
There are a lot of differences between countries, for example: different criteria of 
boundaries, differences between the number and the time to present new laws, etc. 
It’s not easy to manage the localizations at the global level, continent level, country 
level. 
MS develops Dynamics in a centralized way, which makes it difficult to comply with the 
legal and regulatory requirements of the individual countries. So partners fill-in own 
gaps with own solutions  such as sales and payroll taxes and L.O.P.D. (Ley Organica de 
Proteccion de Datos – regulates how personal information is handled.) However, there 
is no system for sharing these solutions on a national level.  
Microsoft tries to integrate the local regulations of each country into their software, 
but there are always areas which are lacking, which need improvement, or which have 
errors. And each partner makes their own changes, but there’s no incentive to share 
this with other partners or even with Microsoft. All of the localizations created by the 
individual partners are different and not necessarily compatible. So all of the partners 
have the standard version of NAV and their own “standard plus” version. This becomes 
a point of differentiation, where partners claim that their standard plus is better than 
the others.  
 
There are differences in partner participation in localizations over the countries. In one 
cases they take part in the decision; this is the case of Partners Network, and not in the 
other cases.  
When MS brought Navision there were differences between the localizations from 
distinct countries. They have made an effort to standardize the “country solutions”, 
and partners don’t realize about it if they don’t work in international projects. 
We didn’t have access to localization statistics because he (Tomas Navarro, Microsoft) 
told us that they are confidential. In our opinion localizations statistics are important 
to show how localizations are adapting the solutions to countries and markets. 
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9.9.2 Localization – Microsoft Support 
There is a difficulty in establish what MS considers a “localization” and also to establish 
priorities between the localizations. It seems that there is a lack of communication 
with partners because there isn’t a localizations roadmap, or if there will be partners 
don’t know anything about it. 
It’s difficult to differentiate what is a “personalization” and what is a “business 
practice” there is a conflict between the final customer and the partner. 
Partners need to know in what localizations MS is working and also when is to be 
supposed to be delivered.  
There is a lot of bureaucracy to manage localizations with partners. 
9.9.3 Localization – Add-ons 
Localization of the add-ons is really a big challenge. Localization across countries is 
difficult. You cannot underestimate the translation of the marketing and 
documentation material either. From the beginning when you design any vertical 
solution you have to decide if it is going to be local or international. 
9.9.4 Localization – Collaboration Between Partners 
In EEUU partners share code between themselves and also with MS, not in Europe. The 
European laws don’t help MS and partners to share code. 
9.10 Activation of Partners 
9.10.1 Activation of Partners - General 
It’s difficult for partners to run a profitable business until they reach a certain size – 
they become profitable when they have at least 15 people. Therefore, it’s very difficult 
for new partners to get started.  In many cases the partners aren’t very large, and 
usually only understand the technical aspects of the vertical, and not necessarily the 
business issues. 
Partner Development Centers exist who have the function of activating partners.  In 
each training area, the partner comes in for a day and leaves with a business plan. 
They also do specific workshops. They help partners on a practical level by 
participating in the sales process, to help close a deal for example. They also help on a 
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practical level with implementations. However, they only sell services to partners, not 
to end clients. The client sees them as part of the partner’s team.  They are evaluated 
by Microsoft based on a comparison of partner sales before and after training. 
It’s difficult to find qualified PDC’s in other countries because it’s not a very profitable 
business.   
Success outside of Spain will depend on how well Microsoft chooses PDC’s; the PDC’s 
need to be skilled in evaluating where the partner needs help, as well as having 
practical skills like helping a partner close a sale. 
In the Spanish market, Microsoft has developed an initiative where emerging partners 
are supported through Partner Activation Centers (centros de activación de partners) 
which are external but which maintain a close relationship with Microsoft. This project 
is called Afirma. 
MS does have consultants working with partners – largely within AX and CRM. They do 
this to bring in MS specific knowledge. Many customers ask to deal with MS explicitly. 
The MS consultants offer additional expertise and knowledge of enterprise platforms 
and infrastructure products (with a handful of AX consultants). They are mostly in the 
USA, but there are others in Munich (about 100 altogether). There are more GP 
consultants in the USA.  
This is another area, similar to training and recruiting, where Microsoft has allowed 
external parties to provide the service. However, like those other areas, there is a 
potential conflict of interest here, since these companies who are given the label 
“Partner Activation Center” are also certified Dynamics partners who provide other 
services, including development of verticals and Dynamics. So in the end, they are in 
competition with the new partners on some level.  
9.11 Partner Monitoring 
There is no quality evaluation of implementation projects. There is a pressure on 
selling but not in the results of the implementation. 
The experienced partners who began their businesses 20 years ago and have general 
directors who are a bit older tend the react badly to the extreme pressure from 
Microsoft to grow. The general consensus is that Microsoft is too focused on selling 
licenses and not on the final client solution. 
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Productivity Centers (e.g. Centro de Productividad in Manresa). These focus on all 
Microsoft products including Dynamics, and offer benchmarks to customers and 
partners. The MS Productivity Center is helping partners in the increase of the speech 
level, training partners, helping partners in projects, and sales training. The main 
objective is showing how they can integrate different technologies to increase the final 
value.  
 
MS Productivity Center is leading an initiative to measure ROI in projects, and also 
benchmarking different projects in different countries. 
Microsoft does extensive, random customer surveys 
In the Spanish market (perhaps in other countries as well) there is a person dedicated 
to verifying customer references as well as testing project quality. 
Microsoft does not specifically keep track of partner performance such as variance 
analysis on project hours estimated vs. actual, budgeted cost vs. actual, etc. 
Microsoft is too focused on sales of licenses. Every month there is tremendous 
pressure from Microsoft for the partners to report results. 
The emphasis is on quantity not quality, and on short-term not long-term results. 
Most partners are losing money due to this excessive pressure and short-term focus. 
Microsoft: User acceptance tests can be done in a simple, generic fashion to a certain 
level: Have you trained key users? Have you migrated certain amounts of customer 
data? Have business processes been included in process scope? Are key processes 
tested (order entry, etc). 
In the event that the current partnership disbands, MS will go in and try and find 
another partner for them. In theory there should be a procedure for what should 
happen if their implementation partners go out of business. The ultimate insurance 
that the customer has is that he has access to the source code, so you can always find 
someone to work on the system.   
It seems that there are a lot of distance between MS and Partners. Partners don’t clear 
know what the role of the subsidiary (MS in the country) is. 
The newest partners depend on Afirma (MS outsourcing) as a Activation Partners 
Center, not directly to MS.  
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Microsoft: With Sure Step we have taken the first step in controlling quality in the 
ecosystem. 
Microsoft: There are a number of quality control challenges in the MS ecosystem. 
There are many small partners. We do not really know about how many 
implementations have gone well, and not well. 
9.12 Method (Sure Step) 
9.12.1 Method (Sure Step) – Adoption 
Partners  use methodologies provided by Microsoft when it makes sense. They use 
what they need and ignore what they don’t. Their technicians develop their own tools 
to fill in the gaps of what is lacking from Microsoft. 
 
Most consultants are using their own methodology, and the methodologies that 
Microsoft is rolling out are in version 1.0 and will need a lot of modification. IBDos, for 
example, started with the On Target methodology from Navision, but have been 
modifying and evolving the methodology to suit their needs. A single methodology for 
all partners and clients would be welcome, though. 
Partner:  One methodology that we always do is a prior diagnostic. They charge the 
customer between 8,000 and 24,000 euros for this (about 15% of project cost). 
Partners are not aware of MS methodologies. 
Partners think is difficult to use completely a methodology, because there are 
differences between countries, markets, customers, specialization, etcetera that can 
affect the methodology implementation. 
Former NAV partners are using the old NAV methodology, the pre-analysis is the most 
used. 
It seems in partner’s opinion that Sure Step is developed for projects with a low level 
of customization. 
Microsoft: We now have a software solution test where partners can test their 
software solutions about certain quality requirements. Currently it is just a 
recommendation that they use Sure Step, but in the future it will be a requirement. 
Sure Step released July 1, 2007 version 1. It has been in use for 6 months. Many 
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partners have selected Sure Step, but there is no real way to measure how many are 
using them. We can measure downloads. Sure Step team is driving contact with 
partners to collect cases studies. But we do not have any detailed data. We can only 
know if the partner has a service plan so he is able to download. 
The only statistics we have are who is downloading application. We also talk to 
partners to get a more qualitative sense of what is going on. There has also been some 
pull from customers who say “we have heard that MS has this tool”. So many of our 
larger international partners have changed from their own tool to Sure Step. 
What we hear from partners on the positive side is that it is good to have a method – 
to show to customer. On the negative side, it is still not easy enough to do partner 
customization. Partners can add their own content (descriptions, template). They 
would like a search function. The contents of Sure Step were developed by 
implementation partners. We have talked to over 300 partners in the development 
process.  
If you build up specific tools within the application (NAV) you link them into Sure Step. 
Hence there is some lock-in there. Our desire is to make it easier to include more 
product specific attributes to the tool box.   
The best of our partners use it – the most profitable and successful ones.  We have 
found that older partners are less likely to adopt and use it. They have been successful 
for many years without it. Also it is in English, which limits adoption. Germans might be 
more prone to use it, whereas Spanish ones perhaps not.  
MS does not have a clear indication of ROI for the product. We have limited data on 
the use. We can also look at project escalation rates as some proxy of success of Sure 
Step. We do have specific statistics on escalation cases. We also have figures on class 
training for Sure Step use. They have been successful. Across product lines we see 
more use in AX partners – projects are more complicated.  
9.12.2 Method (Sure Step) – Background 
The Sure Step implementation tool is designed to cover all Dynamix applications (AX 
NAV, GP, etc). But it also has a product specific layer.   
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An upgrade to Sure Step is due Q1 2008. Version 2 scheduled for July 2008. Differences 
between V1 and V2. V2 will be translated into 4 main languages: German, French, 
Spanish and Russian. Feedback will be processed in order to improve Sure Step itself. 
MS has defined a sales methodology as a front end to Sure Step. The link between 
sales and implementation is in Diagnostics. The emphasis in Sure Step is primarily on 
implementation. 
The next step is to identify business processes within the company. Even in small 
companies the business processes can be complex; more complex than the people 
believe. In the diagnostic phase there can arise many processes that require greater 
attention and are not just simple implementations.  Then you have project scoping. 
You have analysis of infrastructure. Can the HW support the system. Then you have 
the project planning. Then you have the proposal management.  
When you look at key deliverables you have preparation, scope planning, analysis of 
business processes, scope statement, infrastructure assessment, project plan including 
costs, and risk analysis. 
In deployment we have go-live plans, configure test system, end-user training, final 
user testing and validation. We recommend training key users very early on. This way 
the key users can be involved in customization questions.  You can also follow a 
traditional waterfall model as well. We recommend that the partner get a sign-off on 
each phase so expectations are met. 
Operation is basically closing the project and transitioning to the owner-operated 
model. It Includes support contract and opportunities for additional business. Project 
management tasks are important. It is important that each individual phase is started 
with planning. The disciplines in project management are risk and scope. Issue 
management, procurement, time and cost, quality management. These are more 
salient in large enterprise management.  
Then we have cross-phase management, which emphasizes inter-dependencies 
between different phases. We have included many templates in application to support 
all phases; Deliverables, statement of work, contracts, etc. 
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There is a clear trade-off between quality control, PM discipline, etc. and speed and 
agility. So what we have tried to do is embrace this flexibility in the tool – via filters 
and project profiles. Partners can use the templates more or less as they like. They 
need to critically look at PM tools. We had a roundtable at Convergence and they all 
had the same problem – scope control. Customer wants everything for no money, 
competition is there so partners do not say no – so consequently, you get scope 
problems. So looking into how to manage scope is one of the biggest challenges of the 
partners as well as the Sure Step application. Some partners have very limited project 
management capabilities.  In Europe, many partners are doing fixed price, were as in 
USA many are using time and materials. 
What we recommend is that partners pay diagnostic upfront – but customers resist. 
One solution is a hybrid, where we say we do the high level diagnostics is included in 
prices. If we need to go to details, that is payable. The same is true for an 
infrastructure analysis.  
Sure Step has phases. It has repeatable processes. Hopefully improving customer 
experience by bringing best practice. Even rapid implementations require some 
methodology to maintain consistent quality. In the mid-market it is an absolute must 
that you have a methodology. As a partner you have to have a methodology. Even the 
small customers require it. The want good software that is cheap and fast. 
We have some phases – from diagnostic to operation. We also want a customer for life 
cycle. Hence we need some for optimization. He we can talk about 2 types of 
optimization: 1) technical such as system and database optimization, and 2) 
optimization for the implementation of other business modules for future product 
sales and upgrades. 
We can do implementation in several ways: a) rapid implementation, and b) more 
thorough analysis and planned implementation. 
From there we can define certain cross-phases that are processes that permeate the 
entire implementation process such as business process analysis, data structures. 
One of the things that many of our partners are weak in is project management skills. 
So we have said that project management must an integrated component. We have 
also defined a number of roles, where we described specific roles and what is expected 
Page 236 de 245 
 
from each, as well as recommended skills. These include consultant roles as well as 
customer roles.  
All of this is embedded in a small application – it is a software application. We have 
phases: Diagnostic, Analysis, Design, Development, Deployment, Operation. Each 
phase has tasks and sub-tasks. Each phase has a plan activity. You have pre-conditions, 
to identify dependencies. Then you have post-conditions and process and deliverables. 
It is a consistent way to look at all phases.  
There are different implementation models. When we talk rapid implementation, we 
have a diagnostic phase, then go directly to deployment and operation. This means we 
cancel analysis, design and development.  We can do this because we define rapid 
implementation as having no custom programming of any kind. It is simply a standard 
implementation. We have simple customizations like forms, invoices, fields, etc. If you 
have more than 1 add-on solution, then you should be careful. If you have a very high 
volume of transactions, then you cannot do rapid implementation (you have 
infrastructure issues). Also if you need 10 years of transactional data, the rapid is out 
of the question.  
What we have done in NAV is to provided them with questionnaires. We have master 
data structures to help with data migration. We have user set-up tools for permissions. 
We have implemented best practices. 
If we look at diagnostics; here we go from sales to implementation. This is a very 
important phase. Here you develop project scope and map – often a customer 
proposal. Also all of the deliverables are defined. You later have to do the transition 
from the sales team to the implementation team. This is a common source of 
problems, as you have the sales team promising everything and then the 
implementation team cannot deliver within the bounds of the agreement.  
Implementation can be done in many ways. A full implementation will typically be 
done by AX – this is the more complex application. It looks like a waterfall, but this can 
vary – it can also run in parallel. Sometimes diagnostic phases should require 
additional analysis. Then you can agree that outcome of analysis phases will determine 
further project definition. Many partners are asking the customer to pay for the 
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analysis up-front, and if project is accepted money is rolled into rest of 
implementation.  
When looking at complex roll-out scenarios, you need to look at how it could be done. 
You can also use a hub and spoke scenario with a core system and add-ons as 
appendages.   
When you look at the application you will see the same model. You are able to set 
some filters. So for example, you define the product (AX, NAV). You can also select the 
project type (small versus complex).  The Sure Step application is very scalable 
between rapid and full implementation. Consultants do have the opportunity to cherry 
pick which exact functions they would like. This is going be emphasized even more in 
version 2; these filtering functions. We have discussed whether this should be web-
based, but there are always connection issues. 
Are we generating paper, or are we parameterizing? Well – this is the ideal, but hard 
to achieve – but something we work for in next version so of the project. There is a risk 
of over-automation, it can ruin project. We have tried to find this balance in role 
definition. Sometimes customers do not expect to have to do anything. So it is 
important to manage expectations – that they have to contribute.   
Partners can add their own scripts. We have spreadsheets and product demo scripts. 
We do not have a cost estimation tool – this might just be too difficult to build. What 
we do have is integrated with MS Project. We now have many product specific filters 
(for example, CRM). So you could go out and say we are going to have a NAV CRM. 
With CRM – the customization level is so high, it is difficult to provide standard 
implementation.  
Within future versions of Sure Step, we can embody specific set-up data and industry 
specific practice into the tool. In this form we can facilitate business specific 
knowledge transfer.  
9.13 Product Updates (roadmap) 
The main issue is that there is a lack of a roadmap for Dynamix, which would keep 
partners informed as to upcoming changes in future versions. Partners are responsible 
for keeping their vertical solutions compatible with the latest version of Dynamix, but 
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since they do not know where the product is going, it is difficult and expensive. The 
partner is also responsible for keeping the vertical consistent with new versions of 
Dynamics. The partners develop an add-on for a specific version of Dynamics, but 
when a new version appears, it is difficult and expensive for the partner to make the 
add-on compatible with the new version. 
 
NAV had new initiatives about marketing, new markets and methodologies. MS does 
not involve their partners at this level of strategy. 
Microsoft: When AX and NAV come with the new release, we need to have a new test 
specification. So if we want them to use Sure Step, this needs to be in test 
specification. But we have not fully figured this out. 
There is no clear message about how to position Dynamics AX and Dynamics NAV. 
There was a message about “convergence” but it is not clear for the market, because it 
does not seem technologically possible.  
The current product placement is punishing NAV because NAV is going to the smallest 
enterprises. 
The distance between partners and developers is getting bigger, so partners have 
difficulties to know what MS is doing, and also where the products are going. It seems 
that there is a lack of communication. 
Partners don’t clearly know where products are going, so partners don’t know if they 
are developing the products in the right way, because new versions of NAV or AX can 
absorb the partner’s developments. 
There is no clear message about the future of MS’s ERP portfolio. 
There is an opportunity to develop a workflow for NAV. 
Microsoft: The real problem is the customizations that are poorly documented. This is 
totally disastrous for the upgrade path. In NAV the source code is fairly accessible and 
Seaside is fairly easy to modify – and this affects the source code. This is the problem. 
This is part of the appeal of the product – NAV is very easy to customize. You can have 
instances with 2 different partners with additional add-ons that are poorly 
documented. Yes, you can just have modifications of the source code to do a simple 
modification that is not documented. The market driver for NAV is that it so easy to 
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customize. Customers feel that it is their software. Our partners always tell us the 
same thing, MS has some problems but the software is great!  
At the end of the day however, it all comes back to Microsoft, because it is MS 
software. 
Software factories don’t have a clear future, since they depend on other partners to do 
business. They don’t add value to MS because they don’t sell licenses.  
9.14 Partner Levels 
There are 175 partners in Spain, of which 15 are classified as gold certified. 
Microsoft internal partner classification (based on sales) 
Partners are classified in three categories based on revenues: 
Top 
Core 
Emerging 
Top partners may be national or international, while Core and Emerging are usually 
national. 
Top and Core partners are assigned a dedicated partner account manager (PAM). 
Microsoft: We are considering requiring higher levels of certification in order to use 
Sure Step. But as of now everyone can use it. We are considering requiring certification 
for future versions. The idea would be to establish some basic requirements for 
knowing how to use it/using it correctly. It is important to stress the differences 
between the different partners. Some of the larger partners will operate completely 
differently than the smaller partners. Especially considering the transition from sales to 
implementation. 
PAMs are providing good partner support. 
9.15 Sales Support from MS 
One of the primary issues has is that more experienced partners who have the best 
possibilities for growth often don’t have as much of a drive to grow, while new 
partners who are more motivated to grow because below a certain level of activity, the 
business isn’t profitable, need more resources and support. To help the larger and 
more experienced partners to grow, they need help with human resources, training, 
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marketing, and more financial flexibility. The smaller partners are helped by the 
Partner Activation Centers, but it is not clear how successful this model has been.  
The focus is very much on the short-term. While medium- to large-size partners are 
assigned a partner account manager (PAM), these people are very sales-focused and 
very short-term focused. Their function is important as an aggregator of information, 
but there’s a need for advisors who are more strategic, who can make 
recommendations to partners on how to grow their business, what to change, provide 
special assistance, etc. 
MS sometimes does telemarketing campaigns, but the results are poor. Moreover, MS 
does not optimize the position of the verticals in Google. 
There is tremendous pressure from MS to generate sales, but MS does not support the 
partners’ sales efforts.  
Solutions Specialists:  experts in various aspects of ERP who help with the sales 
process, especially for large sales. A new initiative that IBDos would like to see grow.  
The two biggest limitations to growth for the biggest partners are finding qualified 
people and financing growth. IBDos commented that for them to double in size 
organically, it would normally take about ten years. However, Microsoft wants them to 
double in two years.  But in order to do so they would need some kind of financial 
assistance. They don’t want a bank, but they would like some flexibility when it comes 
to paying Microsoft. They have to pay their employees right away, often investing in 
training them for up to a year before they see a return on their investment, and there’s 
a lag before they are paid by their clients.  
 
Microsoft puts a lot of pressure for sales, and then creditrans comes to collect, and if 
you’re a day late they cut off your configurator. So the partners feel why should they 
take the risk of growing so fast, when any mis-step could result in Microsoft’s stopping 
their business? So this dichotomy is very negative for the partners. Also, there isn’t one 
voice to deal with – like a Business Advisor type of role. Different people ask for 
different things, constantly pressuring. There isn’t an open forum to discuss the issues 
you have with your business – if you talk about financial issues it feels embarrassing 
because they think you’re asking for a favor or a loan, or business isn’t going well. 
There’s no one to make recommendations on what changes to make in your business 
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in order to be successful, how other partners achieve profitability with a particular 
activity, etc. 
One idea that Microsoft has is that there’s a tendency for partners to grow for a while, 
and then to level out. So, to keep the business growing, they need to constantly add 
new partners.  
9.16 Marketing and Branding 
 
9.16.1 Marketing and Branding – Microsoft Support 
Microsoft engages in various types of co-marketing campaigns with partners where the 
cost is shared between Microsoft and one or more partners. 
Microsoft: We do have industry marketing managers, but the effort is not very 
consistent.  
Microsoft conducts campaigns to help promote certain vertical markets. 
Microsoft also conducts branding campaigns and awareness campaigns for Microsoft 
products. 
Inner circle – partners suggest customers who may be interviewed for testimonials, 
and in return the partners are given “points”. 
There is a serious marketing problem in Europe. Microsoft is targeting potential 
Dynamics customers with direct mail promotions, but they need to do general brand 
building. 
IBDos has found themselves creating marketing events where they pull together 100 
or 150 potential clients. But these companies, when they arrive at the point of 
choosing an implementation partner, request 3 bids and IBDos won’t necessarily be 
the partner chosen. So they end up making the marketing investment for the other 2 
potential implementation partners, something which they consider unfair. Although 
lately Microsoft has been trying to help by providing Marketing Funds. 
Microsoft’s brand is helping partners to sell Dynamics NAV. 
The consolidated position of MS is recognized by the market. 
Now partners have more opportunities, especially access to big deals. 
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There are tactical initiatives related to sales but not strategic, maybe due to on sales 
pressure. 
Forum Indeco is an example of a tactical action with poor results; it isn’t a strategic 
action to improve the products. 
Marketing events are not clearly defined, because partners have the sensation that 
they have to pay for events with a not clear return. 
The awareness about the MS’s portfolio as a complete solution is very well done.  
9.17 Tech Support and Maintenance 
MS charges partners for support, but they (Microsoft) do not add much value. 
As an ISV there is a high level of support when needed. 
Sometimes it’s difficult to access people with the knowledge needed for solving 
technical problems. 
Partner Advantage is less than the normal support with Navision or Baan. 
Sometimes in situations where the level of technical support doesn’t cover the 
partner’s needs, the partner spends a lot of resources to solve the problem, affecting 
their profitability. 
There is a technological focus instead of a business focus, but they can forget the 
integration between different solutions (outlook, Share point, etc.). 
It is difficult to find the real experts on a technological problem. 
9.18 Tools (e.g. PartnerSource) 
 
The PartnerSource portal is an extranet where partners manage all of their information 
related to their relationship with Microsoft including the status of their certifications, 
technical support (by partner level – registered, certified, gold certified), revenues, 
add-ons, etc. 
Partner Source contains all the necessary information but it is very difficult to find the 
information that you need. It’s difficult to find partner’s solutions. It seems that 
Partner source doesn’t have a marketing focus. 
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The MS web site isn’t a source for new customers, because it’s very difficult to find a 
partner with the solution that the customer wants. New customers usually come from 
the partner’s sites. 
Instead of there are solutions for partners, they didn’t realize (for example: workflow 
for NAV).   
Partners find out about new MS initiatives because they attend international meetings 
or meetings with international partners, not by the subsidiary communications. 
There is an initiative called “demo-to-win” to help partners in the presales process. 
The Spanish area for Partner Source is not up-to-date. 
The Partner Program site is huge, and it’s difficult to find information that partners 
want. 
Partners receive very few requests from other partners who found their add-on on the 
Solution Finder website. 
MS on-line web page is very poor. MS methods are designed for generic situations and 
often do not apply to the specific context they apply to. 
9.19 Training of Customers 
Microsoft: We have data on the number of user licenses bought versus the number of 
actual users, and we can see that there are very few people actually using the licenses 
(5%). One reason could be that the user training is insufficient. So there is something 
about the adoption rates that tell us that the software is not being utilized 100%. 
When you have a low adoption rate, there is an increased chance that the customers 
are unsatisfied with the software and that they will switch to other platforms in the 
future. It is a proxy that expectations are unfulfilled. Customers see that 
implementations as expensive and often behind schedule. Sure Step could address the 
training element.  
Microsoft Productivity Center in Manresa is trying to show how technologies can 
increase productivity. Their focus is on business value not on technology. Their focus is 
increase the productivity of users, and then users can increase the organization’s 
productivity. MS Productivity Center is training end customers to show how they can 
increase their own productivity using MS products. 
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9.20 Other issues 
9.20.1 Background:  
Of the major ERP providers in the small and medium enterprise segment, Microsoft is 
one of the few providers which does not sell direct at all, but rather relies exclusively 
on channel partners. Oracle (only part of the channel goes through partners; most of 
the implementations are done by Oracle), SAP, etc. sell direct and through channel 
partners. For small businesses and local solutions, the market is still being defined. 
Most of the providers are addressing this market by buying existing companies or 
solutions to achieve scale in this market. (e.g. Sage, CCS (Spanish market)). 
Important quote from Microsoft: At the end of the day however, it all comes back to 
Microsoft, because it is MS software. However, a tremendous amount of autonomy is 
given to partners and external service providers (training, recruiting, partner 
activation) in terms of how they customize the software and run their business. 
Meanwhile, there is very limited quality control and monitoring by Microsoft, whether 
in terms of software development, implementations, or technical support. In addition, 
there is very little Microsoft involvement in the relationships between partners. 
Microsoft’s monitoring efforts are primarily focused on the number of licenses sold. 
This is a very risky strategy since, as mentioned above, at the end of the day it all 
comes back to Microsoft. The general consensus is that Microsoft is very focused on 
generating license sales in the short-term, but does not get involved in helping 
partners craft strategies for long-term growth and development of their businesses.  
Microsoft sees SureStep as an important way to control quality in the market, but it is 
a very new methodology, and has not yet been widely adopted by the partners. Most 
of the larger partners have developed and are using their own methodology. SureStep 
could also be a useful tool to help with scope management, a key factor in reducing 
TCO. 
9.20.2 Product 
Office integration has a positive effect over pre-sales, sales and implementation. 
The use of .NET is helping partners to integrate solutions. 
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MS is placing their products in different market positioning but partners are selling 
where they can.  
NAV and AX are more usable, it seems the MS effect over the products. 
Now they have new opportunities of cross selling, CRM, outlook, Sharepoint, etcetera. 
There is a risk, Dynamics is more complex and needs more configuration than other 
MS products, and these products are more closely to IT departments than business 
managers. 
9.20.3 Externalization 
There is a difficulty for partners to understand why MS is externalizing: certification, 
training, partners activation, etc.   
9.20.4 Microsoft Services 
 
Sometimes MS need to be the prime contractor to access an account, after that they 
have to subcontract partners, but it’s important to establish the criteria to do it, and 
partners should prepare to afford it. 
9.20.5 Market 
Customers in European market demand higher levels of customization than EEUU. 
 
  
 
  
